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This introductory Chapter provides the essential background to the three essays on 
international migration, which form the main substance of the thesis. This Chapter is 
divided into three sections. Section 1.1 provides an overview of the migration 
phenomenon, with particular focus on the more recent trends in international 
migration. This is followed by a brief overview of the intellectual debates on 
international migration in Section 1.2. The final section sets out the objectives and 
organization of the thesis.  
1.1 The Migration Phenomenon 
 Migration1 has been a constant and influential feature of human history. War, 
famine, political repression, lack of opportunity and employment, and severe 
economic distress have always driven large numbers of people from one specific area 
of the globe to another, and the intermingling of their genes, skills and cultures has 
played a crucial part in human evolution.  
 The phenomenon of migration has supported the process of global economic 
growth, contributed to the evolution of states and societies, and enriched many 
cultures and civilizations. Migrants venture beyond the confines of their own 
community and country in order to create new opportunities for themselves and their 
future generations. As a result, they have often been amongst the most dynamic and 
entrepreneurial members of society.  
                                                
1 ‘Migration’ refers to the act of ‘crossing of a boundary of a political or administrative unit 
for a certain minimum period of time’ (UN DESA, 2009). It includes the movement of 
refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants. Broadly, it can be 
categorized as ‘internal’ (a move from one area (a province, district or municipality) to 




International migration, broadly defined by the United Nations as a 
phenomenon of “territorial relocation of people between nation-states”2, has been 
growing rapidly in terms of numbers, pace, and complexity since the end of Cold 
War3 (UN DESA, 2009; PRB, 2007; Table 1.1). By virtue of its influence on both the 
sending (mostly less developed nations) and receiving (mostly more developed 
nations) societies4, international migration issues have risen to the top of global policy 
agenda.  
The Cold War effectively cut off roughly one-third of the world’s population 
(the populations of former Russia, China, and their various satellite countries) from 
the global market-economy, and mired much of the remaining world (including Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa) in proxy confrontations (Massey, 2003). This not only 
limited cross-border flows of capital, goods, raw materials, and information, but also 
the movement of people across national boundaries, thereby substantively limited the 
potential of globalization.  
 The end of Cold War in early 1990s forced many nations from the Cold War 
                                                
2 Two forms of relocation are excluded from this broad definition. First, a territorial 
movement which does not lead to any change in ties of social membership and therefore 
remains largely inconsequential both for the individual and for the society at the points of 
origin and destination, such as tourism; second, a relocation in which the individuals or the 
groups concerned are purely passive objects rather than active agents of the movement, such 
as organized transfer of refugees from states of origins to a safe haven.  
 
3 The Cold War refers to the phenomenon of prolonged state of conflict, tension and 
competition that existed between a number of world powers, including the United States, the 
Soviet Union, China, France, Britain and those countries’ respective allies from the mid-
1940s to the early 1990s. Throughout this period, the conflict was expressed through military 
coalitions, espionage, weapons development, invasions, propaganda, and competitive 
technological development, which included the space race. The conflict included costly 
defense spending, a massive conventional and nuclear arms race, and numerous proxy wars 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_war).  
 
4 For less developed nations however, domestic migration is often the more common and 
dominant experience due to a host of factors such as common laws and language, lower 
transportation and information costs, etc. International migration is more characteristic of 
high skilled migrants in these countries.  
 
 3 
constraints, which required them to choose between two superpowers, the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. It limited their scope for economic engagement 
with the rest of the global economy, and for pursuing more outward-oriented 
economic policies. The end of Cold War also ushered in the consolidation of stable 
multilateral institutions; the acceleration of free trade agreements (FTAs) (bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral), and the emergence of a new global security regime. While 
international trade and capital flows increased rapidly in the second half of the 
twentieth century, it was not until the 1990s that the world witnessed an upsurge in 
international migration, particularly in skilled labor migration.  
 The upsurge in international labor movements in the recent decades reflects 
among others the changing policy dynamics in countries across the globe following 
the fall of the Iron Curtain5 (Lemaitre, 2005), in conjunction with the growing 
globalization of economic activity. In addition, demographic imbalances between 
developed and developing countries, and large differences in wages have tended to 
encourage the movements of workers from economies where they are in surplus to 
those where they are most in need. 
Contemporary migration, in contrast to earlier pre-Cold-War migratory 
phenomenon, is uniquely related to, and defined by the economic and social 
integration that are collectively known as globalization (IOM, 2008). Though the 
processes of globalization have primarily focused on the expansion or consolidation 
of legal and administrative mechanisms to facilitate the movement of capital, goods 
and services (and not labor), the developments in the transnational movement of these 
factors appear to be largely responsible (directly or indirectly) for the creation of an 
                                                
5 The term ‘Iron Curtain’ refers to the boundary which symbolically, ideologically, and 
physically divided Europe into two separate areas for about five decades, from 1945 to 1990, 
roughly corresponding to the period beginning from the end of Second World War until the 
end of the Cold War.  
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unprecedented labor mobility on a genuinely global scale. Therefore, in the 
contemporary world, international migration plays an important role in national, 
regional, and global affairs.  
 The process of globalization has transformed the world. States, societies, 
economies and cultures in different regions of the world have become increasingly 
integrated and interdependent. Advent of new technologies has enabled the rapid 
transfer of capital, goods, services, information and ideas from one country and 
continent to another. The global economy has expanded, providing millions of 
women, men and their children with better livelihood opportunities. But the impact of 
globalization has been uneven (Stiglitz, 2002), and growing disparities are evidenced 
in the standard of living and level of human security available to people in different 
parts of the world (GCIM, 2005). An important result of these rising differentials has 
been an increase in the scale and scope of international migration.  
It is therefore useful to highlight selected facets of contemporary international 
migration at the outset. Table 1.1 provides latest available data6 on international 
migrants, their distribution across major areas of the world, and its share in total 
population.  The following observations may be made on the basis of Table 1.1: 
 
 
                                                
6 One of the major limitations in international migration research is the lack of consistent, 
comparable data across countries. The availability of migration data is unpredictable and 
unsystematic. There is no central international data bank for the data that are currently 
collected by various international agencies (see Box 1.1) to be entered, compiled, 
harmonized, and shared. In most countries, a central national repository for migration data 
does not exist. Global estimates of migrant stocks and flows are dependent on specific 
country definitions and estimates of who the migrants are, and how many they are in number.  
One of the most cited sources for comparable data is the United Nations Population Division 
data, which has been used extensively for the purpose of this thesis. See Box 1.1 for a note on 
issues and challenges relating to collection and dissemination of international migration 
statistics. 




Trends in International Migration Stock, Their Distribution, and Share in 
the Population, 1990-2005 
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Africa 16.4 17.1 0.7 10.6 9.0 2.6 1.9 




7.0 6.6 -0.3 4.5 3.5 1.6 1.2 
North America 27.6 44.4 16.9 17.8 23.3 9.7 13.5 
Europe  49.4 64.1 14.7 31.9 33.6 6.8 8.8 
Oceania 4.8 5.0 0.3 3.1 2.6 17.8 15.2 
Source: Complied from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision 















(i) In 2005, the number of international migrants in the world was approximately 
191 million, a gain of about 36 million over the 1990-2005 period7. While 
representing three percent of the world’s population8, the pool of international 
migrants was equivalent to the sixth-most populous country in the world 
(Martin et al., 2006). Over a relatively longer time horizon, the number of 
international migrants increased by 121 million over a span of 45 years from 
1960 to 2005, from an estimated 70 million to 1960 to 191 million in 20059 (UN 
DESA, 2006).  
(ii) The increase in the number of international migrants has exhibited a steady rise 
over the past two decades - by 10 million from 1990 to 1995; close to 12 million 
from 1995 to 2000; and above 14 million from 2000 to 2005.  
(iii)  The developed countries absorbed most of the increase in the number of 
international migrants between 1990 and 2005 (33 out of 36 million). In 
developing countries, the migrant stock stagnated during the period. It declined 
in 1990-1995 and increased slowly from 1995 to 2005. The increase in the 
number of international migrants in certain developing countries was 
counterbalanced by declines in the number of migrants in other developing 
                                                
7 Between 10 and 20 million migrants are not counted in these stock figures. Among them are 
about 2.5 million international students. 1 in 5 such student around the world is from China 
(15.2 percent) or India (5.2 percent) (Papademitriou, 2008). 
 
8 Martin (2008) argues there is an issue of comparing apples and oranges when one compares 
the immigrant population stock data with other data such as trade and GDP which measure 
imports, exports, annual output and FDI flows. He notes that “if we were to put the immigrant 
data on a similar footing, say by relating inflows of working-age immigrants to new additions 
to the working-age population, the resulting measure would average 30-40 percent for the 
OECD area, not so far from the trade-to-GDP ratio of 45 percent for OECD countries” 
(Martin, 2008). 
 
9 About a fifth of this increase however is the result of the transformation of internal migrants 
into international migrants when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) disintegrated 
in 1991, the former Yugoslavia split in 1992, and the former Czechoslovakia was divided in 
1993 (UN DESA, 2006). 
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countries. The repatriation of refugees, in particular, counterbalanced the 
increases in economically-motivated migration in Asia and in other parts of the 
developing world (UN DESA, 2006).  
(iv) As a result of the above trends, there has been an increasing concentration of 
international migrants in the developed world. The proportion of the global 
migrant stock living in developed countries rose from 53 percent in 1990 to 60 
percent in 2005.   
(v) Trends in Table 1.1 also suggest an uneven distribution of migrants globally. 
Specifically, while the proportion of migrants living in Northern America 
increased from 18 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2005, and the share of 
Europe rose from 32 percent to 34 percent10, the proportion of international 
migrants living in all other regions, i.e. Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Oceania, dropped between 1990 and 2005 (Table 1.1). Although 
Asia still accounts for a significant proportion of all international migrants, 28 
per cent in 2005, this proportion has fallen from 32 per cent in 1990. 
(vi)  Relative to the total population, the proportion of migrants increased between 
1990 and 2005 in the more developed regions and declined in the less 
developed regions. In 2005, international migrants constituted the largest share 
of the population in Oceania (15 per cent), Northern America (14 per cent) and 
Europe (9 per cent). In contrast, international migrants accounted for less than 2 
per cent of the total population in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Moreover, the proportion of international migrants in the total 
                                                
10 Stated differently, in 2005, one in every three international migrants lived in Europe and 
about one in every four lived in Northern America. The increase in the number of migrants in 
Northern America is particularly noteworthy. Between 1990 and 2005, the migrant stock 




population has declined in these three regions since 199011 (Table 1.1). 
 Table 1.2 provides a list of the top 10 countries with the highest number of 
international migrants in 1990 and 2005. The Table provides an insight into an 
important facet of contemporary international migration. It suggests that a relatively 
small majority of countries host the bulk of all international migrants. In 1990, the top 
10 countries with the largest migrant populations accounted for 52 per cent of all 
international migrants and, in 2005, the share had risen to around 54 percent. The 
United States headed the list in both years, hosting 15 per cent of all migrants in 1990 
and 20 per cent in 2005. However, the share of receiving countries other than the 
United States declined during the period. Excluding the United States, the share of 
global migrants declined in other top destinations from 37.1 percent in 1990 to 33.5 
percent in 2005. Therefore, international migrants have increasingly concentrated in 
the United States in the post-Cold war period, but destinations other than the United 








                                                
11 The drop in the number of refugees is one of the main reasons for the slow increase in the 
number of migrants in most developing regions and the decline observed in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the group of least developed countries. The number of refugees in 
developing regions dropped from 16.5 million in 1990 to an estimated 10.8 million in 2005 
(UN DESA, 2006). Refugees accounted for 7 per cent of the migrant stock in 2005. However, 
they constituted almost 18 per cent of all international migrants in Africa and 15 per cent of 
those in Asia. Particularly large populations of refugees were present in Western Asia (4.7 




Top 10 Countries/Areas with Highest Number of International Migrants, 1990 and 2005 
 
  1990  2005 


























1 United States 
of America 
23.3 15.0 15.0 - United States 
of America 
38.4 20.1 20.1 - 
2 Russian 
Federation 
11.5 7.4 22.4 7.4 Russian 
Federation 
12.1 6.3 26.4 6.3 
3 India 7.5 4.8 27.3 12.2 Germany 10.1 5.3 31.7 11.6 
4 Ukraine 7.1 4.6 31.8 16.8 Ukraine 6.8 3.6 35.3 15.2 
5 Pakistan 6.6 4.3 36.1 21.1 France 6.5 3.4 38.7 18.6 
6 Germany 5.9 3.8 39.9 24.9 Saudi Arabia 6.4 3.4 42.1 21.9 
7 France 5.9 3.8 43.7 28.7 Canada 6.1 3.2 45.3 25.1 
8 Saudi Arabia 4.7 3.0 46.8 31.7 India 5.7 3.0 48.3 28.1 
9 Canada 4.3 2.8 49.5 34.5 United 
Kingdom 
5.4 2.8 51.1 31.0 
10 Australia 4.0 2.6 52.1 37.1 Spain 4.8 2.5 53.6 33.5 
 
Source: Adapted from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,  




 Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of countries by the share of migrants in total 
population. While international migrants accounted for small proportions of the 
population of many countries in both 1990 and 2005, the number of countries where 
the share of migrants exceeded 10 per cent increased from 73 in 1990 to 79 in 2005. 
Only 30 of these countries had populations of at least one million in 1990 but by 
2005, their number increased to 35 (UN DESA, 2009). In 2005, countries with at least 
20 million inhabitants where international migrants constituted high shares of the 
population included Australia (20 percent), Canada (19 percent), France (11 percent), 
Germany (12 percent), Saudi Arabia (26 percent), Spain (11 percent), Ukraine (15 
percent) and the United States (13 percent) (UN DESA, 2009).   
 The gender dimension of international migration also throws light on a steady 
aspect of labor flows. Table 1.3 reveals that women and girls have accounted for a 
very high proportion of all international migrants for a long time. Already in 1960, 
female migrants accounted for nearly 47 out of every 100 migrants living outside of 
their countries of birth. Since then, the share of female migrants among all 
international migrants has been rising steadily, to reach 49 percent in 1990 and nearly 
50 percent in 2005. Although this trend is consistent with an increasing ‘feminization’ 
of international migration (Zlotnik, 2003), the increase recorded is relatively small 
compared to the high level of feminization that already existed in 1960.  
In developed countries, female migrants accounted for around 52 percent of 
international migrants during the past two decade, but their share was markedly lower 
in developing countries, at 46 percent over the same period. By 2005, female migrants 
outnumbered male migrants in Europe, Northern America, Oceania and in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In Europe, female migrants accounted for over 53 per
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Figure 1.1 
Distribution of Countries by Share of Migrants in Total Population, 1990 and 2005 
 
      Source: UN DESA (2006)
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Table 1.3 
Share of Female Migrants in Total International Migrants – 1960, 1990 
and 2005 
 Percentage of Female Migrants 
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Note:  NA – Not Available.  
 Figures in parenthesis provides the total number of international migrants for 
 each year.  




cent of the migrant stock in 2005. In contrast, females were underrepresented among 
the migrant populations of Africa and Asia. In fact, the proportion of female migrants 
experienced a slight decline in Asia during the period, due to a reduction in the 
proportion of females in some member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
and in several countries of South-central Asia. Therefore, although there has been an 
increase in the worldwide proportion of female migrants, it has not been a universal 
phenomenon.  
 The above trends suggest that contemporary international migration is 
unambiguously increasing in scale and diversifying in scope. Currently, almost all 
countries participate in the migration system as countries of origin, transit, or 
destination, and many play all three roles. The phenomenon of migration has become 
intertwined with the process of globalization, which may be characterized as the 
widening, deepening, and speeding up of global interconnectedness in all aspects of 
contemporary socio-economic life.  
 Indeed, the key indicator of globalization is evidenced in the rapid increase of 
various types of cross-border flows including finance, trade, ideas, pollution, and 
importantly - people. The transnational network taking the form of transnational 
corporations, global markets, international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, and transnational communities has become the key organizing structure 
for all these flows. The modern information and communications technology (ICT), 
including the internet, superior telephone connectivity, and cheaper air travel has 
become the key tool for aiding and easing such flows.  
 Therefore, international migration has emerged as a global and diverse 
phenomenon with a significant influence in both sending (mostly less developed 
nations) and receiving (mostly developed nations) societies. The presence of 
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international migrants in host nations has given rise to many contentious issues and 
has generated huge controversy and national debate, often resulting in serious socio-
political outcomes.  
 On one hand, while international migration has often been welcomed for 
economic, political, and humanitarian reasons, it has also brought into play many 
sensitive issues, particularly those relating to national and international security, 
identity, cultural adaptation, economic development, and degeneration of the welfare 
state, among others.  
 For example, while on one hand immigrants are blamed for disrupting civil 
society, putting fiscal strain on public expenditures, and lowering wages, among other 
woes (Huntington, 2004), on the other hand, skilled immigrants are often associated 
with innovation and the growth of technology sectors (Freeman, 2006).  For migrant-
sending countries, while emigration is associated with welcome financial windfall in 
the form of remittances (Acosta et al., 2008), it is also seen to drain poor economies 
of their most educated workers (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008).   
 A large body of empirical and theoretical literature exists on the causes of 
migration12. In general, migration is a response to two broad types of differences that 
prompt people to move - economic and noneconomic. The factors that encourage a 
migrant to cross borders, in turn, can be grouped into three categories - demand-pull 
in destination areas, supply-push in areas of origin, and network factors that link 
destination and origin.   
 Table 1.4 exhibits the resulting 2 x 3 matrix designed to distinguish economic 
migrants who are encouraged to move by demand-pull guest worker recruitment from 
                                                
12 While a comprehensive review of the literature on causes of migration is beyond the scope 
of this “Introduction”. For detailed reviews on the above, Massey et al. (1993), Skeldon 
(1997), Castles and Miller (1998) and Boyle et al. (1998) are useful.   
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noneconomic migrants encouraged to cross borders to join family members settled 
abroad. 
 As an illustration, a worker in Country X may be recruited to work in 
agriculture sector in Country Y, a demand-pull factor; and failing crops may 
encourage him to go, a supply-push factor; the movement can happen in part because 
friends and relatives went the year before and can tell him about wages and conditions 
abroad, a network factor. Demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors rarely have 
equal weights in the migration decisions of individuals or families, and the 
importance of each factor can change over time. Generally, demand-pull factors 
combine with supply-push factors to set migration flows in motion, and network 
factors become more important as migration streams age or mature.   
 Family unification is probably the most important noneconomic factor 
encouraging migration. In many cases, one member of a family is the pioneer who 
goes abroad and obtains a job and/or residence rights. Refugees and asylum seekers 
move primarily for noneconomic reasons. Refugees are persons outside their country 
of citizenship who are unable or unwilling to return to face persecution. Most refugees 
stay in camps near their countries of origin until the situation in their home countries 
changes or until they are resettled in another country, but asylum seekers arrive in a 
country and ask to be recognized as refugees. If they are recognized as refugees, they 
are usually allowed to resettle and make a new life in the country. For the purpose of 
the thesis, we exclude noneconomic migrants from the ambit of discussions and 
analysis.  
While the most obvious cause of migration is the disparity in incomes13,  
                                                
13 In 2005, per capita GDP (adjusted for PPP) was $33,600 in high-income OECD countries, 
compared to $9,200 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, $8,400 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, $6,200 in the Middle East and North Africa, $3,900 in East Asia and the Pacific, 
$2,100 in South Asia, and $1,700 in Sub-Saharan Africa (OECD, 2008). 
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Table 1.4 
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employment, and social well-being between the migrant-sending and migrant-
receiving areas, the emerging differences in global demographic patterns14 with 
regard to fertility, mortality, age-structure, and labor force growth are also becoming 
increasingly important.  
1.2 Broad Demographic Trends 
 The world population is in the midst of an unprecedented transformation 
brought about by the transition from a regime of high mortality and high fertility to 
one of low mortality and low fertility. This demographic transition is responsible for 
the rapid and accelerating growth that the world population experienced in the 
twentieth century, as well as for the slowing down of that growth and for the changes 
in the age distribution associated with those developments15. 
 According to the 2008 Revision, the latest available, of the official United 
Nations population estimates, world population is projected to reach 7 billion early in 
2012, up from the current 6.8 billion, and surpass 9 billion people by 2050. Most of 
the additional 2.3 billion people will increase the population of developing countries, 
which is projected to rise from 5.6 billion in 2009 to 7.9 billion in 2050, and will be 
distributed among the population aged 15-59 (1.2 billion) and 60 or over (1.1 billion) 
because the number of children under age 15 in developing countries will decrease 
                                                
14 Demography usually refers to the scientific study of human populations, primarily with 
respect to their size, their structure, and their development. Migration is one of the three 
traditional components of demography, the other two being fertility and mortality. The 
additional components of demography include population distribution, population policies, 
population projections, and population interactions (such as those relating to urbanization, 
environment, health, and family).  
 
15 In terms of the effects of the demographic transition on population age structures, 
demographers usually distinguish three distinct stages. During the first, there is a rejuvenation 
of the age distribution as the proportion of children increases. During the second, triggered by 
fertility reductions, the proportion of children begins to decline while the proportion of adults 
and older persons rise. During the third stage, reached usually after lengthy periods of fertility 
and mortality decline, the proportions of both children and adults of working age decline, and 
only the proportion of older persons rises. 
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(UN DESA, 2009). 
 In contrast, the population of the more developed regions is expected to change 
minimally, from 1.23 billion to 1.28 billion, and would have declined to 1.15 billion 
were it not for the projected net migration from developing to developed countries, 
which is projected to average 2.4 million persons annually from 2009 to 2050 (UN 
DESA, 2009).  
 Currently the population of the less developed regions is still young, with 
children under age 15 accounting with 29 per cent of the population and young 
persons aged 15 to 24 accounting or a further 19 per cent. In fact, the numbers of 
children and young people in the less developed regions are at an all time high (1.7 
billion children and 1.1 billion young people), posing a major challenge for their 
countries, which are faced with the necessity of providing education or employment 
to large cohorts of children and youth even as the current economic and financial 
crisis unfolds. The situation in the least developed countries is even more pressing 
because children under 15 constitute 40 per cent of their population and young people 
account for a further 20 per cent (UN DESA, 2009).    
  In the more developed regions, children and youth account for just 17 per cent 
and 13 per cent of the population, respectively, and whereas the number of children is 
expected to change little in the future, remaining close to 200 million, the number of 
young people is projected to decrease from 160 million currently to 134 million in 
2050 (UN DESA, 2009).   
  In both the more and the less developed regions, the number of people in the 
main working ages, 25 to 59, is at an all time high - 605 million and 2.5 billion, 
respectively. Yet, whereas in the more developed regions that number is expected to 
peak over the next decade and stagnate thereafter, in the less developed regions it will 
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continue rising, reaching 3.6 billion in 2050 and increasing by nearly half a billion 
over the next decade (UN DESA, 2009). These population trends justify the urgency 
of supporting employment creation in developing countries as part of any strategy to 
address the global economic crisis that the world is experiencing.  
 Furthermore, the implications of population ageing cannot be dismissed. In the 
more developed regions, the population aged 60 or over is increasing at the fastest 
pace ever (growing at 1.9 per cent annually) and is expected to increase by more than 
50 per cent over the next four decades, rising from 264 million in 2009 to 416 million 
in 2050. Compared with the more developed world, the population of the less 
developed regions is ageing rapidly. Over the next two decades, the population aged 
60 or over in the developing world is projected to increase at rates far surpassing 3 per 
cent per year and its numbers are expected to rise from 475 million in 2009 to 1.6 
billion in 2050.  
 In terms of the major areas of the world, there are significant demographic 
complementarities, as these areas are at different stages of the demographic transition. 
 Europe is well into the third stage of the transition and its population, which is 
already the oldest in the world, is expected to age rapidly in the foreseeable future. 
Northern America and Australasia also find themselves in the third stage of the 
transition. However since their fertility levels have not fallen as low as those of 
Europe, they are expected to experience a somewhat slower ageing process. Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean find themselves in the second stage of the transition 
and are still in time to benefit from the demographic bonus. However, because these 
two regions experienced on average fairly rapid fertility reductions, they are expected 
to age more rapidly than Europe or Northern America did in the past. Lastly, Africa 
has only recently embarked on the second stage of the transition and still has a very 
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young population with high dependency levels. Furthermore, because Africa is the 
major area most affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, its transition to low mortality 
has been interrupted and it is not clear whether the incipient fertility reductions 
experienced by countries in the region will accelerate or not over the short term. Even 
assuming that fertility reductions proceed at a moderate pace, Africa is expected to 
continue being the major area with the youngest population well into the 21st century. 
The above trends and projections suggests that demographic trends such as 
low birth rates and aging populations in developed countries will continue to create 
demand for workers from demographically-rich countries or areas to supplement their 
labor supply; sustain their social security systems; and maintain competitiveness of 
their respective economies through skilled and unskilled16 labor migration. This, in 
turn, will require the development of sound public policies to facilitate the 
adjustments that will be necessary in a variety of spheres, including the provision of 
health care and old-age support. The migrants, to the extent that they are long-term 
migrants, will have an impact on the current fertility rates, future ageing patterns, the 
skills composition of the labor force, and more subtly social and political norms of the 
recipient (developed) countries. Young migrants to the extent that they sink roots in 
these countries will be tomorrow’s old, which in turn will have significant 
implications for the expansive welfare systems in general, and health and social 
security systems in particular. Many of the welfare state programmes in the OECD 
countries are predicated on the basis of certain social patterns of behavior and 
thinking. If even a section of the new migrants share these insufficiently, then there 
                                                
16 The demand for unskilled workers in the developed arises partly on account of adverse 
demographics, and partly due to the reluctance of relatively affluent natives to engage in low-
paying jobs. 
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may be a need to restructure some of these programmes if the effectiveness, 
affordability, and political acceptability are not to be adversely affected. 
 For the developing countries however, the benefits associated with the 
‘demographic-gift’ phase are not automatic. For instance, the second stage of the 
demographic transition usually entails a rapidly growing population of young people 
(aged 15 to 24) who need to be educated and provided with gainful employment in 
order to become assets for society. Indeed, uneven geographic distribution in the 
growth of the world’s labor force is another dimension of economic inequality 
between nation-states that adds to international migration pressures.  
 The world’s labor force of 3.1 billion in 2005 included 600 million workers in 
the more developed countries and 2.4 billion in the less developed countries (Figure 
1.2). Almost all labor force growth is projected to be in the lower-income countries. 
The work force in these countries is projected to increase by about 425 million 
between 2005 and 2015, while the labor force in higher-income countries is projected 
to remain stable. 
 For the developing countries therefore, the demographic bonus may provide an 
opportunity for speeding development, but realizing those benefits depends on the 
adoption of macroeconomic policies that promote productive investment, increase 
employment opportunities, and in general ensure a stable social and economic 
environment favorable for sustained economic growth and sustainable development. 
The demographic complementarities require policymakers to design appropriate 
migration policies, involving both immigration and emigration. 
 Substantial changes in government perceptions of migration trends have taken 
place since 1990s as Governments around the world have reacted to the challenges 
and opportunities associated with international migration. Since the mid-1990s,  
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Figure 1.2 




Source: Complied from International Labor Office Database (2009), LABORSTA 














Governments have increasingly reported that they wish to maintain their levels of 
immigration and are less inclined to take action to restrict those levels (United 
Nations, 2006). As of 2005, only 22 per cent of 194 countries wanted to lower 
immigration, down from 40 per cent in 1996 (Figure 1.3)17. Furthermore, the 
proportion of countries seeking to maintain the prevailing level of immigration rose 
from 30 per cent in 1996 to 54 per cent in 2005, whereas the proportion seeking to 
raise levels remained constant at about 5 per cent. While in 1996 one quarter of all 
countries had reported no intervention with respect to immigration, one fifth did so in 
2005. These mostly include countries in Africa that are experiencing net emigration 
and whose borders are difficult to supervise (United Nations, 2006). 
 With respect to emigration, about one quarter of all Governments reported that 
they wish to lower emigration, a proportion that has remained virtually unchanged 
since 1986. Fifty-three countries are concerned about emigration, with four noting 
their concern about the loss of highly skilled workers. By contrast, 11 countries - 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Tuvalu, 
Viet Nam and Yemen seeked to increase emigration (United Nations, 2006). 
 In response to the high emigration of skilled workers, particularly from small 
and low-income countries, their Governments have adopted initiatives to encourage 
their return. In 2005, 72 countries had policies and programmes to encourage the  
                                                
17 The trend away from restricting immigration is more pronounced among developed 
countries, 60 per cent of which had inclined to lower immigration in 1996, but only 12 per 
cent of which inclined to do so in 2005. Among developing countries, the proportion with 
policies to lower immigration has also declined, from one third in 1996 to one quarter in 
2005. Notably, the member States of the GCC have long maintained policies to restrict 
migrant inflows in order to reduce their dependence on foreign workers and have been trying 
to foster increased employment among their nationals. For instance, in 2003, the Government 
of Saudi Arabia set the goal of reducing the number of migrant workers to at most 20 per cent 
of the population by 2013, a goal that, if achieved, would mean a reduction of the current 
migrant stock by at least 3 million.   
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 Figure 1.3 
Government Policies on Immigration – 1996, 2001, 2003, and 2005 
 














return of their nationals, up from 59 in 1996. Among those 72 countries, 59 were 
developing countries (United Nations, 2006). 
 Given the importance of remittances for the economies of many countries of 
origin18, their Governments have been implementing policies to increase remittance 
flows, promote transfers through formal channels, reduce the cost of transfers, and 
channel remittances into productive investment. The measures taken include tax 
exemptions on remittances income; improved access to banking services for senders 
and receivers of remittances; cooperation with countries of destination to allow 
domestic banks to operate overseas; and reduction of duties on goods sent home by 
migrants (World Bank, 2006). 
 The above provides an overall contemporary context for the three broad essays 
of the thesis. In view of the above context, and in the current state of global migration 
dynamics, four inter-related arenas of change can be identified which will continue to 
be critical in the shaping of global migration over the coming decades.  
 First, the global context for migration has undergone a structural change, 
reflected in the relationship between globalization and the development of ever more 
complex patterns and processes of international migration. This refers not only to 
economic globalization and the development of global governance, but also the 
emergence of global cultural and social connectivity.  
 Second, the role of individual states and regions in migration systems has 
changed.  The relationship between demographic, economic, social and political 
changes and patterns of movement has become more complex. It is now necessary to 
                                                
18 The remittances have been among the fastest-growing international financial flows. Formal 
remittances to developing countries doubled between the late 1980s and mid-1990s to almost 
$60 billion, doubled again by 2002, and almost doubled again to $208 billion in 2006 (World 
Bank, 2006). In 2008, remittance flows were an estimated $305 billion. The total flow of 
remittances is actually larger than the formal amount.  
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examine the changing characteristics of nation-states and the complex ways they are 
embedded in regional and global relationships to understand contemporary migration 
phenomenon.  
 Third, the nature of migratory behavior at the micro-level needs to be re-
considered, particularly the way in which migration brings about transformations in 
communities of both sending and receiving areas, the involvement of different socio-
economic groups in migration, and the transnational character of migrants’ identities 
and livelihoods that challenge classical notions of migrant integration and the nation 
state. 
 Fourth, with regards to the policy environment concerning international 
migration, there is a need to examine the factors that encourage, as well as the factors 
that hamper effective policy-making and collaboration across boundaries.  The 
changing popular views of migration and its perceived impacts, which create new 
pressures on nation states to manage both inward and outward migration, while 
sustaining their place in the globalised economy also merits importance. 
 
1.3   The Intellectual Debates on International Migration – A Brief Overview 
 
 The academic work and intellectual debate relating to international migration 
saw a particular surge in 1960s (Grubbel and Scott, 1966; Johnson, 1967) following 
observed large-scale movements of skilled personnel from the developing countries to 
the developed ones, popularly termed as the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon. The dominant 
view in the literature during this period was that such movement of skilled labor 
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adversely affected the donor country through significant welfare losses19 and 
reduction in average productivity levels, even as it accrued significant gains for the 
host country (the ‘brain drain’ debate).  International mobility of skilled workers was 
essentially seen as a zero-sum game, and most of the public policy debates 
concentrated on ways and means to contain the ‘migration leakage’ in the less 
developed countries through a ‘tax on brains’ (Bhagwati, 1976; Bhagwati and 
Hamada, 1974)20.  
However, a growing body of literature (post Cold-War) took a diametrically 
opposite view of the phenomenon. The literature indicated that due to possibilities of 
higher investments in human capital in the source country and higher foreign 
investments in the domestic economy, out-migration of talented people could be an 
essential condition for long-run growth in the donor country (Khwaja and 
Scaramozzino, 2003). In a theoretical framework, Mountford (1997) concluded that 
when educational decisions are endogenous, and when successful migration is 
uncertain, a brain drain may increase productivity. Others argued that the incentives to 
acquire skills may be strengthened by the prospect of being able to migrate (Stark, 
Helmenstein, and Prskawetz, 1998). Thus, even in the presence of brain drain, the 
average educational level of those left behind in the home country may be higher than 
otherwise. In an OLG setup, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) showed that brain 
drain may favor sending countries if the domestic human capital formation is 
                                                
19 The argument was based on the premise that if migrants’ contribution to the economy is 
greater than their marginal product, significant welfare losses would accrue, since social 
return to education exceeds its private return, and given the fact that education is often partly 
or wholly public financed (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974).  
 
20 A systematic review of the ‘brain drain’ literature can be found in Bhagwati and Wilson 
(1989) and in Findlay and Stewart (2002), and Commander et al. (2002).  
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stimulated enough. They validated their claim using cross-sectional data from 37 
countries.  
Furthermore, in general, the migration literature also pointed out to three 
major “feedback effects” that go on to boost productivity and growth in the donor 
country. First, return migrants who bring back their refined skills and expertise from 
abroad gave a big fillip to productivity. Second, expatriates who remain abroad 
contribute money via remittances that are used for human capital formation in the 
donor country. Lastly, their transfer of knowledge or technology can increase 
productivity and economic development. The key challenge for the developing 
countries however is to engage appropriately in the exchange of skills in the global 
labor market and to align their national policies that support an optimum level of 
migration. 
 The realization that the amount remitted by migrants to developing countries far 
exceeds foreign assistance has fueled growing interest in the relationship between 
migration and development among both scholars and policymakers. A series of 
reports and review articles have summarized the links between migration and 
development (Amassari, 1994; Lucas, 2005; Newland, 2004; Russell, 2003; Skeldon, 
2003, 2004; Sörensen et al., 2002). Many focus on the impact of remittances (Carling, 
2004; Orozco, 2002; Gammeltoft, 2002; Lowell and de la Garza, 2000; Ratha, 2003), 
while others consider the impact of circular and return migration (Ammasari and 
Black, 2001; Black 2001; Ghosh, 2000; Hugo, 2003; King, 1986), the role of 
diasporas (Kapur, 2001; Koser, 2003; Newland and Patrick, 2004; Van Hear et al., 
2004) and policy (Carling, 2004; Ellerman, 2003; Koser, 2003; Martin et al., 2002). A 
much smaller literature considers the question of “social remittances” or the impact of 
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migrants on ideas, behaviors and social capital in the sending country21 (Levitt, 1999). 
As noted, research in international migration has generally centered on skilled 
labor migration. Models propounded have generally exploited the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework (Basu, 1998); theories in human capital formation 
(Biene, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001); taxation theories (Bhagwati, 1976; Bhagwati 
and Hamada, 1976; Korner, 1997); welfare theories (Bhagwati and Rodriguez, 1976); 
benefit-cost framework (Borjas, 1995); Harris-Todaro framework (Hazari, 1994); and 
game theory formulations (Scaramozzino and Khwaja, 2003). 
Empirical work in international migration has also focused on skilled 
migration, particularly those of doctors, nurses, students and those in IT services. 
Non-availability of data due to poor data-keeping practices in the developing 
countries, from where bulk of the emigration takes place, have resulted in less 
empirically meaningful work. Difficulty in tracing and hence collecting data on 
movements of unskilled and/or semi-skilled workers (as these workers tend to use 
illegal channels more often) is also one of the reasons why unskilled labor movements 
have received scant attention from the researchers.  
Generally, studies in international migration have mainly involved a particular 
country or region though in recent years there have been attempts to construct cross-
country dataset to estimate the extent of migration by level of education from 
developing countries to the US and OECD countries (Carrington and Detragiache, 
1999). The country or region specific studies have in general focused on the question 
of whether migration has had a beneficial or detrimental effect in the growth of the 
respective economies (Docquier and Rapoport, 2008; Kapalan et al., 1998; Borjas, 
1995). In particular, country studies have addressed issues concerning remittances 
                                                
21 Rao (1993), for example, emphasized the role of social capital and attitudes in India’s 
economic future. 
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(Docquier and Rapoport, 2003), return migrants (Dustmann, 1996; Zhongdong, 
2002), repeat migrants (Constant and Zimmermann, 2003), income inequality and 
poverty relating to emigration from the country/region.  
A host of policy papers on international migration can also be identified in the 
literature. These papers raise issues concerning immigration and subsequent policies 
either from a sending or receiving country perspective (Grether et al., 2000; Lowell, 
1999; Peixoto, 2001); and compensatory policies (Johry, 1995). Recent policy papers 
have concentrated more on the socio-economic and political impacts of migration 
policies. These concern settlement and citizenship issues (Iredale et al., 2003); issues 
relating to credit constraints and self-employment of return migrants (Rapoport, 
2002); and hostile public opinion against the immigrant population (O’ Rourke and 
Sinnott, 2003).  
 The growing importance of international migration as a contributor to the 
integration of the world economy has led to renewed interest among policymakers, 
international organizations, and the research community, including analysis of 
institutional and policy reforms designed to moderate its impact in source and 
destination countries, and creating win-win situations for the stakeholders involved in 
the migration process. This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature through 
detailed analyses of various contemporary aspects of international migration.  
 
1.4  Objectives and Organization of the Thesis 
 
 Most academic studies on migration can be divided into three categories on the 
basis of methodology. The first group includes macro-econometric studies that 
perform cross-country comparisons based on aggregate data. The second group 
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comprises of micro-econometric analyses that generally focus on a single country and 
that employ survey data. Finally, there are descriptive case studies that tend to be 
policy-centric. These three levels of studies contribute to understanding of migration 
in different ways.  
 Macro studies and aggregate data provide the overall picture, but they give 
limited insight into the causes and consequences of migration in individual countries. 
The country econometric studies fill that gap. The purpose of the case studies is to 
illustrate and clarify many theoretical mechanisms and to advance understanding of 
the impact of different migration policies, given that introducing policy variables in 
econometric regressions is generally difficult.  
 The overriding objective of this thesis is to contribute towards the understanding 
of selected aspects of contemporary international migration, which has important 
implications for public policies at the global and local (country-specific or province-
specific) levels. Towards this objective, the thesis aims to identify and address a 
variety of development- and policy-related questions concerning contemporary 
international migration, using the most appropriate of the three methodologies 
adopted by the researchers as outlined above. The analysis in the thesis is from a 
public policy and management perspective.  
 As the phenomenon of international migration is multi-faceted and 
geographically global in scale, some selectivity in issues, and geographical scope was 
essential for manageability. The thesis is structured around an introduction, three 
essays involving three separate (but interrelated) and relevant aspects of contemporary 
migration – interrelationships among globalization, demography and migration 
policies; a case study of return migration in the state of Kerela in India; remittances 
and development, and a concluding observations.  
 32 
 Essay 1, titled “Globalization, Demographic Challenges, and Public Policies 
Towards Migration” examines the complex interrelationships between globalization, 
demographic trends, and migration policies and analyzes the various policy 
implications arising out of their interrelationships. It analyzes the potential impact that 
the forces of globalization and demography might have on the current migration 
policy paradigm in the developed world. Towards this objective, the essay uses 
available aggregate data from multilateral sources, and undertakes an analytical 
descriptive macroeconomic approach to outline the policy implications that arise from 
the complex interplay of globalization, demography, and migration policy and 
management in the contemporary world. 
Essay 2, titled “The Return Migration Phenomenon: The Case of Kerala” 
undertakes an empirical study of the phenomenon of return migration, based on two 
surveys undertaken in 1998 and 2001 respectively in the Indian state of Kerala. The 
importance of Essay 2 lies in the fact that studies on return migration are relatively 
rare in the Indian context. The essay therefore helps fill a crucial gap in the Indian 
migration literature through a case study of the state of Kerala. This case study is also 
important because Kerala accounts for a significant proportion of India’s emigration 
and return migration.   
Specifically, the essay examines the dynamics of return migration in Kerala 
from two specific aspects. First, it utilizes the two surveys to map the detailed profile 
of the return migrants, including their employment and occupational patterns. It then 
examines whether there has been occupational mobility among the return migrants. 
This is important because such mobility is one of the avenues through which 
migration could bring about a structural transformation of the economy. Second, it 
analyzes various policy initiatives which the Central and State governments can 
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pursue to enhance the contribution of return migrants to Kerala’s overall economic 
and social development.   
 Essay 3, titled “Remittances and Development: Public Policy Imperatives” 
reviews relevant analytical and empirical literature concerning the possible role of 
remittances in the economic development of recipient countries. It surveys the 
channels through which remittance flows can impact on intermediate goals of 
economic development such as macro-economic stability, efficiency, savings and 
investment intermediation, and household capital formation. Towards this objective, 
the essay undertakes a case study of India, which is among the top remittance-
recipient country in the world.  
The thesis ends with Concluding Remarks that provides a very brief summary 
of the essays of the thesis, points out limitations of the study, and identifies potential 







Appendix 1.1: Collection, Dissemination of International Migration Data and 
Challenges Facing Policymakers – A Note 
 In recent years, there has been an increasing global awareness of the different 
forms of movement – permanent and temporary, regular and irregular, voluntary and 
forced - and its possible socio-economic impact on both the sending and receiving 
countries. As international migration issues moves to the forefront of policy agendas 
around the world, there is also a growing recognition of the corresponding need for 
reliable and comprehensive statistics on international migration. Accurate, 
comparable, and timely data and statistics on international migration are needed, not 
only to have the right numbers for research and analysis, but also to plan for, and 
provide budgetary support to, the numerous administrative and policy measures that 
deal with migrants (including refugees).  
In general, national government departments are the key actors that collect 
migration data, but their practices vary from country to country. The increase in 
international cooperation on migration-related issues, along with the recognition of 
the need for timely and comparable migration data, has motivated many international 
agencies to undertake extensive efforts aimed at collecting data and at encouraging 
States to harmonize data collection practices.  
 Currently, statistics are collected in a wide variety of forms and for a variety of 
different purposes. Most States collect a certain amount of basic entry data. 
Traditional immigration countries and countries with active temporary or permanent 
migration generally have systems to collect more or less comprehensive data on 
immigration to that country. An increasing number of national statistics offices collect 
comprehensive information on demographic changes by compiling and collating 
available data from a variety of sources that often cover specific groups of people and 
specific aspects of immigration and emigration. 
 A number of agencies produce migration statistics at the international level. 
These include the following:  
United Nations Population Division - It is one of the leading international actors in 
compiling global migration data, especially migration stock data obtained in 
population censuses. The population Division compiles global migration statistics in 
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cooperation with the UN Statistics Division, but also follows migration issues and 
policies along with its general monitoring of world migration as one of the main 
components of population developments, in addition to fertility and mortality.  
UN Statistics Division - The UN Statistics Division publishes the United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook on population statistics. Some issues of the Yearbook (such 
as 1977, 1985, and 1996) have included special migration statistics. Data for the 
yearbook is gathered through questionnaires sent to governments. The yearbook 
covers over 230 countries or areas in the world.  
UN Regional Economic Commissions - Some UN regional economic commissions 
are particularly active in compiling and developing migration statistics. For example, 
the Population Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) has produced regional migration data since the early 1970s. 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) - The 
UNHCR keeps track of trends in the numbers of asylum-seekers, mainly with the help 
of regular collection of figures from national authorities. UNHCR's Population Data 
Unit combines monthly, quarterly, six-monthly, and yearly statistics on asylum-
seekers broken down by countries of origin for each receiving country.  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - The OECD 
refers to a body of 30 countries whose cooperation and policy development is 
supported by the Organization in many different areas. Migration is dealt with mainly 
as a social and labor market issue in the OECD. The OECD annually produces 
migration report - “Trends in International Migration”, also otherwise called the 
SOPEMI report. The report summarizes national reports and statistical data submitted 
by national correspondents from OECD member States. Each SOPEMI report also 
contains a few chapters on general international migration trends and topical themes. 
The long sequence of yearly SOPEMI reports provides a valuable time series on 
migration data, albeit limited to industrial countries and a few transition countries 
including Turkey and Mexico. 
International Labor Organization (ILO) - The ILO follows migration from a 
number of perspectives, including the protection of the rights of migrant workers, 
discrimination in the labor market, and combating trafficking and exploitation of 
migrant women and children. A few of ILO's Conventions are focused on migrants, 
notably Convention No. 97 on Migration for Employment (adopted in 1949) and 
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Migrant Workers Convention of 1975 (No. 143). ILO compiles data on migrant 
workers on its International Labor Migration Database (ILM) with basic labor 
migration tables with time series starting from 1986. Information is gathered through 
a questionnaire sent to member States. In addition to labor migration figures, the 
database also contains relevant legal texts and supporting information on legislation. 
Commission of European Communities - The Commission of European 
Communities (EC) intensively monitors migration trends and is active in developing 
policy responses for many areas of migration of concern to its member States. This 
work includes substantial technical assistance to promote state-of-the-art migration 
statistics, not only in the member States, but also in the recently acceded and 
candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and other countries that are 
cooperation partners in Eastern Europe and on the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean. 
Eurostat - The Statistical Office of the EC, Eurostat, publishes regular reports based 
on migration statistics from member States and accession countries. Eurostat is 
involved in extensive work in the area of methodological development aimed at 
harmonization of migration data in the EC and building capacity in the national 
statistical offices of accession and partner countries. 
Council of Europe - The Council of Europe works in cooperation with Eurostat and 
the UN in developing migration data collection. The Council of Europe publishes 
migration data in its annual reports “Current Trends in International Migration in 
Europe’ and “Recent Demographic Developments in Europe”, which are products of 
the Council's Migration Committee and Population Committee, respectively. The 
Council of Europe continuously monitors new developments in the integration and 
human rights of migrants through regular reporting of the members of the Migration 
Committee.  
International Organization for Migration (IOM) - The International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) is gathers and publishes migration data from some regions and 
on some issues that are not covered by the statistics produced by other agencies, such 
as those relating to trafficking in human beings.  
Other Agencies - Other international bodies such as UNESCO, UN Centre for 
International Crime Prevention, Interpol, World Bank, and regional organizations 
(such as the African Union and the Organization of American States) and regional 
development banks, all follow at least some aspects of migration and often collect 
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related data. Similarly, numerous think tanks and research institutions compile both 
quantitative and qualitative data. Many regional, international, and national data 
networks also exchange and distribute migration data and other related information. 
Data Challenges for Migration Policy Makers 
The availability of migration data is unpredictable and unsystematic. There is no 
central international data bank for the data that is currently collected to be entered, 
compiled, and shared. Nor is there in most countries a central national repository for 
migration data. Accuracy, or how well the data reflects reality, can be difficult to 
achieve due to a host of factors, including the movement of migrants within the host 
country, the challenge of assigning each migrant to a distinct migration category, and 
human error. 
 The comprehensiveness of international migration data depends upon the extent 
to which data are regularly collected and compiled. Much of the data on migration is 
dispersed among different government agencies and often not collated or compared. 
 Timeliness of data is a crucial factor when crafting migration policies. Use of 
outdated statistics results in unsuccessful programmes and policies that do not reflect 
actual trends and migrant needs. Comparability refers to the challenge of establishing 
common migration terminology and definitions among States. It is difficult to achieve 
comparability of data between governments, when the information collected is 
influenced by its internal legislation, structures, policies, and priorities. Any 
comparisons must be undertaken carefully to clearly reflect differences in migration 
labels and the manner of data collection. 
 The issue of confidentiality is an important consideration in the collection and 
sharing of data. Often, privacy legislation or other legal acts prevent governments 
from sharing information. In some instances, detailed data is collected but it is only 
available for internal use. A delicate balance needs to be achieved between disclosing 










GLOBALIZATION, DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARDS MIGRATION 
 
This essay first explores the interrelationships among globalization, demographic 
challenges, and patterns of migration. The term ‘interrelationships’ is used because 
their impacts are not unidirectional. This will be clear from the analysis. After 
analyzing these interrelationships, the essay then discusses public policy implications 
arising out of these interrelationships.  
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2.1 sets the context by providing 
an overview of migration patterns in the current phase of globalization.  The 
phenomenon of globalization refers to a dynamic process whereby people, finance, 
services, goods and, perhaps as importantly, ideas and social behaviors, are 
transported and transmitted across national borders, with ever increasing degrees of 
influence over individuals and societies (Friedman, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002; Asher and 
Rajan, 2003). 
The World is undergoing dramatic ageing of the population, with many highly 
populated countries becoming old before they become rich. In 2008, the majority of 
the world’s population became urban, and this trend is expected to continue (United 
Nations, 2007). Section 2.2 provides an overview of global demographic trends 
including size of the population and its growth; levels of trends in fertility and 
mortality; international migration trends; population ageing; and urbanization. Section 
2.3 analyzes the intertwined relationships among globalization, demographic trends, 
and international migration, with policy imperatives. Section 2.4 connects the specific 
aspects of immigration, population ageing, and migration policies, and examines their 
interrelationships in the backdrop of globalization. Section 2.5 analyzes the 
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implications for migration management policies. Section 2.6 provides the concluding 
remarks. 
2.1 Migration in the Context of Globalization 
Globalization is a multi-faceted phenomenon covering economic, political, social, and 
cultural dimensions. In the broadest sense, globalization refers to a multitude of 
interactions and growing interdependence among governments, organizations, 
businesses and people around the world (IOM, 2008). The focus of this essay is 
however only on selected economic aspects of globalization, and in particular, their 
impacts on global labor mobility. In economic terms, globalization would imply the 
ease with which each element of production-distribution-information-communication 
of the production and trade flows can be located over large geographical distances 
(Asher and Nandy, 2009). 
Thus, a major feature of globalization has been that of vastly expanded cross-
border movements of people across the globe. In particular, freer movement of labor 
within the European Union; increasing (political) willingness among traditionally 
restrictive immigration regimes to take advantage of demographic complementarities; 
and increasingly inexpensive means of transport has facilitated greater population 
mobility across the globe.   
 In 2005, the latest year for which comparable global migration data are 
available, there were about 191 million international migrants22 worldwide, nearly two 
and a half times the figure in 1965, an increase well in excess of the global population 
growth rate over the same period (UN DESA, 2006). According to IOM (2008), the 
                                                
22 UN DESA (2006) defines “international migrants” as persons residing in a country other 




number of international migrants is likely to have grown to 200 million since then. 
This would imply that about 3 percent of the world’s people had left their country of 
birth or citizenship for a year or more in 200523. The number of international migrants 
in industrialized countries more than doubled between 1985 and 2005, from almost 55 
million to 120 million (UN DESA, 2006). 
 The distribution of global migrants varies around the world.  Half a century ago, 
only a few industrialized countries, primarily the ones that had established formal 
immigration programmes in the aftermath of World War II like the United States, 
Canada and Australia, were identified as “countries of destination”, while the 
“countries of origin” were mostly in Europe.  
 More recent patterns of movement are more diversified (Figure 2.1). The largest 
flow of migrants is from less developed to more developed countries. In 2005, 62 
million migrants from developing countries moved to more developed countries but 
almost as many migrants (61 million) moved from one developing country to another. 
Large flows of people also move from one industrialized country to another, and 
much smaller flows move from more developed to less developed countries (Figure 
2.1). Thus, significant movement of people occurs not only from developing countries 
to developed countries but also from one developed country to another, as well as 
between developing countries. Indeed, most international migration takes place 
between the developing countries that hold more than 80 per cent of the world’s 
population. The current pattern suggests that most countries are now simultaneously 
countries of origin, of transit, and of destination, albeit to varying degrees.  
                                                
23 To provide perspective, the number of the migrants worldwide would constitute the fifth 
most populous country in the world.  As a proportion of world population, the number of 
international migrants is seemingly small, but the migrants are unevenly spread across the 
world, impacting some countries more than others. However, even a marginal change in the 
propensity to migrate would result in large additional number of migrants in absolute terms.  
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Figure 2.1: Origin and Destination of International Migrants, 2005 
 
















 At the same time, there has been a diversification of migratory behavior to 
include short-term relocation, longer-term temporary assignments, permanent 
migration and even multi-stage migration itineraries leading back to the point of 
origin.  
 The magnitude, patterns and nature of contemporary migration suggests that, in 
contrast to earlier migratory phenomena, it is now uniquely related to, and defined by, 
the processes of economic and social integration that are collectively known as 
globalization (IOM, 2008). While it is true that formal or organized aspects of 
globalization have focused on the elaboration of legal and administrative mechanisms 
to facilitate the movement of capital, goods and services (and not people)24, these 
developments appear to be largely responsible for the creation of unprecedented labor 
mobility on a truly global scale (IOM, 2008).  
 The particular conditions identified as contributing to the above trends may be 
grouped into two inter-related sets.  
 The first set consists of enabling factors such as macro-political changes, 
including the collapse of the former Soviet Union and global integration of India and 
                                                
24 Relatively little attention has been paid in the literature to the relationship between trade 
and investment flows on the one hand, and international migration flows on the other hand, 
compared to the FDI for example. To some extent, this relative neglect reflects the practical 
reality of legal restrictions on migration flows that have been much stronger, in the post-
WWII period, than legal restrictions on capital flows. To the extent that economists worried 
about possible linkages between international trade and international migration in the past, 
application of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Factor-Price Equalization Theorems led to the strong 
inference that international trade and international migration were substitutes. Specifically, to 
the extent that migration is primarily driven by economic incentives, differences in real wages 
- or in returns to human capital more broadly - will generate incentives to migrate. But since 
international trade operates to equalize returns to factors of production on a global basis, 
increased international trade should lead to reduced international migration, all else being 
constant. On the other hand, to the extent that migration is primarily driven by noneconomic 
considerations, such as a desire to reunite with family members or to escape political 
persecution, there is no reason to expect a systematic relationship between trade and 
migration. In particular, the international equilibration of factor returns might have little or no 
impact on incentives to migrate, although, at the margin, economic considerations might 
predispose an essentially non-economic immigrant to choose one country rather than another. 
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China to the world; the advent of affordable air transport; the creation of real-time and 
relatively cheap global communication networks; and the redefinition of individual 
and family identities in transnational terms. In combination, they have resulted in 
almost unlimited networking possibilities, knowledge sharing, and awareness of 
opportunities.  
 The second, and arguably more important set of causal factors arises out of the 
interplay of large, not well-understood, socio-economic variables that form part of 
complex international equations. Pritchett (2006) identifies five such driving forces.  
 The first of these factors consists of disparities in income and employment 
opportunities across and within countries and regions, particularly the steep economic 
gradients between developed and developing countries. According to Pritchett (2006), 
wage gradients of between 2 to 1 and 4 to 1 between countries of origin and 
destination were at the root of mass worker movements in the 19th century. Currently 
the real wage gaps are often as high as 10 to 125.  
 The second factor is the increasing global demographic imbalances, leading to 
potential demographic complementarities (Asher and Nandy, 2007). While the 
populations of low-income countries will grow significantly over the next 50 years, 
the populations of high-income countries will grow at a much slower rate (UN DESA, 
2007). Simultaneously, the populations of the latter will continue to age. The 
proportion of persons above 60 years of age in more developed regions is expected to 
grow from 21 percent in 2007 to 32 percent in 2050, while the number of children is 
                                                
25 Even today growth differentials and job opportunities and wages gaps continue to fuel 
strong push and pull effects and migrations flows, often in the form of illegal migration. 
These flows are particularly concentrated in “contact” regions between high income and low 
or middle-income countries, where relative proximity and ground routes facilitate access. It is 
typically the case of the periphery of the United States and the European Union - Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean; Eastern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa. In many 
countries of these regions the share of emigrants often reaches 10 percent of the total 
population. 
 44 
expected to decrease from 17 percent to 16 percent. Stated differently, in 2050 there 
will be in industrialized countries twice as many people over 60 than children (UN 
DESA, 2007). 
 Demographic disparities are expected to generate migration from two directions. 
While on one hand, shrinking and ageing populations in industrialized countries will 
stimulate demand for migrant labor from demographically-rich developing countries; 
on the other hand, large numbers of young workers in developing countries will seek 
work and livelihood opportunities abroad (Lawson et al., 2004). 
 From a broader policy perspective, it is important to view the phenomena of 
global ageing in the context of globalization itself - a world increasingly dominated 
by the flow of human and economic capital across national boundaries, and not in 
isolation. Indeed, a key stimulus to such capital flows is the emerging demographic 
imbalances arising from the differential movement of regions into maturity.  
 The third factor is linked to the liberalization of flows of goods, capital and 
services, including communication, across virtually all parts of the world. In such 
circumstances, pressures for labor mobility are bound to increase, as the international 
community stands to gain very significant economic benefits from the lifting of 
constraints on worker mobility. 
 Indeed, in the historical process of migratory movements, economic, and 
structural changes appear as one of the main drivers (Timmer, 2007). With various 
paths and paces existing in the world, economies and societies have progressively 
switched from primary activities (i.e. agriculture) to industry and services, this 
evolution being based on innovation, technical change, and their control. The well-
known process has been an increasing productivity in agriculture, allowing labor and 
capital transfers towards new economic activities, a process accompanied by a 
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progressive spatial restructuring with migration of labor and people from country to 
city, and from scattered activities (typically agriculture) to concentrated activities 
(typically industry). 
 The fourth factor lies in current and expected future demand in developed 
countries and mid-income developing countries for low-skilled services (for instance, 
in home care or hospitality sectors) arising from a combination of increased 
productivity, greater access to higher education, rising incomes, reluctance of 
nationals to perform certain jobs perceived to be of lower status, ageing populations 
and the globalization of manufacturing. Technological advances (especially 
automation) may go some way towards countering that phenomenon, but, as Pritchett 
(2006) has argued, the capital/labor substitution process has obvious limitations. 
While it is conceivable that devices endowed with artificial intelligence will 
increasingly replace human service providers, such developments are unlikely to 
completely replace nurses in hospitals or serving personnel in restaurants and hotels.  
 Finally, account must be taken of increased pressure for population movement 
through shifts in the desired population of specific countries or regions. In brief, a 
large decline in labor demand in a given location (and this has been the experience of 
many developing countries in recent times, for instance as a result of changes in 
agriculture, in climate or in resources) creates substantial pressure for outward 
migration.  
 Therefore, forces of globalization and associated technological changes have 
given rise to powerful socio-economic dynamics that play across national borders. 
Widespread income disparities, population imbalances (and associated demographic 
complementarities), and labor market discrepancies have combined to produce 
migratory flows that are increasingly dominated by the search for a better life through 
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improved employment and livelihood opportunities26. The means and pace of 
migration have changed but the core objective has remained the same, i.e. to improve 
the living conditions for oneself, family and particularly children (Hatton and 
Williamson, 2005). 
 The net impact of all the above factors is a global context where migration is 
increasingly seen at the individual level, as a choice worth including in life plans27; 
and at the national level, as a significant factor to be taken into account in economic 
and business planning, whether by governments or the private sector.  
 Though almost all countries participate in the global migration system as 
countries of origin, transit, or destination and many simultaneously play all three 
roles, perceptions of migration problems and public policies concerning them differ 
markedly between countries.  
 The United States and Canada are classic countries of immigration that have 
been shaped by newcomers from many countries, and they continue to plan for the 
arrival and integration of immigrants despite the fact that, in the U.S. case, 30 percent 
of foreign-born residents are unauthorized (Martin et al., 2006).  
 The industrial European countries, by contrast, are reluctant countries of 
immigration, accepting the return of people from former colonies and guest workers 
who settled, but not developing more open immigration systems (Martin et al., 2006).  
 Asia has been a relative latecomer to labor migration. Many Asian nations sent 
migrants to the Middle East after oil prices rose in the 1970s, and later to other Asian 
nations as guest workers and trainees. Several Asian countries sent mostly female 
                                                
26 The ongoing global economic crisis has temporarily blunted the force of these factors, but 
once global growth resumes, these factors will once again exert powerful influence on 
migration.  
27 This choice however is not one that is necessarily exercised by a majority of people, since 
roughly 97 per cent (IOM, 2008) of the world’s population consistently opts not to migrate. 
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migrants abroad, such as Filipinos, Indonesians, and Sri Lankans who work as 
domestic helpers in such Persian Gulf countries as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and 
nurses in many of the industrial nations.  
 The Middle East is a special case with migrants constituting 70 to 90 percent of 
private sector workers in most oil-exporting countries. As a result, many of the Gulf 
oil-exporting nations have tried, so far with limited success, to “nationalize” their 
workforces by prohibiting the employment of migrants in particular industries and 
occupations (Martin et al., 2006).  
 Africa has long been associated with seasonal labor migration across borders 
drawn by colonial powers, but nationalism has sharpened differences between natives 
and migrants in some of the relatively richer countries that receive migrants, such as 
the Ivory Coast and South Africa. Africa, which has an eighth of the world’s people 
and a quarter of the world’s refugees, has witnessed several dramatic and large-scale 
refugee movements, as in the Great Lakes region in the mid-1990s and in western 
Sudan in 2004 (Martin et al., 2006).  
 In previous centuries Latin America and the Caribbean islands received settlers 
and slaves, who intermixed with native peoples. Most Latin American countries today 
are emigration areas, and some have large percentages of their natives abroad. 
Economic troubles in South America have redirected much of the labor migration that 
took traditionally took Bolivians to Argentina and Colombians to Venezuela; 
migrants from both sending and receiving countries in South America now 
increasingly migrate to Europe and North America.  
 Oceania includes the traditional immigration countries of Australia and New 
Zealand as well as Pacific islands, many of which face unique immigration, economic, 
and environmental issues. 
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 Dynamics of globalization arise from powerful economic and technological 
factors. These are likely to remain intact, or even accelerate in the future. The current 
global economic crisis, severest in over seven decades, is not likely to impact these 
fundamental factors, at least in the medium term. These fundamental factors however 
will increasingly interact with profound demographic changes globally, and these will 
have significant implications for migration levels and patterns. The next section 
therefore analyzes global demographic trends, and its implications. 
 
2.2 Global Demographic Trends28 and Migration Implications  
The relationship between migration and demography is complex. Vastly 
differing population growth rates, together with extended life expectancy in most 
regions, are resulting in significant demographic differences between regions and 
corresponding variations in labor supply, ability to absorb technological advances, 
and patterns of labor demand around the world.  
 The world is moving from a pattern of high birth rates, high mortality, and 
relatively short life expectancy to one of low birth rates, low mortality, and long life 
expectancy; and from high rates of population growth to much lower rates and even, 
ultimately, to a stable or even declining population. A complicating factor in such a 
demographic transition is that it is occurring at different times and at a different pace 
in different parts of the world. 
 Each country’s demographic transition typically involves several major phases 
whose duration depends on the timing and pace of changes in mortality and fertility. 
 Initially, as infant mortality declines and population growth takes off, the 
country’s population tends to grow younger, and the youth share of the population 
                                                
28 See Appendix 2.1 for a note on the sources of population projections.  
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expands. The burden of raising many children tends to restrain other types of saving 
and investment and thus, other things equal, tends to restrain economic growth. 
 Later, as birth rates decline, the youth share of the population contracts and the 
working-age share expands. With fewer children to care for, the adult population can 
work, save, and invest more, all of which tend to potentially enhance economic 
growth. When the workforce is relatively young, the country is likely to have 
relatively low saving and relatively high demand for investment, and therefore 
relatively high rates of return. However, as a large portion of the labor force reaches 
middle age, saving may rise, but in relatively capital-abundant economies, investment 
returns may fall, necessitating non-domestic channels for deploying savings.  
 Still later, however, as birth rates remain low and adults continue to live 
longer, the elderly share of the country’s population rises. As a result, working-age 
adults may not have as many children to raise, but they have many more old (and 
increasingly older) people to support and care for. In addition, the rate of saving may 
decline as retirees draw down their savings (i.e. life-cycle effect). 
 Other developments, for example, political, economic, or environmental 
disruptions and post-war “baby booms” can also change the age structure of a 
country’s population in similar ways. 
 This section examines the unfolding demographic transition around the world. 
The following sub-sections provides an overview of demographic trends29 worldwide, 
including for major areas, development groups, and selected countries. Trends 
                                                
29 The trends are discussed on the basis of the information compiled from a variety of sources 
such as World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, World Population Prospects: The 
2006 Revision 1 and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, prepared by the 
United Nation Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN 
DESA). Estimates of the number of international migrants are derived from Trends in Total 
Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. The information on population policies is derived from 
World Population Policies 2007, the biennial survey of population policies prepared by the 
Population Division of the United Nations. 
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relating to population size and growth; fertility; mortality; international migration; 
population ageing; and urbanization are examined.  
  
2.2.1  Size of the Population and Its Growth 
Table 2.1 provides the size of the global population, its distribution (by major areas), 
and its current and projected growth in few selected years over the period 1950-2050. 
On the basis of Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Figure 2.2, the following observations may 
be made: 
1. In July 2009, the world population will stand at 6.8 billion and, according to the 
medium projection variant, is expected to reach 9.2 billion in 2050. The 
increase in the length of the period required for each new billion to be added 
reflects a declining population growth rate30 (Figure 2.2).  
2. However, the population trends vary markedly at the country level. Developed 
countries are characterized by low mortality and very low fertility that is not 
sufficient to ensure the replacement of generations and will therefore eventually 
result in declining populations31.  
3. Table 2.2 lists countries that would experience decreases in the size of their 
population sometime during the first half of the twenty-first century. From a 
demographic point of view, this is the first time in human history that so many 
countries will be experiencing depopulation at the same time. 
                                                
30 The global population growth rate peaked in the period from 1965 to 1970 at 2 per cent 
annually and has been declining since then. For 2005-2010, it was estimated to be 1.17 per 
cent per year, and it is projected to reach a low 0.36 per cent per year in 2045-2050 (UN 
DESA, 2009). According to US Census Bureau projections, world population growth is 
projected to reach 0.50 in 2050 (Figure 2.2).   
 
31 This is of course with the exception of the United States. See Appendix 2.2 for a note on 
this issue. 
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Note: Figures in parentheses represents the percentage share of the respective group/region in the World. 
*The estimates used in the table (and all other tables in the essay) are “medium” variant projections provided in UN DESA (2009). In the “low” and “high” variant scenarios, fertility is assumed to level off at half a 
birth below and half a birth above that in the “medium” variant scenario, respectively (assumptions about mortality and net migration are unchanged). The “medium” variant projections provide the most plausible 
scenario.  
Sources: Compiled and modified from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2009). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 1, New York: United Nations.
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 According to United Nations estimates, if the present demographic trends 
continue, 32 countries are projected to have smaller populations in 2050 than in 
2000. Of those, 15 are located in Western Europe and 14 are countries classified 
as economies in transition.  
   In Asia, Japan is the only country that would experience depopulation. 
In Japan, the population is expected to start declining in just a few years, after it 
reaches a peak at 128 million. The population of Italy, currently around 57 
million, is projected to shrink by as much as 30 per cent by mid-century. Total 
EU population (including the ten accession countries) is projected to decrease to 
431 million by 2050 from 452 million in 2000.  
   The traditional countries of immigration, Australia, Canada, the United 
States, and New Zealand, are expected to experience a population decline over 
the next fifty years. The continuing regular inflow of migrants has traditionally 
been well above the number of migrants needed to prevent a decline in the total 
population in these countries. Even though the fertility level in these countries is 
predicted to remain below the replacement level for the next few decades, 
assumed future immigration intakes will be able to offset declining population 
growth32. 
   Without gains from international migration, the populations of 
developed countries would decline between 2010 and 2050. With a projected 
net migration gain averaging 2.3 million migrants annually, the overall 
population of such countries is projected to increase slightly, from 1.23 billion 
                                                
32 In the United States, assuming a continuing annual net intake of 760,000 migrants per year 
as was experienced during 1995-2000, the total population of the country is projected to 
increase from 278 million to 349 million between 2000 and 2050. But, without any migration, 
the total population would increase to only 290 million in 2050. 
 55 
in 2009 to a maximum of 1.26 billion in 2031, and to start declining thereafter33, 
to reach 1.25 billion in 2050. 
4. In contrast, the population of the developing countries is growing robustly 
because their average fertility is still well above replacement level. From 2009 
to 2050, their population is projected to increase by 2.3 billion, from 5.6 billion 
to 7.9 billion34 (Table 2.1), accounting for 98 percent of the global population 
growth over the same period. The population of the least developed countries, in 
particular, is expected to double, reaching 1.7 billion in 205035.  
5. A country-wise breakup (not reflected in Table 2.1) reveals that in 2009, only 
11 countries have more than 100 million inhabitants - China, India, the United 
States of America, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, the Russian 
Federation, Japan and Mexico (listed in order of population size); and they 
account for 61 per cent of the world population. A total of 69 countries with 
                                                
33 The populations of 45 developed countries are projected to decrease between 2009 and 
2050, including in the Russian Federation (by 33 million), Japan (by 25 million), Ukraine (by 
15 million), Germany (by 8.4 million) and Poland (by 7.7 million). Population decline and the 
associated acceleration of population ageing are therefore important concerns for a growing 
number of countries. 
34 The populous countries of Brazil, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan are expected to 
contribute 828 million inhabitants to the world population between 2009 and 2050, with their 
overall population increasing from 2 billion in 2009 to 2.8 billion in 2050. Were fertility 
levels in those countries to remain constant at 2000-2005 levels, their population would reach 
3.9 billion in 2050. Constant fertility in the less developed regions would produce a 
population of 10.6 billion in 2050, 2.7 billion more than the estimate produced by the medium 
variant (7.9 billion). Therefore, in a constant fertility scenario, Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Pakistan would account for 70 per cent of the projected population increase in the 
less developed regions. According to the medium variant, the population of 29 countries, 
most of which are least developed countries, is likely to double between 2009 and 2050. Four 
countries will gain more than 100 million persons - India, with a projected increase of 455 
million; Nigeria, 134 million; Pakistan, 122 million; and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 120 million (UN DESA, 2009).  
 
35 The above projections are contingent on continued fertility reductions in developing 
countries, particularly in the least developed countries, where total fertility is projected to 
drop from 4.6 to 2.5 children per woman between the periods 2005-2010 and 2045-2050. 
Without further fertility change, the population of the least developed countries could reach 
2.8 billion in 2050. 
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populations ranging from 10 million to 100 million inhabitants account for more 
than 33 per cent of the world population. The population share of the 73 
countries or areas with populations ranging from 1 million to 10 million 
inhabitants is 5.4 per cent, while the remaining 76 countries or areas, each 
having fewer than 1 million inhabitants, account for just 0.3 per cent of the 
world population. 
2.2.2  Levels and Trends in Fertility and Mortality 
Global fertility36 has declined markedly since 1965, from 5.0 children per woman in 
the period 1965-1970 to 2.6 children per woman in 2005-2010  (Table 2.3). Since 
fertility in the more developed regions was a low 2.4 children per woman in 1965-
1970, the decline resulted mainly from reductions in developing countries, where 
fertility dropped from 6.0 to 2.8 children per woman over the period considered 
(Table 2.3). 
 Very low fertility levels that are not sufficient to ensure the replacement of 
generations are a matter of concern in many countries. UN DESA (2009) reports that 
in 2005-2010, 86 countries or areas, including 53 developed countries, had below-
replacement fertility.  
 Indeed, global population ageing has been fuelled by a fall in Total Fertility 
Rates (TFRs). Alongside the well recognized low fertility of western Europe, with all 
countries below replacement level, and southern Mediterranean countries in particular 
at 1.2–1.4, we see a similar pattern emerging in Asia too. Singapore and South Korea 
have now fallen to below 1.2, while Hong Kong, at just below 1, now has the lowest 
TFR in the world. 
                                                
36 Fertility rates are typically measured by the total fertility rate (TFR), which measures the 
average number of children each woman would have if the age-specific fertility rates in her 
region or country in a given year remained unchanged over her expected lifetime 
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 Table 2.3 




Major Areas 1965-1970 2005-2010 2045-2050 
World   4.9 2.6 2.0 
  More developed regions   2.4 1.6 1.8 
  Less developed regions 6.0 2.8 2.1 
    Least developed countries 6.7 4.6 2.5 
    Other less developed countries 5.9 2.5 1.9 
Africa 6.8 4.7 2.5 
Asia   5.7 2.3 1.9 
Europe  2.4 1.5 1.8 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 5.5 2.4 1.9 
Northern America   2.6 2.0 1.8 
Oceania   3.6 2.3 1.9 
 
Sources: Compiled and modified from Population Division of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2009). World 
Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and World Population Prospects: The 2006 














 It appears that 60 per cent of developed countries consider their fertility levels 
to be too low, up from 40 per cent in 1995 (UN DESA, 2009). Among the 47 
countries that consider their fertility to be too low, 27 are in Europe and 12 are in 
Asia. Policy makers in developed countries are already paying a great deal of 
attention to declining fertility rates, although no measures or programmes have 
successfully increased fertility rates significantly over an extended period. 
 Better hygiene, improved nutrition and scientifically based medical practices 
resulted in major reductions in mortality during the twentieth century. By 1950-1955, 
the more developed regions, which benefited first from such advances, had a life 
expectancy at birth of 66 years, which has since increased to 77 years (Table 2.4). 
Mortality in developing countries declined rapidly and life expectancy increased from 
41 years in the period 1950-1955 to 65 years in 2005-2010. Hence, the difference in 
life expectancy between developed and developing countries has narrowed, from 25 
years in 1950-1955 to 12 years in 2005-2010 (Table 2.4). 
 However, lagging mortality decline in the least developed countries, where 
life expectancy37 rose from 36 years in 1950-1955 to just 55 years in 2005-2010, has 
increased the gap between them and other developing countries from 5 to 13 years. 
Such divergence is the result partly of the exceptionally rapid increase in life 
expectancy achieved by Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (Table 2.4), and 
partly of high HIV prevalence38, failure to control endemic tropical diseases, 
including malaria, and the effects of protracted conflict in many least developed 
                                                
37 Life expectancy at birth is the number of years newborn infants will live, on average, if 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of their births stay the same throughout their lives. 
That measure is also referred to as “period” life expectancy because it depends on mortality 
rates in a particular period. 
38 The emergence of HIV and the resulting worldwide pandemic has increased mortality in 
the countries most affected by the disease. According to UNAIDS (2008), in 2007, an 
estimated 33 million people were living with HIV, 90 per cent of whom lived in developing 
countries, and two thirds of whom lived in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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 Table 2.4 
Life Expectancy at Birth for Both Sexes Combined, By major area, Selected periods 
 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) Average Annual Increase (years) 







World  46.4 64.2 67.2 75.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 
 More developed regions  66.1 74 76.5 82.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 Less developed regions  40.8 62 65.4 74.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 
   Least developed countries  36.2 50.4 54.6 67.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 
   Other less developed countries  41.5 64.2 67.9 76.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 
Africa 38.5 51.9 52.8 66.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Asia  41 64.5 69 77.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 
Europe  65.6 72.6 74.6 81 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean  51.4 68.6 73.3 79.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Northern America  68.8 75.5 78.5 83.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Oceania  60.4 72.3 75.2 81 0.3 0.2 0.1 
 
 
Sources: Compiled and modified from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 
(2009). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 1, New York: United Nations.
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Figure 2.3 
Difference between Female and Male Life Expectancy by Development Group, 1950-2010 
 
 Source: World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision 
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countries, particularly those in Africa. 
Despite the impact of HIV/AIDS, life expectancy is projected to increase in most 
regions and to reach unprecedented levels by 2045-2050 - 75 years globally, and 
higher in all major areas except Africa. While the life expectancy figures for most 
major areas are expected to converge, those for the least developed countries will lag 
behind (Table 2.4). 
 As a general trend, in most countries today, females have a higher life 
expectancy than males (Figure 2.3). Globally, newborn girls can expect to live 69.5 
years at 2005-2010 mortality rates, compared with 65 years for boys. Between the 
periods 1950-1955 and 2005-2010, the difference between female and male life 
expectancy increased from 2.7 years to 4.5 years. This increasing female advantage in 
survivorship results from a faster improvement in female life expectancy compared 
with that of males in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania. 
2.2.3  International Migration Trends 
 Table 2.5 presents latest data on international migration. The following 
observations are made based on the table. These projections were made before the 
current global crisis became evident. Nevertheless, the medium-term migration trends 
are not expected to be altered significantly.  
1. The number of international migrants, which stood at 155 million in 1990, and 
191 million in 2005, is expected to reach 210 million in 2010, still representing 3 per 
cent of the world population.  
2. It is projected that about 128 million international migrants, or 61 per cent, 
will reside in developed countries, whereas 82 million, or 39 per cent, will live in 
developing countries. International migrants will account for about 10 per cent of the 
population of developed countries, but for just 1.4 per cent of that of developing 
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Table 2.5 
International Migrants, Their Percentage Distribution by Major Areas and Gender, 1990-2010 
 
No. of international 
migrants (millions) 
Increment 
(millions) Percentage Distribution 
Percentage of Female 
Migrants 
Major area 1990 2010 1990-2010 1990 2010 1990 2010 
World  155 210 55 100 100 49 49 
    More developed regions  82 128 46 53 61 52 52 
    Less developed regions  73 82 9 47 39 45 45 
Africa 16 19 3 10 9 46 48 
Asia  50 58 8 32 28 45 44 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean  7 7 0 5 3 50 50 
Northern America  28 50 22 18 24 51 50 
Europe  49 70 20 32 33 53 53 
Oceania  4 6 2 3 3 49 51 
 
 
Sources: Compiled and modified from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 
(2009). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 1, New York: United Nations.
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countries in 2010.  
3. Europe is expected to host the highest share of international migrants (33 per 
cent), followed by Asia (28 per cent), Northern America (24 per cent), Africa (9 per 
cent), Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania (3 per cent each). High-income 
countries are expected to host 62 per cent of all international migrants. 
4. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of international migrants is expected to 
increase by 55 million, from 155 million to 210 million. Some 83 per cent of those 55 
million, or 46 million migrants, are expected to be added to the migrant population of 
developed countries, while developing countries as a whole will gain just 9 million 
migrants. 
5. The proportion of female international migrants, which reached 49 per cent in 
1990, is expected to remain at that level until 2010. In developed countries, female 
migrants have outnumbered male migrants since 1985 and their proportion is 
expected to remain at 52 per cent in 2010. In contrast, female migrants remain 
underrepresented in Asia, largely because the major receiving countries in Western 
and South-eastern Asia are the destination of significant numbers of contract workers, 
most of whom are men. 
 Trends and projections available from the UN DESA (2009) database also 
indicates that while in 1990, 30 countries hosted 75 per cent of all international 
migrants, by 2010, 27 are expected to do so. The United States will account for 20 per 
cent of all international migrants in 2010, followed by the Russian Federation (6 per 
cent), Germany (5 per cent), Canada (3 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (3 per cent). 
Between 1990 and 2010, nine receiving countries will absorb 83 per cent of the 
increase in the migrant stock, with the United States gaining about 20 million 
migrants, Spain gaining about 6 million and Germany gaining nearly 5 million. 
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 By 2010, migrants will constitute at least one fifth of the population of 47 
countries, including Australia, Canada and Saudi Arabia, and of 34 other countries 
with fewer than a million inhabitants each. A high proportion of international 
migrants characterize the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council; Hong 
Kong and Macao, Special Administrative Regions of China; Israel; Jordan; 
Singapore; and several small countries in Europe. 
 As expected from the above trends, in the more developed regions, net 
migration became the driving force of population growth in 1995-2000. However, a 
projected net annual intake averaging 2.3 million migrants will not prevent the 
population of those regions from decreasing, although the decline will likely start only 
after 2030. The slow growth of the working age population coupled with sustained 
economic growth in many developed countries has led to sector-specific labor 
shortages that have been increasingly filled by migrant workers. 
 
2.2.4 Global Population Ageing 
 Smaller families and longer life spans are shifting the age distribution of the 
world population from younger to older. While in 1950, only 8 per cent of the world 
population was aged 60 years or over, by 2010, that proportion is expected to rise to 
11 per cent, and it is expected to reach 22 per cent in 2050 (Table 2.6). Globally, the 
number of persons aged 60 or over is expected almost to triple, from 743 million in 
2009 to 2 billion in 2050. By that date, the number of older persons will exceed the 
number of children under the age of 15.
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Table 2.6  


























Sources: Compiled and modified from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 
(2009). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 1, New York: United Nations.













6,909 (100.0) 2010 27 62 11 2 100 World 
 
 9,150 (100.0) 2050 20 58 22 4 100 
1,237 (17.9) 2010 17 62 22 4 100 More   Developed 
Regions 
 1,275 (13.9) 2050 15 52 33 9 100 
5,671 (82.1) 2010 29 61 9 1 100 Less Developed Regions 
 
7,875 (86.1) 2050 20 57 20 3 100 
1,033 (14.9) 2010 40 55 5 0 100 Africa 
 
 
1,998 (21.8) 2050 27 62 11 1 100 
4,167 (60.3) 2010 26 63 10 1 100 Asia 
 
 
5,231 (57.2) 2050 18 54 24 4 100 
733 (10.6) 2010 15 63 22 4 100 Europe 
 
 
691 (7.6) 2050 15 51 34 10 100 
352 (5.1) 2010 20 62 18 4 100 North America 
 448 (4.9) 2050 17 56 28 8 100 
589 (8.5) 2010 28 61 10 1 100 Latin America and the  
Caribbean  729 (7.9) 2050 17 52 26 5 100 
36 (0.5) 2010 24 58 15 3 100 Oceania 
51 (0.6) 
 
2050 19 50 24 7 100 
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 As may be observed from data in Table 2.6, population ageing is more 
advanced in the more developed regions, where the proportion of older persons is 
estimated at 22 per cent for 2010 and the number of older persons already exceeds by 
a wide margin the number of children under the age of 15. By 2050, the proportion of 
older persons in the more developed regions is likely to reach 33 per cent, more than 
double the expected proportion of children (15 per cent). 
 Although the process of population ageing is less advanced in the less 
developed regions, it is occurring at a faster pace than in Europe, given the rapid 
reduction of the overall fertility level in those regions. The proportion of older 
persons in the less developed regions is expected to increase from 9 per cent in 2010 
to 20 per cent in 2050. Despite the fact that the proportion of older persons in those 
regions is lower, developing countries are already home to more older persons than 
developed countries, and it is projected that in 2050, 80 per cent of all older persons 
will live in developing countries39. Therefore the extent to which developing countries 
meet the challenges of the ageing population will help determine how the global 
ageing challenges are met.  
 Europe will continue to have the highest proportion of older persons - 22 per 
cent in 2010 and 34 per cent in 205040. In contrast, only 11 per cent of the population 
                                                
39 Between 2010 and 2050, the older population of those countries is projected to increase 
from 481 million to 1.6 billion, while that of developed countries is expected to rise from 262 
million to 406 million. 
40 Regarding the proportion of the population aged 60+ in the world’s oldest countries at the 
turn of the twentieth century, with the exception of Japan the top 20 are all European. 
Globally, Italy has the highest proportion of persons aged 60+, primarily a consequence of its 
low fertility levels. In the EU 15, Italy has the highest proportion of older people (24.2 per 
cent) while Ireland has the lowest (15.1 per cent). Australia, Canada and the United States are 
at the lower end of this scale, between 12 and 13 per cent. Interestingly, even the former 
Eastern European countries have higher percentages than Canada, Australia and the US but 
these proportions represent very different numbers of older people. The largest population of 
older people in the developed world is in the US, with 45 million people aged 60+, followed 
by Japan with nearly 30 million, and Germany with around 19 million (UN DESA 2006, 
Harper, 2006). 
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of Africa is expected to be aged 60 or over by 2050, up from 5 per cent in 2010. The 
fastest growth in the proportion of older persons is projected to take place in both 
Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, where older persons will constitute 24 per 
cent of the total population in 2050, up from 10 per cent in 2010 (Table 2.6).  
 Also of key importance is the speed with which such an age-structural 
transition is occurring, with the less developed and transitional countries facing 
extreme rapidity of ageing. While it took Europe (EU 15) some 120 years to go from 
a young to a mature population, maturity being achieved in the year 2000, such a shift 
in the proportion of young and old will have occurred in Asia in less than 25 years. 
France, for example, took over 100 years to move from seven per cent to 14 per cent 
of its population aged 60+, while in Japan it took just 30 years. While the predicted 
increase by 2025 in the percentage of people aged 60+ for the EU 15 is around 33 per 
cent, it is 400 per cent for Indonesia, 350 per cent for Thailand, Kenya, and Mexico, 
280 per cent for Zimbabwe and up to 250 per cent for India, China and Brazil 
(Harper, 2006). This rapidity of demographic ageing, resulting in their becoming old 
before they become rich, is one of the greatest policy and institutional challenges for 
less developed and transitional economies. 
 The share of the working-age population in total population will fall in 
advanced countries, but increase in many developing countries (Table 2.6)41. In 
developing countries42, the share of the working-age population is projected to 
increase until 2015, and then remain at this higher level as a declining share of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
41 In Japan and some European countries, this decline has already started and is projected to 
accelerate. In the United States, a high rate of immigration and higher fertility rates result in a 
more modest projected decline until 2025, after which the share of the working-age 
population stabilizes. 
42 Looking at specific countries, large declines in the share of the working-age population are 
anticipated in Russia and China, while steady increases are expected in India and Nigeria. 
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young offsets a rising share of the elderly. The working-age share will, however, start 
to decline in some regions before 2050, first in central and Eastern Europe, and then 
in Asia and Latin America. In the Middle East and Africa, increases in the working-
age populations are projected out to 2050.  
Figure 2.4 shows the declines in the share of working-age population in 
selected developed countries. It is clear that labor force shrinkage will be critical in 
Europe and Japan. For example, if the present demographic trend continues, 
Germany’s population aged 15-64 years would decrease from 68.1 per cent to 56.9 
per cent between 2000 and 2050. In the example of Germany, this percentage change 
is based on a projected decrease of the population aged 15-64 from 56 million to 45 
million between 2000 and 2050. 
The future change in the size of working-age population in the course of 
population ageing will affect the economic sustainability of a country because the 
potential support ratio - the number of persons of working age (15-64 years) per older 
person - will often be halved, from 4 or 5 to 2. 
Traditional countries of immigration are predicted to slow the decline of the 
working-age population with immigration programmes, which select relatively young 
migrants for permanent settlement. Only one-sixth of the population of more 
developed regions were under 15 years old in 2000, while in less developed regions a 
third of the population was under 15 years old. These figures are important pointers to 
the future directions of these populations, particularly in terms of the future 



























The Growth of Oldest Old: The growth rate of those aged 80+ is of equal 
significance43 (Table 2.6). This is the fastest growing age group in the world, with an 
annual growth rate of 3.8 per cent. Low fertility around the time of World War I and 
declining mortality rates among this cohort partly explain this - people reaching 80 in 
the mid-1990s were part of a relatively small birth cohort. Fertility increased again in 
the post-World War I period, so that at the turn of the century a much larger birth 
cohort was reaching 80. In just four years, the growth rate of the world’s 80+ group 
thus increased from 1.3 per cent to 3.5 per cent.  
 Currently 40 per cent of those aged 80+ live in Asia, some 16 per cent in 
China alone, partly a reflection of China’s very large proportion of the total world 
population; 30 per cent are in Europe and 13 per cent in the US. Japan is predicted to 
have 40 per cent of its older population aged 80+ by 2030. 
 In most countries, longevity is increasing. Global life expectancy at age 60 
rose from 15 years in 1950-1955 to 20 years in 2005-2010, and it is expected to reach 
23 years in 2045-2050. As a result, the older population is itself ageing, and persons 
aged 80 or over, who would constitute about 2 per cent of the world population in 
2010, are expected to account for 4.4 per cent in 2050 (Table 2.6). 
 In the light of the above trends it is predicted that by 2050, the population 
pyramid for the developed world will settle as population parallel lines, with around 
10 per cent of the population in each age decade between birth and 100; that of 
transitional and developing countries will straighten considerably. Over the next 40 
years, however, we shall continue to see a top heavy pyramid, with a large bulge of 
mature and then older adults moving up as the dominant population. In the developed 
                                                
43 In recognition of this increase in the oldest old, the UN Population Division is now 
producing population projections with a final age category of 100+.  
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countries this is due to the baby boom cohorts of the middle of the last century. In the 
less developed and transitional countries, this is due to the ‘shelf’ generation (Harper, 
2006), i.e. the current cohort of young reproductive women who, while themselves 
typically part of large horizontal families with five to eight siblings, have chosen to 
bear only one, two or even no children. 
 The trends as analyzed above have serious implications for public policy 
around the world. Population ageing poses challenges to the financial sustainability of 
pension systems based on the redistribution of earnings from younger to older 
generations and of health-care systems44. 
 In developing countries, an estimated 342 million older persons lack adequate 
incomes, and their number may rise to 1.2 billion in 2050 if the coverage of pension 
schemes does not expand (ILO, 2002). Since women constitute the majority of the 
older population and have lower labor force participation than men, they are 
particularly likely to be poor in old age. Consequently, policies aimed at providing a 
safety net for older persons need to focus on older women in particular (ILO, 2002). 
  
2.2.5 Urbanization 
 Another interesting facet of global demographic trends is the increasing 
urbanization around the world. According to United Nations World Urbanization 
Prospects, in 2008, for the first time in history, the number of urban dwellers 
                                                
44 However, population ageing need not necessarily be seen in a negative way. Population 
ageing brings important benefits, especially during the four or five decades when the 
proportion of children declines and that of older persons increases slowly. If the population of 
working age can be productively employed during that period, more resources can be 
available for investment and to spur economic growth. Additionally, given that women with 
fewer children are more likely to work, with investment in health and education increasing 
and people saving more for a longer retirement, population ageing can produce additional and 
permanent increases in per capita income and economic growth. However, those outcomes 
depend on developing appropriate institutions and adopting policies that foster the 
accumulation of human and physical capital. 
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surpassed the number of rural inhabitants. World urbanization is expected to continue 
at a fast pace in many developing countries, yielding by 2050 a world population that 
will likely be 70 per cent urban.  
 Between 2007 and 2050, the number of urban dwellers is projected to increase 
by 3.1 billion, from 3.3 billion to 6.4 billion, while the world population will gain 2.5 
billion persons (United Nations, 2007). The difference represents a net population 
transfer from rural to urban areas as a result of migration and the transformation of 
rural localities into urban centres, usually described as “reclassification”. 
 Future population growth will be largely concentrated in the cities and towns 
of developing countries. The urban population of developing countries is projected to 
increase by 2.9 billion, from 2.4 billion in 2007 to 5.3 billion in 2050 (Figure 2.5), 
whereas the urban population of developed countries will likely rise from 0.9 billion 
in 2007 to just 1.1 billion in 2050. As a share, between 2007 and 2050, the urban 
proportion of the population of developing countries is projected to increase from 44 
per cent to 67 per cent, while that of developed countries will likely rise from 74 per 
cent to 86 per cent. 
 The above discussion suggests that the world is undergoing a centuries-long 
demographic transition that will potentially leave the global population larger and 
much older, on average, than it is today. Improvements in nutrition, sanitation, health 
practices, and medical care have dramatically reduced infant mortality and extended 
the life expectancy of children and adults. 
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 Figure 2.5 
Rural and Urban Populations, By Development Group 
 
 
   Source: World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, Highlights
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With more children living to adulthood and having children themselves, the world is 
going through an unparalleled period of rapid and sustained growth in population. As 
population and incomes have grown, however, people have begun to reduce the 
number of children they have. The resulting decline in fertility rates is gradually 
reducing the rate of population growth, and the world population is gradually 
becoming older. 
 The timing and pace of the transition vary considerably across regions and 
countries of the world. Fertility rates have fallen nearly everywhere, but while they 
have generally fallen to lower levels in developed countries than in most developing 
countries, they are falling more rapidly in the developing countries.  
 Similarly, life expectancies have risen to higher levels in developed countries 
than in developing ones and will remain higher for many years to come, but life 
expectancies have risen nearly everywhere and are currently rising more rapidly in 
most developing countries.  
 In addition, immigration from developing countries has contributed to 
population growth in some developed countries, including the United States, although 
most other developed countries have allowed relatively little immigration. The net 
result of those trends is that population growth rates are currently much higher in 
most developing countries than in developed ones, but growth rates are gradually 
declining nearly everywhere.  
 Many developed countries that are already well into the transition have nearly 
stable or even declining populations that are rapidly ageing. In contrast, many 
developing countries will continue to have much younger and rapidly growing 
populations for several decades to come. The differences across regions are likely to 
have significant effects on international economic trends. 
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 Significant uncertainties exist in the timing and magnitude of the demographic 
transition and the shifts in population structure, and how those developments will 
affect national economies throughout the world and the international economic flows 
among them. 
  
2.3 Globalization, Demographic Trends, and Migration: Interrelationships 
 and Policy Implications  
  
 The demographic trends outlined and analyzed in the previous section are not 
occurring in isolation. They are shaped by globalization, involving increasing flow of 
human, financial, and technological resources across national boundaries. They also 
help shape globalization characteristics.  
 At the same time, a key stimulus to global human and capital flows emerges 
from demographic imbalances arising from the differential movement of regions into 
maturity. Thus while an understanding of the dynamics of globalization is essential to 
address the challenges and opportunities of ageing societies, so also is the necessity to 
analyze the impact of global ageing on globalization, and on migration flows and 
public policies concerning them. 
 Accordingly, the following sub-sections analyzes the effects of immigration, 
and demographic trends on selected economic aspects of globalization. Intertwined in 
the analysis is also how various aspects of the global economy is in turn shaping 
demographic patterns, and migration policies. To make the analysis manageable, the 
essay narrows the scope to selected aspects of the above. The key objective therefore 
is to examine the interrelationships among the phenomena of globalization 
(economic), demographic trends (population ageing), and migration (immigration).  
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2.3.1 Effects of Immigration 
 The economic impact of immigration is complex and has many dimensions. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. Note that the shock to the economy is referred to in 
this figure as ‘demographic change’ rather than immigration. The same catalogue of 
impacts can be applied, whether the exogenous shock under consideration is one of 
immigration, emigration, births or deaths. However, here we want to analyze the 
impact of immigration. 
 The impact of any demographic change may be divided into supply effects 
(consequences for labor and capital) and demand effects (consequences for public and 
private consumption, international trade and domestic and foreign investment). The 
interaction effects occur at the interface of supply and demand effects. Eventually, 
there will be general equilibrium effects of the market forces on quantities sold, 
prices, wages, interest rates, income, wealth and public sector activities. There are 
also productivity effects in both the short run and the long run. Finally, demographic 
change will generate a range of externalities, which include environmental effects, 
agglomeration, social effects and the other external effects (Figure 2.6).  
 Figure 2.6 also indicates that whatever the initial demographic shock (level of 
immigration for example) might be, the economic consequences may generate further 
demographic change (fertility, mortality, morbidity and migration) in the long run. 
Despite the growing importance of immigration as a contributor to national and global 
population change, remarkably little is known about two of the core components of 
Figure 2.6 - the impact on productivity and externalities. 
 77 
Figure 2.6 




Impact on Productivity and Competitiveness  
 In general, high levels of immigration usually coincide with higher economic 
growth and with agglomeration, but such association does not necessarily imply 
causation. There are three channels through which immigration can improve 
competitiveness and productivity. These are (1) acceleration of productivity 
improvements associated with new investment induced by immigration, including 
possible economies of scale and scope effects; (2) through potential positive impacts 
on creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship; and (3) through improving allocative 
efficiency. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
 First, growth in the labor force through immigration raises the return to 
capital. This encourages investment until eventually the risk-adjusted rate of return is 
again spatially equalised. To the extent that the additional investment embodies the 
latest technologies, immigration can enhance total factor productivity (TFP). This 
effect is dependent, however, on the sectoral allocation of the additional investment. 
Given the growth in the number of households, increased residential building activity 
for example is highly probable (Saiz, 2003). However, this type of investment is 
likely to have less technological spillover benefits than fixed capital formation in 
some areas such as high-tech sectors. 
 The second way that immigration can enhance competitiveness is through 
Schumpeterian innovation45. This occurs when immigrants bring new ideas, work in 
                                                
45 Joseph Schumpeter gave two theories on entrepreneurship, sometimes called Mark I and 
Mark II. In the first one, the early one, Schumpeter argued that the innovation and 
technological change of a nation comes from the entrepreneurs, or wild spirits. He coined the 
word Unternehmergeist, German for entrepreneur-spirit. He believed that these individuals 
are the ones who make things work in the economy of the country. In Mark II, developed later 
as professor at Harvard, he asserted that the actors that drive innovation and the economy are 
big companies which have the resources and capital to invest in research and development. 
Both arguments might be complementary today 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schumpeter).  
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‘sunrise’ industries and occupations, or set up new businesses. Immigrants may have 
higher rates of self-employment and be less risk averse than the locally born 
population46. 
 The growing international mobility of professionals that may be referred to as 
a ‘brain exchange’ or ‘talent flow’ is also likely to contribute to competitiveness of 
destination regions. It can furthermore be argued that growing social or ethnic 
diversity due to immigration encourages innovation and entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004), although the effect on growth is by no means easy to 
detect (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005)47.  
 The third way that immigration can affect economic growth is through 
improving economic efficiency. It can be argued that migrants are more responsive to 
economic signals because of a lack of ‘cumulative inertia’ and thus help keep the 
economy moving. The fact that migrants are younger, on average, also tends to make 
them more willing and able to adjust to economic change. Immigration also increases 
the size of the regional economy, which can potentially lead to more competition and 
efficiency. 
 To the extent that immigration is controlled by government agencies, and 
therefore at least partially exogenous, the overall impact of the effects mentioned 
above should be detectable in time series modeling of TFP. However, the impact of 
immigration on productivity has been inadequately researched throughout the world. 
Poot (1993) provided some very tentative New Zealand evidence that there is only a 
                                                
46 In some countries, particularly those that recruit entrepreneurial migrants through the 
‘points-based admission system’ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), there is a need to 
distinguish between active and passive investment - spillover benefits are likely to be less if 
migrant financial capital is invested in the existing capital stock rather than used as start-up 
capital for new enterprises. 
47 A counterargument is that diversity creates a less cohesive society that may, through 
eroding social capital and trust, reduce competitiveness. 
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weak effect of immigration ‘granger causing’ productivity improvements, but a much 
stronger effect of net migration responding positively at times when TFP growth is 
faster than usual. 
 An additional knowledge gap exists at the micro level. There is little known 
about the transmission mechanisms through which immigrants increase productivity 
of individual firms. The absence of conclusive evidence is the more remarkable given 
that immigration policy is often motivated by these hard to quantify spillover benefits. 
There are many micro-level studies of migrant entrepreneurship, but such studies are 
often of a qualitative nature and based on very small samples. Such studies do suggest 
that there are significant qualitative differences in terms of entrepreneurial activity 
between migrants groups defined by ethnicity or birthplace (Masurel et al., 2002). 
 Little empirical evidence exists on how immigration affects regional or global 
productivity growth. This is not surprising given the difficulty in disentangling a 
number of effects. 
 Firstly, immigration is itself partly endogenous and disproportionally 
distributed in the direction of fast growing cities. Secondly, immigration makes the 
labor force more youthful, so that age and diversity effects must be considered 
separately. Thirdly, the impact in the long run may be different from that in the short 
run48.  
 Two additional effects through which international migration can indirectly 
affect competitiveness are through trade and through international linkages that result 
from a country’s Diaspora continuing (and in some cases deepening) linkages with 
their country and region of birth.  
                                                
48 Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002) found that in the US labor productivity increased more 
slowly in states that attracted a larger share of immigrants during the 1980s, but argued that 
this might be a short-run rather than a long-run effect. 
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 With respect to trade, several studies have found that immigration has a 
positive effect on trade between the source country of the immigrants and the host 
country (Hatton and Williamson, 2005; Wagner et al., 2002; Ching and Chen, 2000). 
Two basic causes for this effect have been identified. Firstly, immigrants tend to have 
a preference for the products from their home countries, as a matter of taste or due to 
emotional attachment. Secondly, immigrants can reduce transaction costs of bilateral 
trade with their home countries either through individual characteristics such as 
business contacts or through more generic traits such as language. 
 While the positive correlation between immigration and trade has been 
generally confirmed, it is important to distinguish the effect on imports from the 
effect on exports.  
 By and large, the elasticity of the effect of immigration on exports is less than 
the elasticity of the effect on imports. A good example is the study by Wagner et al. 
(2002). Using cross-provincial variation in immigration in Canada, they find that 
immigrants expand exports to their native country, but also stimulate imports from 
their native country. The Canadian data suggest that the effect on imports may be 
triple that on exports. Other research similarly suggests that immigration leads to 
deterioration of the trade balance (Ching and Chen, 2000). These effects are likely to 
vary with the characteristics of the migrants and their countries of birth. 
 The evidence on a deteriorating trade balance following an immigration wave 
is consistent with the expectation that immigration-induced population growth 
generates excess demand. If this is just a short-run effect, it may not be of great 
concern. More important are the dynamic gains from increased trade. When growth in 
trade encourages innovation and entrepreneurship in the sectors in which the migrants 
are employed, competitiveness may increase in the long run. 
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 In areas with low or middle income levels, the main driver of population 
change may be emigration. Moreover, regions with large levels of immigration 
sometimes experience also large levels of emigration. Such emigration is a 
combination of outward migration of natives and return or onward migration of 
earlier immigrants. The potential role of the Diaspora in economic development is 
attracting increasing attention in middle-income countries. The Diaspora phenomenon 
is clearly linked with global economic integration and the growing mobility of 
professional and other skilled workers. In the global market for ‘talent’, such links can 
be exploited for development (Cervantes and Guellec, 2002; Henoch, 2006). A recent 
example is that of how Russia’s Diaspora contributes to a competitive edge in the 
software industry (Bardhan and Kroll, 2006). 
 There are various ways in which regions can benefit from Diaspora. The first 
is through encouraging return migration49 by means of special tax treatment or 
training and investment subsidies. Governments can also develop Diaspora 
knowledge networks through promoting business associations or virtual clusters 
through the Internet. There can also be integration of home and host regions through 
joint ventures and other forms of cooperation. Finally, incentives may be created to 
channel remittances to productive investment in the home region. 
 
2.3.2. Effects of Demographic Trends (Population Ageing)  
 Section 2.2 analyzed various contemporary demographic trends. In this sub-
section, we confine our analysis to the impacts of population ageing, that is unfolding 
globally.  
 Population ageing can refer to either an increasing share of older persons in 
                                                
49 Essay 2 of this thesis examines the phenomenon of return migration in the Indian state of 
Kerala.  
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the population (structural ageing) or an increase in the number of older persons 
(numerical ageing), or both. Like immigration, population ageing affects the economy 
also in many ways50.  Figure 2.6 can be used to obtain a catalogue of economic 
consequences.  
 The economics literature on ageing tends to emphasize public policy problems 
associated with population ageing. More recent literature downplays such problems 
and takes a more optimistic stance of ‘positive ageing’ through policy responses and 
market forces that will encourage older persons to continue to make economic 
contributions that will avoid or overcome many problems. In addition, resources that 
were allocated to the young are freed up in many countries and generate a (temporary) 
phase of an increasing proportion of the population at the key labor force ages. This 
provides a so-called ‘demographic dividend’ (Lee, 2003) although this dividend 
requires investment in education and training of the workers in order to reap the 
benefits of this ‘window of opportunity’ (Pool, 2005). 
 This following briefly reviews both the macroeconomic and the 
microeconomic links between population ageing and competitiveness, a key aspect of 
economic globalization.  
 The effect of population aging on labor productivity is theoretically 
indeterminate. Disney (1996) for instance, argues that an increasingly mature 
workforce will have higher levels of work experience and therefore might be expected 
to achieve higher levels of productivity than a younger workforce. Furthermore, as the 
aggregate cost of schooling falls when there are fewer young people, more intensive 
training of the young becomes affordable and may lead to subsequent productivity 
                                                
50 See for example, Hurd (1997) for a review of microeconomic issues while Weil (1997) 
provides a macroeconomic review. Here our focus is on public policy issues, which 
encompasses both microeconomic and macroeconomic aspects.   
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growth (Ermisch, 1995; Fougere and Merette, 1999). 
 It is possible that the slower labor force growth implied by an ageing 
population leads to a higher relative price of labor and therefore provides a greater 
incentive to innovate through capital investment or research and development 
(Romer, 1990). 
 However, there are also endogenous growth models in which lower population 
growth results in less human capital accumulation and therefore a lower growth rate 
of labor productivity. In this case, the assumption is that population growth 
encourages technological change, which raises the return to human capital investment 
(e.g. Steinmann et al., 1998). On balance, Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001) argue that 
population growth is neither necessary for, nor conducive to, economic growth. 
 However, if population ageing is associated with high levels of dis-saving, this 
may increase the cost of capital and lower investment. Furthermore, since labor 
mobility (geographic, occupational, industrial) is inversely related to age, population 
ageing may also lower productivity growth through slowing down structural 
adjustment in the economy. In addition, population ageing shifts demand in the 
economy to labor intensive services where the potential for productivity growth may 
be less (Van Groezen et al., 2005). Finally, Canton et al. (2002) argue that when older 
people face a higher cost of adopting new technologies, political pressure in a 
democratic system may slow down innovation adoption in an ageing society.
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Table 2.7 




Notes: 1 All regressions are panel fixed-effects regressions. The sample includes 115 countries; the data for each country are averaged over each 
decade. All demographic variables, as well as several other controls, are instrumented using their lagged values. Bold-faced values are 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
2The working-age population is defined as the age group 15–64 inclusive of both ages. The elderly population is defined as the age group 65 and 
upward. Increases in the share of either are defined as coming at the expense of the age group 0–14 inclusive. These population shares appear in 
growth form in the regression for the growth of real GDP per capita, and in level form elsewhere except in the regression for the current 
account/GDP ratio, where they are expressed as deviations from the world average. 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook (2004), Chapter 3. 
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 Some empirical evidence has emerged on the overall impact of all these 
effects. At the cross-country level, Lindh and Malmberg (1999) find that the 50–64 
age group had a positive influence on labor productivity growth, whereas the 65-plus 
group had a negative effect and other age groups had ambiguous effects. Using 
Canadian provincial data, Tang and MacLeod (2006) find that older workers are, on 
average, less productive than younger workers and that labor force ageing has a 
modest negative impact on productivity growth. Similarly, Brunow and Hirte (2006) 
find that differences in age structure induce differences in per capita output growth 
across European regions. The most significant (positive) growth is generated by the 
age group of 30- to 44-year olds. Using a large panel of developed and developing 
countries, Feyrer (2007) found that it was the relative size of the age group 40 and 49 
that particularly associated with productivity growth. 
 The World Economic Outlook (2004) investigated the relationship between 
demographic variables and per capita GDP growth, saving, investment, the current 
account, and fiscal balances, using a large, 115-country, panel data set covering the 
period 1960-2000. The results from the study are reported in Table 2.7. The key 
results of their analysis51 are the following: 
1.  Per capita GDP growth is positively correlated with changes in the relative 
 size of the working-age population, and negatively correlated with changes in 
 the share of the elderly. The result partly reflects the direct productive impact 
 of a larger labor force. In addition, lower dependency ratios tend to raise 
 saving, which in turn helps finance more investment and boosts output. 
                                                
51 The econometric results should be interpreted with some caution, as historical correlations 
may not reflect causality. In particular, econometric analysis of demographic issues is subject 
to problems of endogeneity and omitted variables. For instance, income itself is an important 
determinant of fertility, mortality, and hence the age structure of populations (Lee, 2003); this 
may introduce biases into the estimated coefficients. 
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2.  There is a statistically significant association between demographic variables 
and saving. According to the life-cycle hypothesis of saving, people try to 
maintain a smooth pattern of consumption through their lifetime. This means 
that when current income is low relative to lifetime average income, saving will 
also be low, and when current income is high relative to lifetime average 
income, saving will be high. Younger people tend to be net borrowers; older 
people at the peak of their earnings potential tend to be high net savers; and the 
elderly tend to dissave, or at least to save at a lower rate than during their 
working years. While there is some contention about the validity of the life-
cycle hypothesis in this finding, particularly whether the elderly actually run 
down their wealth in retirement, the results in Table 2.7, as well as most other 
cross-country studies, find that demographic factors (together with income 
growth, real interest rates, and public saving) play a role in influencing saving 
behavior (Faruqee, 2002). Specifically, saving rises with an increase in the share 
of the working-age population, and declines with an increase in the elderly 
share. 
3. The share of the working-age population is also correlated with investment. 
Demographic change influences investment through its impact on saving, and 
because changes in the labor supply affect the returns to investment. 
4. Current account balances increase with the relative size of the working-age 
population, and decrease when the elderly dependency ratio rises. Although 
saving and investment are both affected by the age structure of the population, 
so that it is not immediately obvious what impact demographic change should 
have on the current account, the finding is consistent with other studies (Feroli , 
2003; Chinn and Prasad, 2003). 
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4. Demographic factors also affect the fiscal balance. Specifically, government 
budgets are adversely affected by population aging due to higher spending on 
pensions, health care, and long-term residential care52. A smaller working-age 
population may also result in lower tax revenues. 
 The econometric evidence across a variety of studies suggests that projected 
demographic changes could have an important impact on future economic 
performance of a country. Not surprisingly then, such trends have substantial impact 
on migration flows and policies.  
2.3.3  Global Demographic Transition: Policy Imperatives 
 What emerges from the discussion and analysis in the previous sub-sections is 
that while the challenges of worldwide demographic transition differ between 
advanced and developing countries, at a broad level, if a policy is to help respond to 
demographic change, it needs to boost labor supply, saving, or productivity. 
 Assuming that participation rates do not change, demographic developments 
will result in a decline in the supply of labor in many advanced countries over the 
next 50 years53. Measures to boost labor force participation rates and labor supply, 
particularly among the women and the elderly (of both genders), including through 
pension system reform and providing other work incentives, have therefore attracted 
considerable interest (Casey et al., 2003; Burniaux, Duval, and Jaumotte, 2003; and 
McMorrow and Roeger, 2004). 
                                                
52 Heller (2003) provides an excellent analysis of the long term fiscal challenges posed by 
population aging). Casey et al. (2003) estimate that among OECD countries elderly-related 
spending will rise by an average of nearly 7 percent of GDP between 2000 and 2050 with 
additional expenditures on health care exceeding those on pensions in a number of countries. 
53 Estimates by Burniaux, Duval, and Jaumotte (2003) suggest that labor supply could drop by 
as much as 35 percent in Japan, 30 percent in Italy, and 17 percent in Germany. 
 89 
 Figure 2.7a 
Policy Response to a Declining Labor Force in Selected Advanced Economies (Labor Force Participation) 
 
Note: The projections are provided in World Economic Outlook (2004). The bases of the projections are data from United Nations World 
Population Prospects 2002, and IMF Staff calculations.  
Source: World Economic Outlook (2004).
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 The increase in the participation rate among the working-age population that 
would be necessary to keep the workforce-to-population ratio at current levels, 
however, is large (Figure 2.7a). For advanced countries, participation rates would 
need to increase by an average of 11 percentage points, with the required increase 
much higher for European countries and Korea than for the United States; for Japan, 
even raising the participation rate to 100 percent would not by itself be sufficient to 
offset the projected decline in the working-age population.  
 Permitting more immigration could also increase the workforce. Again, the 
migration flows that would be required to keep the workforce-to-population ratio 
constant at current levels are very large, particularly when seen against the 
background of the generally low levels of migration in recent years.  
 Raising the retirement age could also help offset the impact of population 
aging on the workforce. An increase of about seven years would be needed, on 
average, in the advanced countries to keep the share of the working-age population 
constant at its current level, although individual country requirements again vary 
widely. 
 Policies that encourage an increase in fertility rates have also been suggested 
as a way to counter current demographic changes, although there would be a long lag 
before these would increase the labor force even if they were effective in raising 
fertility. While there is considerable evidence that public policy has played an 
important role in reducing fertility rates in developing countries, there remains much 
more debate about whether public policies can raise fertility in low fertility countries 
(Demeny, 2003)54.  
                                                
54 Proponents of an activist public policy to raise fertility often point to the Scandinavian 
countries, where measures to make motherhood and the participation in the labor force by 
women more compatible have been implemented, and fertility rates have also increased in 
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 In developing countries, in contrast, the key requirement for labor market 
policies will be to ensure that the larger working-age populations are absorbed into 
the workforce. This will require reforms to improve the flexibility of labor markets, as 
well as better education and training to provide the skills necessary for employment 
(Fasano and Goyal, 2004).  
 Equipping the remaining workforce with a larger and more labor-efficient 
capital stock could help offset the impact of a declining labor supply. To do this, 
saving would need to increase. One-way to achieve higher saving is for the 
government itself to save more before the onset of its population’s ageing. The 
desirability of running primary fiscal surpluses and reducing public debt in advanced 
countries in this way has been proposed in Heller (2003).  
 However, population ageing and non-demographic factors, such as the cost of 
new technologies and drugs, are likely to result in substantial increases in health care 
expenditures in the years ahead and make this fiscal task more difficult.  
 In addition to helping to contain public sector outlays, pension reforms may 
also contribute to higher private saving, although this will depend on the nature of the 
reforms themselves and the strength of the signals sent to those in the labor force to 
bolster their savings for retirement.  
 In developing countries, a strong and stable macroeconomic framework, 
which delivers low inflation and sustainable public debt levels, together with 
institutional reforms are important elements of an environment conducive to domestic 
saving, capital inflows, and capital accumulation (World Economic Outlook, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                       
recent years (although these policies are aimed at broader social objectives, rather than 
explicitly at raising fertility). Whether these measures have caused the increase in fertility, of 
course, is difficult to say, particularly as fertility rates in the United States have also risen in 
recent years largely in the absence of such policies. In the United States, however, the private 
sector has responded to the increase in demand for childcare, and this has supported female 
labor force participation. 
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 More efficient use of existing capital and labor could provide an important 
offset to the expected decline in labor (and possibly capital) availability in the 
advanced countries and the more rapidly ageing developing countries. Therefore, 
structural reforms aimed at boosting productivity by reducing the impediments to 
competition, improving labor market and price flexibility, and spurring innovation 
will be important.  
 Stronger productivity growth, however, will not help to alleviate financing 
pressures in pension systems if benefit payments are indexed to wages (which rise 
with productivity), although by increasing overall income it will provide an 
environment in which reforms are easier to implement. Boosting productivity in other 
developing countries would also provide an important complement to the positive 
impact that demographic change may have on per capita growth in the coming years. 
 A broad mix of measures is likely to be needed to address the consequences of 
demographic change as the size of the reforms that would be needed in any single 
area are sufficiently large that they would be politically and economically difficult to 
achieve. For example, Figures 2.7a, 2.7b, and 2.7c shows that for advanced 
economies as a whole, large increases in participation rates, immigration, or the 
retirement age would be needed to stabilize the labor force to population ratio at 
current levels if enacted on their own. These increases are outside the range of historic 
experience. If reforms were jointly implemented in all three areas, however, the 
required changes would be much smaller; an increase in the participation rate of 3 3/4 
percentage points, immigration of 10 percent of population, and an increase in the 
retirement age of 2.3 years would together be sufficient to keep the labor force to 
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Figure 2.7b 




Note: The projections are provided in World Economic Outlook (2004). The bases of the projections are data from United Nations World 
Population Prospects 2002, and IMF Staff calculations.  





Policy Response to a Declining Labor Force in Selected Advanced Economies (Retirement Age) 
 
 
Note: The projections are provided in World Economic Outlook (2004). The bases of the projections are data from United Nations World 
Population Prospects 2002, and IMF Staff calculations.  
 
Source: World Economic Outlook (2004)
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population ratio at its current level in 205055. 
 These changes, while not easy, are within the range of what has been seen in 
some advanced countries during the past 40 years, or, in the case of retirement age, 
what has been legislated in some countries in recent pension reforms. Further, policy 
responses are often related and complementary, and this may help maximize the 
impact of individual reforms. Raising the retirement age would not only ease the 
burden on pension systems, but would also boost the potential supply of labor as the 
elderly stay longer in the labor force and possibly influence saving behavior. 
 Policies at the international level will be important for coping with demographic 
change. Global adjustment to differences in the pace of population aging will take 
place through the movement of goods, capital, and labor between countries, and these 
flows could be large. The reallocation of global resources will be achieved most 
efficiently if all of these channels are allowed to function smoothly, and the more that 
the adjustment is shared across the channels, the less will be the burden placed on 
each.  
 Policymakers, however, will need to balance economic, political, and social 
considerations. For example, if advanced countries allow more immigration, this 
would help cushion the impact of population aging on their workforces, but social 
implications also need to be taken into account, including the ability to integrate a 
large number of migrants into society and the impact that immigration would have on 
population density (which is already high in Europe and Japan).  
 Capital account liberalization could potentially enable developing countries to 
attract more external financing, and hence provide them with the opportunity to boost 
investment and growth, but it may also raise the risk of financial crisis, particularly if 
                                                
55 The estimates in World Economic Outlook (2004) are based on United Nations World Population 
Prospects 2002, and IMF Staff calculations.    
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economic policies and institutions are not sufficiently robust.  
 Labor mobility may provide an important source of income to developing 
countries through remittances, but could result in potential “brain drain” (especially in 
small countries) whereby the country’s best-educated people leave with a detrimental 
effect on output. Increased international cooperation will be needed to manage these 
cross-country flows, and to ensure that the associated risks are minimized to the 
extent possible. 
 
2.4   Immigration, Population Ageing, and Migration Policies: Their 
 Interrelationships in the Era of Globalization 
 It is now recognized that one of the key drivers of international migration is the 
differential ageing of societies, as high fertility countries, still with high numbers of 
young workers, send migrants to low fertility countries with growing labor shortages. 
There is growing acceptance that the international movement of economic and human 
capital will provide an important mechanism to moderate the effects of global ageing. 
 Nyce and Scieber (2005) have argued, the movement of capital out of more 
ageing regions, to younger, faster, growing transitional and developing economies 
could aid in their economic development while the movement of young workers into 
the more demographically mature regions could compensate for their own fertility 
downfall. Howse (2006) takes this point further and suggests that: 
if ageing societies are able to export capital to areas that are in need of it 
and import people from areas that have a ‘surplus’, it may prove possible 
not just to turn the increasing integration of the world economy to their 
advantage, but to do so in a way that enhances welfare for everyone 
(Howse, 2006, p.2)  
  
 There is, however, a further key factor – that of a growing global skills shortage. 
As the Global Commission on International Migration (2005) highlights, global 
ageing will intensify the world skills shortage and potentially create severe 
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competition on the global labor market.  
 For several decades now, the US, as Europe, has increasingly relied on 
migration and migrant labor to compensate for its own skills shortage. However, the 
degree of replacement migration needed to fully compensate for the downfall in 
young workers is now agreed to be unattainable56 (Feld, 2005; Blake and Mayhew, 
2004).  
 Of crucial importance is the disruption to current flows of capital during this 
time, as the rapid ageing of developing economies (in particular of some Asian 
economies), will require investment flows of both finance and skilled labor 
themselves. It is likely that the migration of both these forms of capital will flow in 
increasingly more diverse patterns, and that the developed world in particular cannot 
rely on continued flows of human capital to compensate for its own fertility fall. 
Developing and transitional economies, will need to retain their skilled workers 
themselves. Furthermore, these countries, especially those in Asia, will also begin to 
compete with Europe and the US as magnets for labor. 
 The rise of China as a potential host country for skilled workers as its own 
demography creates a skills shortage, could significantly contribute to this downfall in 
available global skills. European countries in particular have heavily relied on 
immigrant labor to compensate as their own labor markets contract across a spectrum 
of occupations like health care, manufacturing, services and retail, and even in terms 
of skilled labor, IT. It is therefore essential that OECD countries look to the large 
skills base within their own economies, and retain experienced older workers in their 
                                                
56 The US, for example, needs to admit an additional 5 million immigrants per year (4 times 
current levels) in order to achieve long-term balance in Social Security trust fund, while to 
maintain the current ratio of workers to dependents by 2020, the US need an additional 95 
million more people of working age. To put in perspective, this figure is more than the 
working population of Mexico. 
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labor pool.  Thus, if the US and other European and Western countries can in the 
future no longer rely on a steady stream of skilled migrants, one policy alternative is 
to encourage and enable men and women to stay actively employed in the labor 
market for longer. 
Globalization and Its Impact on Aspects of Migration, and Migration Policies 
 Existing explanations of state responses to international migration have 
emphasized the role of domestic economic and political conditions (Freeman, 1995; 
2002; Money, 1999; Gimpel and Edwards, 1999). Indeed, domestic conditions affect 
both migration dynamics (levels, timing, pathways, etc.) and political responses.  As 
noted by migration scholars international migration (as well as domestic, intra-state 
migration) has both costs and benefits—economic, social, and political (Borjas, 1990; 
Borjas, 1995; Hollifield, 1992; Bhagwati, 1998; Chang, 1998; Cornelius, 1998).  
These are accrued, however, unequally, creating “winners” and “losers” in the 
domestic sphere that creates interests for political mobilization (Freeman, 1995; 2002; 
Money, 1999). 
 They are not sufficient explanatory variables, however, to fully explain policy 
responses to migration in contemporary world politics among primary migrant-
receiving states (Rudolph, 2006). Policies over the past half-century have rarely 
displayed a single-interest focus (either open or restrictive migration policy), but 
instead suggest that the state seeks to balance conflicting national interests toward 
some Pareto-optimal equilibrium (Rudolph, 2003; 2006).  In other words, policy can 
be simultaneously “open” and “restrictive,” and utilize both instrumental and 
symbolic tactics (Andreas, 1999; Rudolph 2003; 2006). 
 However, such models not only neglect key international/structural variables 
that affect the manner in which states respond to migration, but also fail to show how 
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state attitudes have evolved over time. Indeed, state control over migration is a 
relatively new phenomenon when considered in a larger historical context.  This may 
be considered at least partly a function of globalization, or lack thereof, in the pre-
modern era. Long-distance migration in the pre-modern era was generally risky, 
costly, and difficult.  This is not to say that migration did not take place or that it did 
not have a profound impact on societies, cultures, economies, and political institutions 
(Koslowski, 2002).  
 However, linking of immigration control as a foundation of sovereignty, and the 
establishment of this as a policy imperative, is a product of the modern age (Rudolph 
2005). 
 Prior to the development of advanced communication technologies, human 
migration served to contribute to the process of globalization by acting as the conduit 
for the transfer of technology.  In a reciprocal fashion, technological advances that 
drove the process of globalization also increasingly facilitated global migration by 
making travel easier, faster, cheaper, and less risky. 
 Globalization has facilitated increased volume and diversity of global migration 
flows, which has in turn both altered state interests and increasingly politicized the 
issue.  This has, in turn, increased the political desire to increase the capacity of state 
control and has contributed to a growing interdependence between states that 
constitute international migration system (Kritz, Lim, and Zlotnik, 1992).  Lastly, as 
policy makers have become increasingly knowledgeable about migration dynamics 
and its various consequences (economic, strategic, societal, and political), they have 
become increasingly open to pursuing more cooperative policies with other 
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countries57. 
 The immigration market model (sometimes referred to as the “push-pull” model  
is a useful theoretical construct to understand globalization’s primary role in these 
processes (Borjas 1990; Massey et al., 1999).  The basic premise is simple:- migration 
is a function of both supply-side (“push”) and demand-side (“pull”) dynamics.  It is 
particularly useful in understanding why domestic-centered policies may be at least 
partially unsuccessful in achieving stated goals, they respond to only one-half of the 
migration equation.  Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear how profound an 
impact the aspect of globalization have had on both push and pull dynamics of 
migration, and consequently, state behavior regarding it. 
Impact on Migration Volume 
 Globalization’s impact on migration volume is not limited to reduction in 
transportation costs and ease of communications through innovations of the IT 
revolution (though these certainly are significant in explaining rising flows of global 
migration).  The emergence of an increasingly global trading system since World War 
II has had a tremendous impact on both the pace of globalization and its related 
effects.   
 One of the most significant trends of such globalization is the growing disparity 
of wealth, both within countries and between them58.  Both dynamics are migration-
inducing when considered through the lens of immigration market theory.  Push-pull 
                                                
57 For a more detailed note on the evolution of global migration policies in different phases of 
globalization, see Appendix 2.3.   
58 The World Economic Outlook (2007) explores the issue of globalization and inequality in 
detail. It examines the relationship between the rapid pace of trade and financial globalization 
and the rise in income inequality observed in most countries over the past two decades. The 
main conclusion of the analysis was that technological progress has had a greater impact than 
globalization on inequality within countries. The limited overall impact of globalization 
reflects two offsetting tendencies - whereas trade globalization is associated with a reduction 
in inequality, financial globalization, and foreign direct investment in particular, is associated 
with an increase in inequality.  
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theories of economic migration suggest that such movement is the product of relative 
disparities - disparities of opportunity and/or disparities of real wages.  Global 
migration pressures increase as the economic system moves away from equilibrium, 
as is the case with the continued process of economic globalization. 
 As advanced industrial “trading states” have pushed toward an ever more open 
system through the WTO59, global disparities create strong economic incentives for 
international migration. Moreover, disparity of wealth within countries may also 
exacerbate such migration pressures, as the erosion of the middle-class increases the 
supply of labor that may contribute to unemployment (increasing disparity of 
opportunity) and downward pressure on domestic wages (increasing relative disparity 
of wages).  Trade globalization and the industrialization associated with it can also 
contribute to this dynamic of increased migration pressures. 
 Social dynamics of migration associated (albeit indirectly) with globalization 
also contribute to the rising volume of flows. Regardless of what instigated the initial 
movement of persons, migration creates social networks that facilitate the 
continuation of migration streams.  Often referred to as “chain migration,” this 
dynamic is generally explained in terms of the creation of social capital within 
migrant communities.  Prior migrants offer, among other things, access to important 
information regarding modes of entry, crossing routes, the job market, and employer 
referrals (Massey, 1998). Thus, when an individual migrant weighs the potential pros 
and cons of movement, social capital provides tools that reduce risk and shift the 
decision balance toward one more favorable to the decision to migrate.  
 
                                                
59 One of the most important outcomes of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was the 
integration of services into the multilateral trading system. The General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) entered into force on 1 January 1995. The movement of natural persons 
are covered under Mode 4 of the GATS.  
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Impact on Composition 
 In addition to significantly affect the volume of international migration, 
globalization also has an effect on the composition of such global flows.  Some of 
these are linked to those elements outlined above.  For example, the same advances in 
travel and information technology that contribute to the rising volume of international 
migration also shape its composition, enabling more people to move farther distances.  
The result is a pattern of international migration that is truly global in its diversity 
rather than dominated by a few major migration “waves” such as those from Europe 
to the United States in the 19th century.  Migration is more ethnically, racially, and 
culturally diverse than ever before, and globalization continues to contribute to this 
process. 
 Globalization and the disparity of wealth it forwards also contributes to the 
skills composition of flows in much the same way it affects volume.  Economic 
transformations in advanced industrial countries have altered the labor market in 
several important ways over the past two centuries that has shaped migration flows. 
 In recent times, the shift away from manufacturing to skills-based economies (in 
research and development, management, and financial services, for example) has 
created specific needs to high-skilled labor and a relative decline in demand for 
unskilled labor.  Yet the international disparity of wealth between the global North 
and South has served to create migration pressures for a burgeoning supply of low-
skilled labor from developing countries (Borjas 1990; Borjas, 1995).  This trend 
toward increasing proportions of low-skilled labor has generated significant pressures 




Impact on National Interests and Policies 
 Globalization has not only had a significant impact on the magnitude, timing, 
and character of contemporary migration flows, but consequently, has affected the 
calculation of interests among both receiving and sending states.  As with any 
regulated flow, states seek to maximize the utility of policy for the national interest.  
 Among advanced industrial countries, domestic economic pressures press for 
increased levels of immigration.  As analyzed in Section 2.2 in detail, declining 
birthrates is a common byproduct of the advanced industrialization promoted by 
globalization.  Most of the world’s most advanced economies have native birthrates 
below replacement levels (Section 2.2). 
 As noted before, this has resulted in a significant ageing of populations that put 
increasing strains on social security and welfare systems, as the number of those 
drawing from the system continues to outpace the number of young workers 
contributing to it.  Though such domestic economic pressures create demand for 
immigration as a stop-gap measure to maintain liquidity of these systems, the 
restructuring of the economies has created a clear preference for high-skilled labor 
over low-skilled labor.   
 The reasons are clear - high-skilled workers pay more into the system per capita 
than low-skilled workers, utilize less public services (relative to their economic 
contribution to the system), and are less likely to require significant need-based state 
resources at retirement. The end result of this logic is that the desired economic 
effects could be maximized while at the same time the overall volume of immigration 
needed to gain this outcome is minimized. 
 The supply-side of the global immigration market is nearly opposite to this 
demand-side.  On the one hand, highly-skilled labor is relatively scarce, creating 
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pressures for states to become more successful in attracting such workers. On the 
other hand, a large supply of low-skilled labor continues to pursue economic benefits 
of emigration to more prosperous states, creating domestic pressures from the general 
public to limit such inflows (Rudolph, 2006).  Some press for reduced levels of such 
immigration on economic rationales, arguing that low-skilled immigration over-
utilizes public entitlements (relative to their economic contribution), including 
welfare, education, and infrastructure. Others have focused on the effect that large-
scale immigration has on issues of societal security, including national identity, 
culture, and social cohesion (Huntington, 2004).   
 While these developments involve complex issues that warrant considerable 
attention on their own right (Rudolph 2006a), for the purposes of this essay the 
important element to note is this - the direct and indirect effects of globalization on 
migration has made the issue increasingly politicized in receiving states and has made 
increasing control over flows a crucial element of the national interest. 
 A similar cause-and-effect relationship is also evident among migrant-sending  
countries, though this effect may be more of a mirror-image to those in receiving 
states. Like receiving states, globalization has increased the importance of state 
management of migration (i.e. emigration) as a policy imperative. 
 For developing states, emigration offers significant benefits to sending states. 
Globalization cause transformations in the labor market - uprooting workers from the 
agricultural sector and creating incentives for transfer to the industrial sector.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, this was seen as a benefit in its own right. Lewis (1954) suggested 
that it was the availability of this large pool of cheap labor that would help spur 
growth in developing countries if capital investment would be made that could make 
use of it. In a free trade system, this country’s comparative advantage in production 
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would lead to growing profits which would then be reinvested in additional capital, 
creating additional demand for labor.  However, the model’s assumption of perfect 
elasticity between labor demand and domestic migration from the rural sector has 
proven unrealistic in practice.  Instead, sudden shocks to economy and the labor 
market (such as a sudden openness to the global trading market) generally produce 
increased levels of unemployment, as the volume of workers seeking employment in 
the industrial centers find that job creation lags behind supply.   
 For regimes in weak states, such dramatic increases in unemployment can have 
catastrophic economic and political effects. However, emigration provides one means 
by which such pressures can be alleviated.  In such cases, emigration serves as a 
safety-valve for unemployment, allowing development to proceed while minimizing 
economic, social, and political upheaval.  South Korea would seem to be a prime 
example of these dynamics.  During the period of its rapid rise in industrialization and 
development in the late 1970s and 1980s, millions of South Korean workers sought 
employment abroad.  Many of these workers went to work in the construction 
industry in the Middle East.   
 In addition to its potential as an economic stabilizer in the often turbulent 
process of industrialization and development, migration also offers a more direct 
reward for sending states.  This comes in the form of inflows of foreign exchange 
through migrant remittances to the home country.  Globalization’s effect on migration 
volume has created a parallel effect on levels of migrant remittances60. These 
remittances of foreign exchange surpass levels of foreign investment, aid, and income 
from export trade for many developing countries.   
 Increasing levels of foreign exchange is not only important in order to facilitate 
                                                
60 This is analyzed extensively in Essay 3 of the thesis.  
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trade, forward capital (re)investment in the domestic economic, and contribute to 
exchange-rate stability, but perhaps more importantly, to create the social stability 
that is a necessary condition for long-term development to succeed.  When one 
considers the gains involved in successfully managing emigration (or the potential 
opportunity cost for states unsuccessful in this endeavor), it should come as little 
surprise that migrant-sending states increasingly seek a more active hand in 
controlling such flows to conform to national interest. Such efforts include the 
establishment of emigration-related institutions, active lobbying of foreign 
governments regarding immigration and border policies, and becoming directly 
involved in the social processes in international movement (Brand, 2006). 
 Sending countries such as the Phillippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, and Egypt have all established special government-
sponsored programs to encourage the emigration of labor as part of broader strategies 
to acquire foreign exchange, reduce unemployment, and develop skills.  Many of 
these countries increasingly set specific targets for emigration and remittances as part 
of an overall strategy of migration management.                   
 For both sides of the migration equation (sending and receiving countries), 
globalization and its effects (including ageing societies) have profoundly affected 
state interests in managing flows. Where this becomes increasingly politically 
contentious is in the opposing interests regarding the movement of low-skilled or 
unskilled labor, with developing states strongly supporting emigration while advanced 
industrial countries increasingly seeking to deter such migration. The next section 




2.5 Implications for Managing Migration 
 A complicating factor in any analysis of migration and policy is that virtually 
any policy can have some impact on the movement of people. Policies designed for 
some other specific purpose might have a profound influence on migration. Some of 
these impacts appear obvious even if the outcomes were not entirely foreseen. It 
would seem quite clear that policies to improve access to a particular region by 
extending the road network will have an effect on human mobility. For example, such 
an extension might ultimately lead to the depopulation of an area under certain 
circumstances or to a repopulation and resultant ethnic conflict between native and 
immigrant groups under other circumstances. Equally, the construction of a dam for 
water control will have fairly clear implications for migration: it might displace large 
numbers of long-established villagers while at the same time bringing into the area 
large numbers of construction workers on a temporary basis. However, the impact on 
migration of other policies such as trade policy or international agreements on trade 
might not be so obvious. 
 Accepting that virtually any policy can have some impact on the movement of 
people, one can also recognize that a series of policies exist that have been developed 
specifically to deal with migration and migrants. This paper will be concerned 
primarily with these direct migration policies rather than with the overall impact that 
indirect policies may or may not have on migration. 
 Direct policies to manage international migration can perhaps be conceptualized 
as falling into four overlapping clusters - Immigration and emigration; Humanitarian;  
Integration and assimilation; and Migration and development.   
 The first three of these clusters are closely interrelated, more so than they are 
with policies on migration and development, even if synergies exist among them all. 
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The immigration and emigration cluster encompasses policies designed to define who 
can enter or leave a country and how many can do so. Essentially, they create 
channels and define which categories of entrants are ‘legal’ and, hence, which are 
‘illegal’, or ‘irregular’.  
 Humanitarian policies reflect a country’s standing in the world and its 
acceptance of its moral responsibilities more than its need for immigrants. 
Nevertheless, those accepted under humanitarian categories may seek to have family 
members join them and humanitarian, immigration and integration policies begin to 
blend. The integration cluster is concerned with those policies that deal with migrants 
after they have arrived, looking after their welfare, and concerned with their education 
that may eventually create model citizens.  
 Policies in these three clusters are implemented by and within a single country.  
 Decisions who to admit and how to provide for those admitted are, first and 
foremost, national concerns. Policies concerning migration and development on the 
other hand are bilateral or multilateral and something of an aberration in the ambit of 
migration policy. They have come to prominence in recent years and are related to the 
first three clusters to the extent that they are often designed, implicitly if not 
explicitly, to relieve pressure on the immigrant and humanitarian intake. 
 One aspect of migration policy that is often ignored but is a consequence of the 
multidimensional nature of the issue is the bureaucratic nature of the process. Rarely 
is migration policy the responsibility of a single government ministry or department. 
Thus, to speak of ‘migration policy’ as if it were a homogeneous and uncontested 
entity is deceptive. 
 The four clusters identified above are usually reflected in different areas of 
governmental responsibility with different government ministries or departments 
 109 
competing for influence. Immigration policies are rarely formulated with a view to 
their impact on potential countries of origin, thus creating tensions between 
departments with responsibility for development and those advocating particular types 
of immigration, for example. Departments attempting to develop education 
programmes or provide housing for new arrivals might not be aware of how policies 
on admissions are either being planned or implemented. 
 Notwithstanding the above limitations, one of the few clear present trends in 
current attempts to ‘manage’ migration are policies to attract increased numbers of 
skilled migrants while attempting to limit the numbers of the unskilled. As early as 
1967, Canada had introduced a points system as a basis for selecting those with the 
skills most needed nationally. This system was progressively modified to attract those 
with higher qualifications as well as businessmen and entrepreneurs. By the end of the 
century, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, among others in Europe, as well 
as Australia, New Zealand and the United States of those traditional countries of 
immigration, had all made provision to attract the highly skilled and a global 
competition for talent had emerged61. However, it is not just the developed countries 
of the West that need skilled labor - the rapidly developing economies of East Asia, as 
well as nuclei of dynamism throughout the developing world, are rarely self-sufficient 
in the skills they need.  
 However, skilled migration systems are not independent of unskilled systems. 
Skilled migrants create unskilled jobs. Skilled IT engineers require packers, 
transporters and shippers of the hardware and software they create. Bankers and other 
financial experts require office cleaners, restaurateurs and valets. While developed 
countries might wish to attract skilled workers and integrate them as citizens and keep 
                                                
61 Various fiscal incentives have been provided by governments in the developed countries towards 
attracting the highly skilled workers. See Appendix 2.4 for details. 
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the unskilled out, such a strategy is unrealistic.  
 Within Europe, certain countries, including the United Kingdom, see the 
solution to the supply of the unskilled to lie in the countries of new accession to the 
European Union. This policy that is seen to create invisible minorities is not unlike 
those of Japan and Korea discussed above. However, the countries of new accession, 
too, are going through a demographic transition and will soon experience labor 
shortages of their own. This will not provide a long-term solution to the demand for 
unskilled labor, particularly if the development of these countries accelerates with 
accession.  
 As in the case of Asia, the assumption is that migrants, and especially unskilled 
migrants, can be supplied through a continuous system of temporary labor migration 
as observed in Malaysia and Singapore.  
 Castles (2006), identifies a more unsavory dimension to the issue of unskilled 
migrant policy in arguing that governments may come to depend upon irregular 
migrants for unskilled workers. Rather than design instruments that are ultimately 
flawed, it is easier to turn a blind eye to a reservoir of labor that has entered the 
country illegally, as many countries in Asia do today.  
 Thus, here may be an aspect of ‘non-policy’ convergence across the developed 
world. The pool of unskilled labor and the legal temporary migrants, constantly 
turning over, provide the basis for the development of a permanent underclass in the 
developed world, which, in turn, will generate severe problems of social integration 
and fundamental contradictions between immigration and integration policies. Such a 
strategy, even covertly implemented, would not appear to be in the best interests of 
destination countries. Not only would it be against any rights principles held by the 
state and deprive migrants of access to social protection but it would also maintain a 
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significant proportion of the working population beyond the tax-gathering net.   
    
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
In the past century, it was often an economic or a political force that shaped 
the volume and direction of international population movements. Because many 
developed countries will experience the progression of population ageing and 
population declines in the foreseeable future, the demographic dynamics of a country 
will become another underlying factor that must be considered when formulating 
migration policy. 
The way population changes and international migration interact is complex, 
and often not visible in the short run. Yet, policy makers should be fully aware of the 
mid- and long-term impacts of immigration on the host population. Indeed, more 
countries are looking at ways to manage migration in order to meet their 
demographic, economic development, and labor market needs. Governments that used 
to restrict the entry of immigrants are developing programmes to attract migrant 
workers.  
Developing countries are becoming aware of the benefits migrants can bring, 
with contributions through remittances, investment, and expenditures, as well as 
through skills, entrepreneurial activities, and support for democratization and human 
rights. 
  Brain drain is still a significant concern for countries experiencing large-scale 
emigration of skilled workers. Loss of skilled citizens can be a particular challenge 
for emerging economies. 
  How do governments experiencing wide-scale emigration continue to meet the 
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needs of their labor market and their growing economies? This is particularly 
challenging because of the migration ‘hump’ theory (Martin and Taylor, 1996), which 
contends that migration continues to rise with an increase in economic development; 
it is only after reaching a certain level of economic development that the desire or 
need to migrate diminishes.    
  It is likely that the ageing of populations in developed countries will generate 
new demands for migrants in order to lessen the social burden arising from the 
unevenness of population structure, or from maintaining the economic vitality of the 
country. 
  Despite the potential demographic implications, governments may encounter 
difficulties promoting liberal migration policy because of unwarranted concern that 
the result would be mass immigration and changes in the nature of society from an 
inflow of many cultures. 
  Governments will need to take a comprehensive approach to assess policy 
implications, and include an evaluation of policies in all sectors potentially affected 
by increased migration. This will include not only economic and labor market 
policies, but also social policies and in particular those related to integration and 
social cohesion. 
From a public policy perspective, there is no single solution to the complex 
issue of population ageing and immigration. Measures to respond need to be 
comprehensive, and may include raising the age of retirement, reassessment of 
pension and health-care benefits, encouragement of labor force participation of 
women, facilitation of technological innovation, and, potentially, a more pragmatic 
view of the immigrants contributions to the economy and society.  
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Migration will not solve all of the challenges created by current and projected 
demographic trends, and policy makers need to consider migration as one part of a 
policy response package. It is almost impossible to counter population ageing by 
immigration alone because it requires not only unrealistically large number of 
migrants, but also strict administrative controls of both inflow and outflow of 
migrants of certain age and sex. 
Ageing populations may turn to foreign labor to offset the shortage of workers 
in certain occupations. Demand is likely to increase for caregivers for the elderly, as 
well as for domestic workers who can support working mothers, and workers for 
other jobs that locals have shunned. Demand for highly skilled workers in order to 
maintain the economic competitiveness of a country is on the rise in many developed 
countries. This increase is often in response to demand from specific sectors, 
including IT, health care, and research. 
Cooperative arrangements can be created to help migration meet the 
demographic needs of surplus populations in most developing countries and, at the 
same time, the needs of ageing, declining populations in developed countries.  
It is not an easy task for policy makers to formulate an immigration policy in 
the demographic climate analyzed in this essay. However, efforts to build 
understanding and recognition of the positive economic and social benefits that 




Sources of Population Projections 
 
 A number of official statistical agencies and private organizations publish 
projections of future population trends, using data from country-specific population 
censuses combined with assumptions about future trends in total fertility, life 
expectancy, and net migration. However, caution must be exercised when using long-
term projections of any kind, and demographic projections do become much more 
uncertain the further into the future one goes.  
 Two organizations regularly issue detailed population projections for all 
countries - the International Programs Center (IPC) of the United States Census 
Bureau and the United Nations Population Division. Both the IPC and the United 
Nations have recently released updated population projections through 2050. Of the 
two organizations, the United Nations’ projections are the most widely cited. The 
analysis in this essay is based on the ‘medium variant’ scenario in the UN’s “World 
Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision”. Several other organizations also produce 
useful projections that provide additional perspective on population trends.  
 For example, The World Bank publishes global population projections 
extending through 2050. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) produces probabilistic population projections extending through 2100. World 
Bank projections are used mainly for planning and project management, whereas 
IIASA’s projections are used primarily to assess projection assumptions and methods.  
 Even though the IPC’s and the United Nations’ projections incorporate 
somewhat different base population estimates, as well as different fertility, mortality, 
and migration assumptions, they are quite similar at the global level, differing by less 
than 2 percent in 2050, and broadly so at the regional level. Both organizations’ 
estimates project rising life expectancies, declining fertility rates, slowing population 
growth, and significant population ageing. However, the two projections’ estimates of 
country-specific population can differ rather substantially. For instance, their 
projections for U.S. population in 2050 differ by more than 6 percent, or about 25 
million people.  
 This essay relies largely on the United Nations’ population estimates and 
projections, mainly because the organization publishes several variations that 
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illustrate some of the uncertainty surrounding its central projection. However, that 
choice should not be considered as reflecting greater accuracy or reliability of either 





The U.S. As An Exception 
 
The United States is the only developed country experiencing significant population 
growth in the early 21st century. The relatively robust U.S. demographic growth 
derives from two factors - The country has higher fertility, and more immigrants than 
other developed countries. At the 2005 rates, American women will have 2.0 children, 
on average, during their childbearing years, compared with 1.4 in Europe, 1.3 in 
Japan, and 1.5 in Canada. U.S. rates vary significantly by racial and ethnic group. 
Non-Hispanic white and Asian women have the lowest fertility, 1.9 children per 
woman, but this is still well above the average for Europe, Japan, and Canada. 
 Several factors probably account for higher fertility in the United States. Some 
fertility experts say it is easier for women to combine education, jobs, housework, and 
childrearing in the United States than in many European countries. American women 
earn higher salaries relative to men, and American men accept more childrearing and 
homemaking responsibilities than European men, on average (Morgan, 2003; Kohler 
et al., 2005).  
 The other force driving U.S. population growth is international migration. The 
United States receives about half of the world’s international migrants, a remarkable 
fact considering that the United States accounts for just 5 percent of world population. 
A long history as an immigrant destination has perpetuated links between immigrant 
communities in the United States and their native countries, which favors continued 
migration.  
 As the world’s largest economy, the United States offers migrants job 
opportunities. Also, U.S. policies facilitate the entry and employment of foreigners. 
At least 1 million new immigrants settle in the United States each year, accounting for 
40 percent or more of its annual population growth (Martin and Midgely, 2003). 
 With continued below-replacement fertility rates, immigration is becoming an 
even more important component of population growth. In 2005, about 12 percent of 
Americans were foreign-born, up from 5 percent in 1970. Even more important for 
future growth, nearly one-fourth (23 percent) of American children under age 15 are 
immigrants or the children of immigrants. These children will fuel future population 
growth when they form their own families. 
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 While U.S. fertility is likely to fluctuate, there is little to suggest big swings up 
or down in the near term. The fertility rate has been remarkably stable since the late 
1980s. Immigration will continue to contribute to population growth in the United 
States, subject to policy changes that could restrict the flow, and to changes in 
economic conditions in the United States and the countries of origin for immigrants. 
 The U.S. population is projected to increase by 42 percent between 2005 and 
2050, rising from 297 million to 420 million. And the U.S. age structure in 2050 will 
still contain considerable momentum for continued growth - 26 percent of Americans 
will be under age 20 and another 31 percent will be in the prime childbearing ages, 20 
to 44, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections (US Census Bureau, 2005). 
Therefore, the United States will continue to straddle the divide between countries 




The Evolution of Policies Towards Migration: Past and Present 
 
It has been observed that policy regimes tend to be more open for international trade 
and capital movement than for immigration. Is that a correct characterization of 
reality? How have policies toward international migration evolved in the last century 
or so? What devices have (are) governments used (using), historically and currently, 
to either encourage or deter foreign immigration to their countries?  
 
Immigration Policies in the First Wave of Globalization 
  
 By mid-19th century, Argentina granted land to facilitate immigrants to settle 
there and the government financed the costs of moving and housing for immigrants.  
The pro-migration climate of the ruling elite in Argentina at that time was captured by 
the phrase, coined by the Argentinean thinker Juan Baustista Alberdi,  “To Govern is 
to Populate”. However, gradually, policies supporting immigration became less 
generous. In 1916, new legislation introduced restrictions for different classes of 
immigrants (e.g. disabled people, unaccompanied women with children, etc.) and by 
the 1920s policies became definitely less favorable for immigration as part of a global 
trend associated with less favorable economic conditions and the onset of nationalistic 
attitudes towards immigration.  
 In Australia, in the 19th century, immigration policies tended to favor those  
coming from  British Commonwealth countries by subsidizing the transportation of 
immigrants and supporting them at arrival. At the same time they restricted the 
immigration of Chinese citizens through taxes and quotas.  Some of these laws were 
repealed afterwards and then adopted again. In the early 20th century Australia 
naturalization laws became aligned with England’s. 
 Brazil also encouraged emigration and settlements through subsidies, special 
benefits for land acquisition and other budget support; in particular, it is considered 
that immigration helped to substitute the effects on labor supply of abolition of 
slavery in the late 19th century, for the sugar-producing areas (north-east) and coffee-
producing areas in the Sao-Paulo province. Later on, like in the  cases of Argentina 
and Australia, Brazilian, legislation became more restrictive in the first two decades 
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of the 20th century. 
 In the second half of the 19th century U.S. immigration legislation went through    
different changes. It became federal rather than state legislation. Racial considerations  
were important. Chinese immigration was restricted in 1888 and the Chinese 
Exclusion Act suspended all Chinese immigration for 20 years. In 1917 a new 
Immigration Act established a literacy test for immigrants and in 1921 quotas were 
established to restrict immigration. In general immigrants from Canada, Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S. were treated more favorably than 
immigrants coming from Asian countries.  
 In Canada by the 1860s the parliament granted autonomy to the provinces to 
handle immigration issues and policies. Land was offered at reduced prices to 
encourage immigrants to settle in Canada. In 1910 immigration from Asian countries 
was restricted through a higher head tax than that of immigrant of non-Asian 
countries. 
 Summing up, immigration policies in the countries of the New World were, on 
the whole, liberal in the 19th century; in addition, immigration flows were in several 
cases, promoted and encouraged by the governments of New World countries in 
response to the need for increased labor supply to support rapid economic expansion. 
However, these policies became gradually more restrictive towards the end of that 
century and the early 20th century, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s. Ethnic 
discrimination (against migration from Asia, in particular from China) was a common 
practice, particularly in Australia, Canada and the US; a feature apparently absent in 
Argentinean and Brazilian immigration policies at that time.     
 
Migration Policies in the Second Wave of Globalization: The Late 20th Century 
  The direction of international migration flows changed significantly during the 
20th century. As mentioned before, in the first wave of globalization migration was 
mainly from east to west say from Europe to the U. S. and Canada and from north to 
south (from Europe, mainly, to Argentina, Australia, Brazil). In contrast, since the 
second half of the 20th century and intensified in the 1980s and 1990s, the second 
wave of globalization, the main flows of migration have been from Latin America, 
Africa and Asia to the US and Europe. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Block, significant migration flows to Western Europe (Germany, Switzerland, 
Sweden, United Kingdom and Finland) and Israel have taken place from former 
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socialist countries.    
 The main recipient country, the U.S. underwent significant changes in the 
legislation regarding migration since the 1960s. The 1965 amendment to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act was intended to facilitate migration to the U.S., 
ending  ethnic discrimination biases of previous legislation. This new piece of 
legislation regulated immigration through a preference system according to family 
status regarding US citizens and encouraged immigrants with skills in short supply in 
the U.S.  Nationality quotas were still in effect but an attempt was made to avoid 
ethnic discrimination. That legislation was changed again in 1986 in an attempt at 
trying to curb illegal immigration through tightened border control while at the same 
time creating schemes of regularization of aliens. In turn, another law amendment in 
1996 sought to further reduce illegal migration through a new Illegal Immigrant 
Reform and Responsibility Act.   
 The changes in immigration policies in the U.S. reflect the recognition of the 
incentives to migrate to the U.S. because of the economic opportunities available to 
everybody, including migrants; at the same time, this legislation tries to reduce illegal  
migration rather than focus in its ethnic composition as in the past.      
 In Europe, since the 1990s, immigration policies are increasingly defined at 
supra-national level by the European Union (EU). The main feature of EU migration 
policies is a sharp distinction between the EU and non-EU origin of the migrants. 
There is a dual EU immigration regime in which every EU citizen has full rights to 
reside and work in any country of the Union. In turn, citizen from non-EU countries 
face several restrictions to immigration and need working visas to reside legally and 
work in the EU.    
 During the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to favor trade agreements over 
common markets with third countries (taking the EU as a unity) as the later 
arrangement would imply free immigration policies within a common market area. In 
the case of NAFTA, liberalization of trade and investment between the U.S. and 
Canada with Mexico did not include a relaxation of the barriers to entry of migrants 
from Mexico to the U.S. (rather NAFTA tightened them).  
 In the case of the EU, an interesting case is Turkey, a country with large 
emigration flows towards Europe. The EU signed a trade agreement with Turkey but 
postponed, for later periods, negotiations for full membership in the EU.  
 Wellish and Walz (1998) have explained the greater preference by receiving 
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countries (e.g. the OECD) for free trade over free immigration in that the degree of 
domestic redistribution of income and social benefits is lower in the case of free trade. 
As domestic redistribution may hamper growth and pose an extra burden on the 
public finances of the host country, national government in receiving countries tend to  
prefer free-trade over free-immigration. 
 





Fiscal incentives for highly skilled immigrants in Selected Developed Countries  
Australia  
In order to encourage businesses requiring a skilled labor force to locate in Australia, 
since July 1, 2002, foreign source income of eligible temporary residents is exempt 
from tax for 4years.  
Austria  
An individual who has not had a residence in Austria during the past 10 years, who 
maintains his primary residence abroad and has an assignment with an Austrian 
employer for less than 5years benefits from tax deductions for up to 35% of the 
taxable salary income for expenses incurred in maintaining a household in Austria, 
educational expenses and leave allowances.  
Belgium  
Certain foreign executives, specialists and researchers residing temporarily in 
Belgium are eligible for a special tax regime that treats them as non-residents. 
Taxable income is calculated by adjusting the remuneration according to the number 
of days spent outside Belgium. Reimbursements of expenses incurred by an employee 
as a result of his temporary stay in Belgium are not subject to personal income tax.  
Denmark  
A special expatriate tax regime applies to foreigners employed by Danish-resident 
employers. Under qualifying contracts, salary income is taxed at a flat rate of 25% 
instead of the usual rates of 39% to 59%. To qualify, expatriates must reside in 
Denmark and earn more than 50900DKK a month in 2001. This tax regime is valid 
for up to 36 months.  
Finland  
A foreigner working in Finland may qualify for a special tax at a flat rate of 35% 
during a period of 24 months if he receives any Finnish-source income for duties 
requiring special expertise and earns a cash salary of € 5800or more per month. This 
law provides that the expert has not been resident in Finland any time during the five 
preceding years.  
France  
Recent legislation changes which aim at encouraging foreign professionals to work in 
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France include a 5-year tax exemption for bonuses paid to foreign expatriates where 
these are directly related to their assignment in France, and tax deductions for social 
security payments made by the expatriates in their home countries. A deduction will 
also be available for pension and health care payments made outside France. It applies 
to foreign professionals (including French nationals with a foreign labor contract who 
have been residing out of France for a least 10 years) coming to France from January 
1, 2004.  
 
Japan  
For expatriates living in Japan, relocation allowances and once-a-year home-leave 
allowances are generally tax-free.  
Korea  
Since January 2003, tax-free allowances of up 40 per cent of salary to cover cost of 
living, housing, home leave and education. Tax-exempt salary for certain sectors for 
up to 5years if the individual is i) employed under a tax-exempt technology-
inducement contract or ii) a foreign technician with experience in certain industries.  
Netherlands  
Expatriates may qualify for a special facility called the “30per cent” (previously the 
“35per cent”). This enables an employer to pay, for up to 10 years, employees 
seconded in the Netherlands a tax-free allowance of up to 30% of regularly received 
employment income and a tax-free reimbursement of school fees for children 
attending international schools.  
Norway  
Expatriates expected to reside in Norway for 4years or less may be allowed a 15 per 
cent standard deduction from their gross income instead of itemised personal 
deductions.  
Canada  
Researchers can benefit from 5-year tax relief in the province of Québec on 75% of 
their personal income if they settle in Quebec to work in R&D in a firm.  
Sweden  
Since 1st January 2001 foreign key personnel who are experts and scientists with 
knowledge and skills that are scarce in Sweden may benefit from a new expatriate 
regime. No taxes are paid for the first 25% of their income. This is valid for a 
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maximum period of 10 years.  
United Kingdom  
Persons, who are seconded to the UK and declare their intention to remain in the UK 
on a temporary basis, can claim tax relief on their housing costs and traveling costs. 
Non-ordinary residents can also claim tax relief for days worked outside the UK. 



































 ESSAY 2 
 
THE RETURN MIGRATION PHENOMENON:  
THE CASE OF KERALA 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The theoretical and empirical literature on migration has paid relatively less attention 
to the phenomenon of return migration62, a case where many migrants return to their 
home countries (after having spent a number of years in the host country) due to 
variety of push and pull factors63. Return migration has been an integral part of labor 
migration. In the past decades, this aspect has emerged as a critical element of many 
governments’ migration policy, whether in terms of effective migration management; 
strong border management; harnessing the developmental potential of the returnees; 
or timely and fair asylum processes (OECD, 2008). 
 The growing importance of temporary migration programmes in many industrial 
countries, and the expectations aroused by the potential role of migrants in developing 
their home countries primarily explain the renewed interest in the issue of return. 
Developing sound policies requires an in-depth knowledge of return migration 
patterns as well as a deeper understanding of the factors that determine it. In the 
absence of robust, relevant, and timely database, and until recently limited interest 
                                                
62 A wide variety of terms is found in the literature to describe return migration (e.g. reflux 
migration, repatriation, homeward migration, remigration, return flow, retro-migration, etc), 
which has lead to much terminological sloppiness. For the purpose of this essay, following 
return migration is defined as the movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle 
(Gmelch, 1980). Re-emigrants (people who move back to their homelands and then emigrate 
for the second time) or temporary returnees are not defined as return migrants, though in 
some settings it is difficult to distinguish analytically the migrants returning home for a short 
visit or seasonally, from those who have returned permanently.  
    
63 Four main reasons are generally advanced to explain return migration: i) failure to integrate 
into the host country, ii) preferences by some persons for their home country; iii) achievement 
of a savings objective, or iv) the opening of employment opportunities in the home country as 
a result of experience acquired abroad. Moreover, migrants are likely to adjust their objectives 
over time, and in light of immigration policies in the host country (OECD, 2008).  
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among the policymakers and researchers, the return migration phenomenon has not 
received requisite attention.  
Conventionally, return migrants are typically classified as retirees who always 
intended to return to their country of origin. They are generally not expected to 
contribute significantly to their home countries’ development, in part because they are 
older and that they are not working in the formal labor market. 
However, with globalization and increasingly liberal immigration regimes 
across the world, returnees are increasingly characterized by transnational networks, 
reflecting new migration dynamics (Potter and Conway, 2005). The globalizing effect 
of easy and cheap travel, fluid residency and citizenship status, and rapid 
communications are key factors driving this change. As a result, in the current phase, 
return migrants are increasingly younger, better trained, and therefore perceived as 
important carriers of both know-how and financial assets. They are also able to 
provide wider exposure to the rest of the world for people in their place of origin. 
The above dynamics of return migrants, reflecting both a return of financial 
and human capital, presents opportunities for policy initiatives by national and local 
governments. The potential of return migrants to help build global networks; forge 
forward links between sending and receiving countries; and directly contribute to 
development efforts provides a good opportunity for innovative policy design that 
channelize such human and financial capital into growth-enhancing productive uses. 
In the literature on both internal and international migration, when assessing 
the impact of labor migration on source countries or communities, substantial focus 
has been placed on the flow of financial resources, i.e., remittances. Relatively less 
attention has been placed on the flow of human resources, i.e. return migrants. As 
noted, since return migrants represent a return of both financial and human resources 
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to migrant sending areas, a systematic study of the return migrants is essential to 
understand its impact on growth, and labor market dynamics in the source country. 
The impact of return migrants on sending societies may be viewed in two 
different ways. The first views the return as a negative factor exacerbating the 
problem of surplus labor in rural areas. The other views return migrants as carriers of 
capital, technology and entrepreneurship, and therefore as a positive factor that 
contributes to the development of the native communities. The later mindset is 
sometimes reflected in public policies of many countries that attempt to attract back 
migrant entrepreneurs back home. There is however no consensus in the literature 
concerning the role that return migrants play in their native communities, and 
especially whether they are more likely to be net consumers or net investors.  
This essay examines the causes and consequences of return migration in an 
Indian State (Kerala), and analyzes the impact on the home communities using two 
household surveys, undertaken in 1998 and 200164. Kerala’s experience is valuable to 
study in the Indian context, as it has been a key state in India’s migration 
experience65.  
The Kerala state’s focus on social and cultural development since 
Independence, the relative stagnation in its productive sectors, and perceptions about 
                                                
64 See Section 3.6.1 for details on data sources used for the purpose of this analysis. The 
Centre for Development Studies (CDS), Trivandrum has undertaken a more recent migration 
survey in 2008, data for which has not yet been made available to the external researchers. 
Though this essay uses an older dataset, the value of this essay lies in bringing empirical 
evidence to bear on some of the critical issues related to return migration. It is expected that 
the more current dataset are not likely to materially alter the substantive conclusions of this 
analysis.   
 
65 The Indian migration experience shows that around 95 per cent of labor outflows reached 
the six GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and 
Qatar) in the Middle East in 1980s. Emigration to Gulf countries was still around the 75 per 
cent mark in 2005. Among all the states and union territories in India, Kerala led with the 
highest number of emigrants in West Asian context (about 36 percent in 2001). This makes it 
an interesting case study in the Indian migration context.  
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excessive labor rigidity and militancy, created an ideal condition for acceleration of 
out-migration from the state, both domestically and internationally (most notably to 
the Gulf countries). In conjunction with a rise in in-migration and emigration, the 
phenomenon of return migration has also assumed large dimensions in Kerala since 
l990s. In 2001 (around the time of the survey), the estimated number of return 
migrants was around 750,000.  More recent estimates suggest that the number of 
return emigrants in Kerala was about 900,000 in 2005 (Zachariah and Rajan, 2007). 
The current global economic crisis, particularly as it has affected the Gulf countries, 
could give further encouragement to return emigration to Kerala.  
This essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the return migration literature.  In the following Section 
(Section 3.3) an overview of the state of Kerala is provided. Section 3.4 reviews 
briefly the earlier studies available on the emigration and return migration experience 
in the state of Kerala. Noticeably, the literature is quite thin; more so, in the case of 
return migration issues. This research therefore aims to fill in the current dearth of 
return migration studies on Kerala. Section 3.5 outlines the research agenda. Section 
3.6 discusses the data sources and research methodology, including details on 
sampling methods and estimation procedures. Section 3.7 analyzes the different facets 
of the data obtained from the two household-level surveys, including demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics. Additionally, it examines the occupation 
distribution in detail, and analyzes the extent of occupational mobility among return 
migrants, and discusses their significance thereof. Section 3.8 analyzes other facets of 
the return migration phenomenon emanating from the data sources that has potential 
public policy implications. Section 3.9 discusses past initiatives by the Government of 
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Kerala, and suggests future policy imperatives. Section 3.10 provides the concluding 
remarks.  
3.2.  Return Migration: Theoretical Approaches 
 While scholarly approaches related to return migration can be traced back to 
the 1960s, it was only in the 1980s that stimulating scientific debates among scholars 
took place on the return migration phenomenon and its impact on origin countries. In 
the 1990s, as globalization process expanded across countries, transnational labor 
flows increased exponentially, with a noticeable parallel surge in return migrants as 
well. About one-third of all migrants were estimated to return to their native homes 
(Murphy, 1999).  
As a prerequisite to exploring how return has been addressed by international 
migration theorists, it is important to stress that the theoretical approaches briefly 
discussed below have, in various degrees, included return migration as a 
subcomponent of their analytical approaches. Some of the approaches are the outcome 
of empirical studies, others stem from the collection of fragmented official 
quantitative data, based on given definitional criteria of the returnee. 
This literature review focuses exclusively on theories that have attempted to 
propose a set of variables aimed at better understanding the magnitude and dynamics 
of return migration to origin countries.  
3.2.1.  Neoclassical Economics and the New Economics of Labor Migration 
Frameworks 
 
 The neoclassical approach to international migration is based on the notion of 
wage differentials between receiving and sending areas, as well as on the migrant’s 
expectations for higher earnings in host countries (Todaro, 1969). The return 
migration is viewed as the outcome of a failed migration experience which did not 
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yield the expected benefits. In other words, in a neoclassical framework, return 
migration exclusively involves labor migrants who miscalculated the costs of 
migration and who did not reap the benefits of higher earnings. Return occurs as a 
consequence of their failed experiences abroad or because their human capital was not 
rewarded as expected.  
In the neoclassical framework, migrants are viewed as individuals who 
maximize not only their earnings but also the duration of their stay abroad to achieve 
permanent settlement and family reunification. In this framework, return cannot but 
be motivated by a failed migration experience, in terms of expected earnings, 
employment and duration. 
While the neoclassical approach to return migration argues that migrants did 
not successfully maximize their expected earnings, New Economics of Labor 
Migration (NELM) framework in contrast views return migration as the logical 
outcome of a “calculated strategy”, defined at the level of the migrant’s household, 
and resulting from the successful achievement of goals or target.  
Stark’s (1991) seminal book argues, the NELM approach “shifts the focus of 
migration theory from individual independence … to mutual interdependence” (p. 
26), i.e. at the level of the family or the household. Moreover, it views return as the 
natural outcome of a successful experience abroad during which migrants met their 
goals (i.e. higher incomes and accumulation of savings) while naturally remitting part 
of their income to the household. 
Remittances are part and parcel of a strategy aimed at diversifying the 
resources of the household with a view to better compensating for the risks, linked to 
the absence of an efficient insurance market in home countries. They also constitute 
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one explanatory factor in the return decision, together with the attachment to the home 
country. 
With reference to remittances and the likelihood of return, Constant and 
Massey (2002) on the basis of the data relating to the return migration of 
guestworkers in Germany from 1984 to 1997, observed that remitters have higher 
rates of employment in receiving countries and that having a spouse in the home 
country increases their likelihood of return (Constant and Massey 2002).  
The neoclassical economics and NELM approaches posit contrasting sets of 
interpretations regarding return migration. Despite their contrasting interpretations of 
return migration, both theoretical schemes however give valuable insights regarding 
the reasons for which people move abroad and return home.  
Nonetheless, as far as their analytical frameworks are concerned, both 
theoretical approaches have several shortcomings. The first relates to the actors 
themselves and their motivations for return. These seem to be determined by financial 
or economic factors only, while providing little explanation of how remittances and 
skills are used in home countries. Secondly, returnees are exclusively viewed as 
foreign-income bearers or “financial intermediaries”. Finally, several empirical 
studies have convincingly demonstrated that the success/failure paradigm cannot fully 
explain the return migration phenomenon. This paradigm tends in fact to isolate the 
decisions and strategies of the returnees from their social and political environment, 
without correlating them with contextual factors at home. 
3.2.2 The Structural Approach to Return Migration 
 The structural approach to return migration argues that return is not solely 
analyzed with reference to the individual experience of the migrant, but also with 
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reference to social and institutional factors in countries of origin. In fact, return is also 
a question of context. 
Just like NELM, the structural approach to return migration shows how crucial 
to the return decision and the reintegration of the migrant are the financial and 
economic resources brought back to origin countries.  
Francesco Cerase’s influential article in 1974 on Italian returnees from the 
United States provides many useful examples of how complex the relationships 
between the returnee’s expectations and the social and economic context (i.e. 
“reality”) at home are. Cerase identifies four different types of returnees, emphasising 
their aspirations, expectations and needs: 
First is the “Return of failure” which pertains to those returnees who could not 
integrate in their host countries owing to the prejudices and stereotypes they 
encountered abroad. Their difficulties in taking an active part in the receiving 
societies or in adapting themselves to host societies were strong enough to motivate 
their return. 
Second, the “Return of conservatism” includes migrants who before 
emigrating had planned to return home with enough money to buy land with a view to 
“liberating themselves from loathsome subjection to the landowners” (Cerase 1974, p. 
254). Because of these aspirations and strategies, conservative returnees only tend to 
satisfy their personal needs, as well as those of their relatives. Conservative returnees 
do not aim at changing the social context they had left before migrating; rather, they 
help to preserve it. 
Third, “Return of retirement” refers to retired migrants who decide to return to 
their home countries and to acquire a piece of land and a home where they will spend 
their old age. 
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Fourth, “Return of innovation” is no doubt the most dynamic category of 
returnees in Cerase’s typology. It refers to actors who are “prepared to make use of all 
the means and new skills they have acquired during their migratory experiences” 
(Cerase 1974, p. 251) with a view to achieving their goals in their origin countries, 
which, according to them, offer greater opportunities to satisfy their expectations. 
Cerase notes that these returnees view themselves as innovators, for they believe that 
the skills acquired abroad as well as their savings will have turned them into “carriers 
of change”.  
Cerase’s typology of returnees clearly constitutes an attempt to show that 
situational or contextual factors in origin countries need to be taken into account as a 
prerequisite to determining whether a return experience is a success or a failure. 
Cerase’s observations have been crucial to subsequent approaches to returnees 
and return migration issues. Thus, a few years later, a study by George Gmelch 
elaborated on Cerase’s typology while stressing the need to correlate the migrants’ 
intentions to return with their motivations for return. 
Intentions to return, whether real or intended, shape the returnees’ 
expectations in origin countries (Rogers 1984; Callea 1986; Richmond 1984). Return 
appears to be guided by the opportunities that migrants expect to find in their origin 
countries but also by the opportunities already offered in their respective host 
countries. As situational and structural factors have a certain bearing on the return 
decision, according to Gmelch, the return decision cannot be planned properly as 
these situational factors need to be gauged a posteriori by the migrants. 
Whatever the level of expectations of returnees, the structural approach to 
return migration contends that these are more often than not readjusted to local 
realities and that, owing to the strength of traditional vested interests in origin 
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countries, returnees have a limited innovative influence in their origin societies. It 
also contends that if readjustment does not take place, the returnee may contemplate 
reemigration. 
The structural approach to return migration is essential to show how 
influential contextual factors may be on the returnees’ capacity to innovate and to 
appear as actors of change. Not only do skills and financial capital shape return 
experiences, but local power relations, traditions and values in home countries also 
have a strong bearing on the returnees’ capacity to utilize their migration experiences 
for improving their home countries. 
3.2.3.  Transnationalism and Return Migration 
In the late 1980s, in an attempt to highlight the dynamic and maintenance of regular 
migration linkages between sending and receiving countries - a fact often overlooked 
by the structuralists - and to interpret the back-and-forth movement of people crossing 
borders, migration scholars from different disciplines started to adopt the 
transnational terminology initially used by international relations scholars. 
Unlike the structuralists and the advocates of NELM, return does not 
constitute the end of a migration cycle. In the view of transnationalists, the migration 
story continues. Return migration is part and parcel of a circular system of social and 
economic relationships and exchanges facilitating the reintegration of migrants while 
conveying knowledge, information and membership. One of the main contrasts 
between transnationalism and structuralism lies in the fact that, according to 
transnationalists, returnees prepare their reintegration at home through periodical and 
regular visits to their home countries. They retain strong links with their home 
countries and periodically send remittances to their households. 
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In fact, transnationalism refers not only to the maintenance of strong linkages 
between migrants and their families or households in origin countries, but also to the 
multifarious ways in which migrants feel linked to one another by their common 
ethnic origins and in-group solidarity. Their human and financial resources seem to be 
embedded in an ethnically defined framework of interaction (Hsing 1998). The 
transnational approach to international migrations tends to view the action of migrants 
as the direct outcome of their belonging to their own (dispersed) migrant community.  
Beyond these divergent interpretations, it is important to mention that, in the 
field of return migration, transnationalism allows cross-border linkages between the 
returnees and their migrant communities abroad to be highlighted. Return takes place 
once enough resources, whether financial or informational, have been gathered and 
when conditions at home are viewed as being sufficiently favourable. In a 
transnational stance, return has been dealt with while referring to the ways in which 
returnees are successful in adapting themselves to their home environment, at all 
levels. They know how to take advantage of the “identity attributes” they acquired 
abroad, with a view to distinguishing themselves from the locals.  
3.2.4.  Social Network Theory and Return Migration 
Just like the transnational approach to return migration, social network theory views 
returnees as being the bearers of tangible and intangible resources. Although the 
respective impact of tangible and intangible resources on return migrants’ initiatives 
is difficult to evaluate a priori, it seems essential to examine return migration with 
constant reference to these elements. Just like the transnational approach to return 
migration, social network theory views returnees as migrants who maintain strong 
linkages with their former places of settlement in other countries. However, such 
linkages are not the direct outcome of the abovementioned commonality of attributes.  
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In a network theoretical approach, linkages reflect an experience of migration 
that may provide a significant adjunct to the returnees’ initiatives at home. Resources 
needed to secure return back home also stem from patterns of interpersonal 
relationships that may derive from the returnees’ past experiences of migration. Social 
structures increase the availability of resources and information, while securing the 
effective initiatives of return migrants. Thus, the composition of networks, which 
consist of a multiplicity of social structures (Eccles and Nohria, 1992), as well as the 
configuration of linkages, is of paramount importance to examine the fundamentals 
that define and maintain the cross-border linkages in which return migrants are 
involved.  
It should be noted that other resources are also important to the success of 
returnees’ initiatives and projects following their return. The availability of these 
resources would also seem to lie in the social capital from which return migrants 
benefited before migrating. On the one hand, past migration experience alone does 
not fully explain the returnees’ initiatives. On the other hand, in terms of social 
capital, return migrants do not represent a homogeneous group. Social capital may be 
viewed as resources provided by the returnees’ families or households. In other 
words, pre-existing social and financial resources, which are provided by the family, 
may shape the performance of return migrants. Social capital pertains to the resources 
from which the returnees may benefit. It is reasonable to think that social capital and 
the potential involvement of return migrants in cross-border social networks may be 
viewed as resources that complement and shape one another. 
Fundamentally, whether they are highly skilled or not, economic migrants or 
refugees, returnees have to be viewed as social actors who may find ways to ensure 
their return to their homelands, and participate in the dynamics of cross-border 
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networks. The reference to social network theory allows the gap to be bridged 
between the organisational structure of networks and the relational content that actors 
attach to their own involvement and membership in such networks.  
Network theory articulates two levels of study. First, return migrants are seen 
as social actors who are involved in a set of relational ramifications. By analysing the 
practice of network membership, other elements of analysis may highlight the 
multiplicity of involvements of these actors, as well as the types of organisation that 
are influential on their behaviours. Second, different network structures offer different 
opportunities in a given context, and different orientations and strategies. It may be 
from this perspective that actors derive their interests and that, at the same time, 
networks persist. 
The five theoretical approaches discussed above focus primarily on the 
economic aspects of return migration. These are at the individual or household levels 
(i.e. neoclassical economics, NELM); and at the micro and macro dimensions of 
return migration (e.g. structuralism, transnationalism, social network theory). Various 
ways in which economic returns have been analysed and returnees depicted differ in 
terms of levels of analysis and research framework. 
Despite such differences, they are all illustrative of the various stages of 
development and maturation that characterise international migration streams (Martin 
and Widgren 2002). In fact, the foregoing comparative analysis of the theories of 
return migration sheds light on the economic and non-economic motivations for 
return, and on the need to contextualise return. 
Just as there exist several demand-pull and supply-push factors that account 
for the dynamics of international migration, there also exist various micro and macro 
factors that motivate return and shape its configuration, under specific circumstances. 
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It is the researchers task to identify the predominant factors. An attempt has been 
made in the subsequent sections to undertake such an exercise in the specific context 
of the Indian state of Kerala.  
3.3. The State of Kerala: An Overview 
 
 Kerala is a state located in south-western India (Figure 3.1), wedged between 
the Arabian Sea and the Western Ghats. Kerala’s coast runs for about 580 km, while 
the state itself varies between 35 and 120 km in width. Kerala is divided into 14 
districts (Figure 3.2). These districts are distributed among Kerala’s three historical 
regions - Malabar (northern Kerala), Kochi (central Kerala), and Travancore (southern 
Kerala)66.  
Besides the state’s administrative capital Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), 
the other major cities in Kerala are Kochi (Cochin), Kozhikode (Calicut), Kannur 
(Cannanore), Thrissur (Trichur), and Kollam (Quilon). Kochi is considered to be the 
the economic/commercial capital, Kannur the political capital, and Thrissur the 
cultural capital of Kerala. 
According to 2001 Census of the Government of India, Kerala had a 
population of 31.8 million, accounting for 3.5 percent of India’s population. Kerala’s 
population growth is India’s lowest. Whereas Kerala's population more than doubled 
between 1951 and 1991 by adding 15.6 million people to reach 29.1 million residents 
in 1991, the population stood at less than 32 million by 2001.  
 
 
                                                
66 Malabar comprises the districts of Kasaragod, Kannur, Wayanad, Kozhikode, Malappuram, 
Palakkad. Kochi comprises the districts of Thrissur and Ernakulam. Travancore comprises the 
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A steadily ageing population (11.2 percent of Keralites were over age 60 in 
2001) and low birthrate (18 per 1,000 in 2001) make Kerala one of the few regions of 
the developing world to have undergone the “demographic transition” characteristic 
of such developed nations as Canada, Japan, and Norway. Kerala’s female-to-male 
ratio (1.058) is significantly higher than that of the rest of India.  
On the economic front, the state’s GDP grew an impressive 10.3 per cent 
between 1999-00 and 2005-06 to reach US$ 26.5 billion (Government of Kerala, 
2006) (Figure 3.3). The per capita income of Kerala was US$ 618.9 in 2004-05, while 
the All-India average was US$ 514.2 in the same year.  
The tertiary sector has been the fastest growing, at a CAGR of 12.6 per cent 
between 1999-00 and 2005-06, driven by sub-sectors like trade, hotels, transport and 
communication. In 2005-06, the tertiary sector accounted for over three-fifths of the 
Gross State Domestic Product (Figure 3.4). The secondary sector, driven by 
construction, registered a growth of 17 per cent in 2005-06 over the previous year. 
The Primary sector share in the GSDP has been declining over the years (Figure 3.4).  
Remittances play an important role in Kerala’s economy. Rajan and Zachariah 
(2007) report that in 2004, total remittances to the state were an estimated Rs. 18.5 
thousand crores, amounting to about 22 percent of Net State Domestic Product 
(NSDP) in the same year. The importance of remittances to Kerala’s economy is 
evident from a few other comparisons for the year 2004. Remittances were 1.74 times 
the revenue receipts of the state, 7 times the transfers to the state from the Central 
Government, and 1.8 times the annual expenditure of the Kerala Government. 
Remittances were sufficient to wipe out 60 per cent of the Kerala state’s debt. The 
remittances in 2003 were 15 times the export earnings from cashew and 18 times of 
those from marine products. At the household level, it has contributed to investments  
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Figure 3.3 


































Kerala: Sectoral Share and Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), 1999-00 
and 2005-06 
 
       


















in education and health, and to accumulation of both moveable and non-moveable 
assets (Rajan and Zachariah, 2007). Indeed, the state economy is often described as 
“Money Order Economy” with obvious reference to the critical role that remittances 
play in the economy.   
Kerala’s human development indices - primary level education, health care 
and poverty alleviation indices are among the best in India. In 2005-2006, Kerala had 
one of the highest literacy rates (89.9 percent) among Indian states. Life expectancy at 
birth (73 years) was among the highest in India in 2001. By the turn of the 21st 
century, the rural and urban poverty rates dropped to 10.0 percent and 9.6 percent 
respectively.  
 Kerala’s low GDP and productivity figures juxtaposed with higher 
development figures than in most Indian states, is often dubbed the “Kerala 
Phenomenon” or the “Kerala Model” of development by economists, political 
scientists, and sociologists. As Nair (1999) observes: 
 “The Kerala economy is Janus-faced: forward looking and advanced 
in its social sectors and backward looking and stagnant in its 
materially productive sectors. Indeed, the Kerala experience has 
become legendary and internationally known as a “unique case of 
spectacular achievement of a region in improving the quality of living 
of its population through enlightened policies and active public 
support and participation sustained over long periods of time, in an 
environment, surprisingly, of low per capita income and relative 
economic stagnation” (Dreze and Sen, 1995; Ramachandran, 1997; 
Nair, 1981; Dreze and Sen, 1997). It is often referred to in academic 






3.4  Studies on Kerala’s Emigration and Return Migration Experience 
 
In the case of Indian labor migration to the Middle East, return migration has assumed 
important dimensions since the mid 1980s67. During the 1970s, employment 
possibilities in the Middle East were more or less assured. Under such market 
conditions, displacement of labor from labor importing countries was minimal.  Table 
3.1 provides the stocks of Indian migrant population in selected Gulf countries in 
1975, 1991, and 2001. The table suggests a steady increase in the stock of Indian 
workers in all the selected Gulf countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia and UAE.  
The labor market scenario in the Gulf however changed towards the beginning 
of the 1980s as demand for imported labor gradually declined, but supply grew (Table 
3.1). The effect was to force intending migrants to return to their native countries. It is 
not that labor migration to the Middle East was reduced, but the labor flow started 
taking place in both directions. The net result was that ‘return migration’ emerged on 
a significant scale. 
Kerala’s migration experience has received the attention of economists, 
sociologists and demographers. The state’s predominant migration experience has 
been to the Gulf countries. The importance of Kerala in India’s overall migration 








                                                





















































Country 1975 1991 2001 
 S Arabia  34,500 600,000 1,500,000 
 UAE  107,500  400,000  950,000 
 Oman  38,500 220,000 312,000 
 Kuwait  32,105 88,000 295,000 
 Qatar  27,800 75,000 131,000 
 Bahrain  17,250 100,000 130,000 
Total 257,655 1,483,000 3,318,000 
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Table 3.2 presents the labor outflow68 from India to the six GCC countries 
(and Jordan) in the Gulf over the period 2000-2005. Barring Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Jordan, the remaining Gulf countries registered an increase in the flow in 2005 
over the preceding year. The table also facilitates comparison of India’s labor 
migration to the Gulf countries against an increasing flow to Malaysia in Southeast 
Asia, a country that has overtaken at least five of the seven countries of the Gulf in 
recent years. 
Table 3.3 shows that the emigrants originate mainly from the three Indian 
states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, though Karnataka overtook 
Andhra Pradesh by a substantial margin in 2005 (Table 3.3). Some of the other states 
having sizeable number of total labor emigrants to Gulf are Karnataka, Maharashtra, 
Punjab and Rajasthan. The emigration clearance data give an underestimate of 
Keralite worker migration to the Gulf because a person holding a graduate degree is 
exempt from emigration clearance, and the number of such graduates is very high 
among the Kerala migrants to the Gulf. This limitation notwithstanding, Kerala 
contributed an average of 25 per cent of emigrants in 21st century, down from an 
average of 35 percent in the twentieth century (Table 3.3). In other words, one out of 
every three or four Indians who migrated to the Gulf has been a Keralite.  
 
 
                                                
68 No documentation of international migration data exists in India, let alone its various sub–
categories. There is indirect documentation of low–skilled emigration of workers in terms of 
their being ECR (Emigration Clearance Required) category of passport holders and as such 
from the number of clearances granted by the Protectorate of Emigrants, Government of 
India. However, these proxies can be an overestimate due to not all of them leaving the 
country. On the other hand, these numbers are normally an underestimate of actual migration 
because many categories are not covered, for example, managerial personnel; gazetted 
government servants; those above 12 years of schooling certificate holder; migrants staying 
abroad for over 3 years and re–migrating; income–tax payers, spouses and dependent children 
up to 24 years of age of Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR) categories, those going to 
specified countries, etc. 
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Table 3.2 




2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
UAE 55,099 53,673 95,034 143,804 175,262 194,412 
Saudi Arabia 58,722 78,048 99,453 121,431 123,522 99,879 
Kuwait 31,082 39,751 4,859 54,434 52,064 39,124 
Oman 15,155 30,985 41,209 36,816 33,275 40,931 
Bahrain 15,909 16,382 20,807 24,778 22,980 30,060 
Qatar n.a. 13,829 12,596 14,251 16,325 50,222 
Jordan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,576 1,851 
Malaysia*  
(Southeast Asia) 
4,615 6,131 10,512 26,898 31,464 71,041 
Other, incl. Indian 
Ocean Island 
Countries 
62,600 39,865 83,193 44,044 17,492 21,333 
Total 243,182 278,664 367,663 466,456 474,960 548,853 
 
Note: Figures are for Malaysia only.  






























Workers Granted Emigration Clearance By Government of India, 
By Major Indian States, 1995–2005 
 
State 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Kerala 165,629 167,325 156,102 91,720 60,445 69,630 61,548 81,950 92,044 63,512 125,075 
Tamil Nadu 65,737 64,991 63,672 69,793 47,402 63,878 61,649 79,165 89,464 108,964 117,050 
A. Pradesh  30,284  29,995  38,278  30,599  18,983  29,999 37,331  38,417 65,971 72,580 48,498 
Maharashtra  26,312  25,214  25,146  24,657  9,871  13,346 22,713  25,477 29,350 28,670 29,289 
Karnataka  33,496  33,761  40,396  11,535  5,287  10,927 10,095  14,061 22,641 19,237 75,384 
Rajasthan  28,374  18,221  28,242  19,824  9,809  10,170 14,993  23,254 37,693 35,108 21,899 
Punjab  11,852  11,751  12,414  26,876  15,167  10,025 12,422  19,638 24,963 25,302 24,088 
Others  53,650  62,956  52,174  80,160  32,588  35,207 57,913  85,701 104,330 121,587 107,570 
Total 415,334 414,214 416,424 355,164 199,552  243,182 278,664 367,663 466,456 474,960 548,853 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rajan (2003) for data till 1999; Government of India, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (GOI, MOIA), 
Annual Reports 2004–5, 2005–6, for data from 2000 to 2005.
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A review of the literature on Kerala’s emigration shows that most of the 
studies have focused primarily on the profiles and socio-economic backgrounds of 
emigrants, processes of emigration, and economic and social impact of remittances. 
Most of the studies were based on representative samples for the whole State and 
others based on selected centres of emigration; some conducted by the State 
Department of Economics and Statistics, and the rest by individual researchers. A 
brief overview of earlier studies is provided below.   
The studies conducted during the late 1970’s and the early 1980’s were mainly 
micro level studies examining the profiles of migrants, their socio-economic 
background, causes of migration and the impact of remittances based on village 
surveys (Prakash, 1978; Mathew and Nair, 1978; Kurien, 1979; Radhakrishnan and 
Ibrahim, 1981; Agro Economic Research Centre, 1982).  
Impact of Gulf Migration on Kerala society, especially the impact of male 
emigration on women and family, is another topic in which a few studies were 
conducted by sociologists (Gulati, 1983; 1987; 1993; Sekhar, 1997). The economic 
impact of Gulf migration on Kerala is a topic, which attracted considerable attention 
from economists and demographers (Nair, 1989; Issac, 1993; Prakash, 1998; 
Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2003). 
Since the mid-1970’s, the factor that had the greatest impact on Kerala's 
economy especially on labor market, consumption, savings, investment, poverty, 
income distribution and economic growth has been the Gulf migration and migrant 
remittances (Prakash, 1998). A similar conclusion reached by another study based on 
a state-wide survey (Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan, 2000). 
Issues connected with return emigration such as the causes of return, socio-
economic background of the returnees, and the problems faced by them is another 
 151 
area where a number of studies are available (Nair, 1986; Nambiar, 1995; Prakash, 
2000; Zachacriah, Nair and Rajan, 2001). Nayyar (1994) estimated that 131,900 
people returned to Kerala from the Middle East during the period 1983–86 and 38,000 
returned during the period 1987-90. Zachariah et al. (2002) estimated that nearly 
147,000 persons during the period 1988 to 1992 and around 400,000 during 1993 to 
1997 returned to the state of Kerala alone.  
There is almost total lack of information on aspects like occupational 
structure, skills acquired, resource position, investment capabilities, and investment 
plans of the return migrants. This has severely impaired the formulation of any 
purposeful reintegration plans for the return migrants underscoring the need for 
further research in this area. This essay aims to address some of these issues.  
The official database as well as the few independent studies cited above, 
demonstrates the presence of data in some elementary form. However, a major 
problem faced by the users, planners and policy makers is their availability in a usable 
form. Lack of usable data severely impairs testing of theoretical frameworks, and 
therefore meaningful policy studies.  
3.5  Research Questions 
 In the context set above, the importance of a systematic study on return 
migration is quite evident. As a subject of policy debate, return migration has been 
rarely discussed, both internationally and domestically (in India), when compared to 
remittances. Given the magnitude of return migrants in the Kerala context, it raises 
important implications for public policies concerning the returnees’ assimilation in 
the social and economic sphere, so as to maximize their potential role in the state’s 
development. There has been a lack of adequate research concerning the above, and 
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this essay aims to fill the gap by analyzing survey data obtained from state-wide 
household surveys in the years 1998 and 200169.  
Specifically, two aspects of return migration phenomenon in Kerala are 
examined. First, it utilizes the two surveys to map the detailed profile of the return 
migrants, including their employment and occupational patterns. It then examines 
whether there has been occupational mobility among the return migrants. This is 
important because such mobility is one of the avenues through which migration could 
bring about a structural transformation of the economy. Second, it analyzes various 
policy initiatives which the Central and State governments can pursue to enhance the 
contribution of return migrants to Kerala’s overall economic and social development.   
3.6  Data Sources and Research Methodology 
3.6.1 Data Sources 
 Data used for the research come from two main sources – the Kerala 
Migration Study (KMS), 1998 and the Return Migration Survey (RMS), 2001, 
conducted by the Centre for Development Studies (CDS). The KMS was sponsored 
by the Indian Council for Social Science Research, New Delhi under its Indo-Dutch 
Programme on Alternatives in Development. The RMS was undertaken with the 
financial support from the Delhi-based South Asian Network of Economic Institutes.  
The RMS was the second part of KMS. The raw dataset for both the surveys were 
made available for the purpose of this essay by the CDS. The analyses in this essay is 
based on data obtained by data cleaning and mining of the raw dataset.  
For the KMS study, household-level migration data were collected covering 
10,000 households selected at random from 200 panchayats (village councils) from 
                                                
69 The aim of the two surveys was to capture various socio-economic dimensions of Kerala’s migration 
phenomenon. Details of the survey, and its scope are indicated by the discussion and analysis in 
Sections 3.6 and 3.7.   
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all the 14 districts and all the 61 taluks (groups of villages) of the State. The details of 
district-wise distribution of rural and urban households in different localities, number 
of households, and total population surveyed is provided in Table 3.4. 
Data for RMS were collected from the households, which had an emigrant or 
return migrant as ascertained by the KMS. The sample included about 1200 return 
emigrants from the selected households.   
Household interviews collected data at both individual and household levels.  
Individual information included personal characteristics (age, sex, education, marital 
status), days of work in each of the following various types of activities, etc. For all 
people with migrant experiences, total months of migration and time of return were 
























                                                
70 Appendix 3.3 provides the entire RMS questionnaire.  
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Table 3.4 
Kerala Migration Study (KMS): Survey Details  
 
District   Localities Households Population 
 Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
 Thiruvananthapuram    8    14    22    400    700    1100    1619    2733    4352   
 Kollam    3    15    18    150    750    900    647    3025    3672   
 Pathanamthitta    1    8    9    50    400    450    202    1534    1736   
 Alappuzha    4    10    14    200    500    700    876    2018    2894   
 Kottayam    2    11    13    100    550    650    431    2353    2784   
 Idukki    0    8    8    0    400    400    0    1658    1658   
 Ernakulam    10    11    21    500    550    1050    2170    2263    4433   
 Thrissur    5    14    19    250    700    950    1091    2961    4052   
 Palakkad    2    14    16    100    700    800    398    3170    3568   
 Malappuram    2    16    18    100    800    900    620    4257    4877   
 Kozhikode    6    11    17    300    550    850    1417    2569    3986   
 Wayanad    0    5    5    0    250    250    0    1137    1137   
 Kannur    7    7    14    350    350    700    2100    1798    3898   
 Kasargode    1    5    6    50    250    300    223    1375    1598   
 KERALA    51    149    200    2550    7450    10000    11794    32851    44645   
 




Sampling Methods: To distinguish relatively permanent returns of migrants from 
temporary home visits, return migrants are defined as those who returned home and 
registered at least eleven months of duration of home stay71. Although there was no 
guarantee that these return migrants will not seek migration work again, the duration 
was long enough for the returnees to participate in local economic activities.  
Household was the ultimate sampling unit for both KMS and RMS. As the 
surveys were designed to cover the entire state, all 14 districts were included in the 
sample. Within a district, the panchayats or municipal wards referred to as localities 
were used as the first-stage sampling unit. The list of sample localities was selected at 
random with probability proportional to the number of households in the locality. 
From each selected locality, one ward was chosen at random and from each selected 
ward, 50 households were chosen to form the sample of households. 
For each district, the number of households in the sample was determined in 
proportion to the number of households in that district according to the 1991 Census 
for KMS and 2001 census for RMS. This number was distributed between the rural 
and urban areas according to their respective sizes in the census. The number of 
households in the sample was divided by 50 to get the number of localities (panchayat 
wards in the case of rural areas and municipal wards in the case of towns) to be 
included in the sample size (See Table 3.4)72.  
                                                
71 This is in broad conformity to the definition offered by the United Nations Statistics 
Division for collecting data on international migration (UNSD, 1998), which states returning 
migrants as “persons returning to their country of citizenship after having been international 
migrants (whether short-term or long-term) in another country and who are intending to stay 
in their own country for at least a year.” 
 
72 For instance, from Thiruvananthapuram district, the sample size was 700 from the rural 
areas (selected from 15 panchayats) and 400 households in the urban areas (selected from 
seven municipalities). These localities were selected from among all the localities in the 
districts with probability proportional to their size reckoned in terms of the number of 
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From each selected panchayat or urban locality, one or more wards were 
selected at random to represent the sample localities. From each of these wards, 50 
households were selected at random by the field staff just before field investigation 
began. The list of households kept by the panchayats was used to draw the sample.  
Migration Estimates: The KMS was designed to measure four types of migrants -  
1. REM (return migrant), i.e. members of the household who, in the past, had 
emigrated out of India, but had returned to Kerala and were now members of 
the household. 
2. EMI (emigrants), i.e. persons who had moved out of Kerala after 1980 and 
were living outside India at the time of survey. 
3. ROM (return out-migrants), i.e. members of a household who had moved out 
of Kerala to other parts of India but had returned and were members of the 
household. 
4. OMI (out-migrants), i.e. persons who had moved out of Kerala after 1980 and 
were living outside Kerala but within India, at the time of survey. 
The main element in the estimation process was the ratio of emigrants (or 
EMI) and return emigrants (or REM) to the number of households in the sample 
locality (panchayat/municipal Ward). 
The estimation was done for each taluk separately. The district total was 
obtained by adding the taluk estimates and the state-level estimate was obtained by 
adding the district estimates. The methodology for estimating return emigrants was as 
follows: 
ri = Number of return emigrants in the sample households in the ith locality = 
1st, 2nd, …. Panchayats and municipal wards 
                                                                                                                                       
households. If the panchayat or urban locality is very large, as is the case of 
Thiruvananthapuram city, several wards are selected from it (e.g, four wards were selected 
from Thiruvananthapuram city). 
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hi = Number of sample HHs in the sample locality (around 50) 
Hi = Total number of HHs in the ith sample locality (from census) 
H = Total number of HHs in the taluk (from census) 
REM = [{sum of (Hi*ri/hi)}/sum of Hi]*H 
As indicated above, the main parameter used for estimation is the ratio of 
migrants (or return migrants) to the number of households in the sample locality. An 
equally valid estimate of the number of migrants is obtained by using the sample 
population in the locality and estimating migrants per household population. The 
formula can be written as – 
REM = [{sum of (Pi*ri/pi)}/sum of Pi]*P 
where Pi = census population in the panchayats  
pi = sample population in the sample locality 
P = total population in the taluk 
ri = number of REM in the sample locality 
 Experimental calculations showed insignificant difference between the results 
obtained by the two methods. For the purpose of estimation, the household ratio 
method was more preferable for the following reasons.  
 First, the sampling was done on the basis of households and not population. 
Second, the number of households in a sample locality was fairly constant 
having around 50 HHs.  
Third, the number of households (the denominator) in a locality is not affected 
by the number of migrants (the numerator). The numerator and the denominator are 
functionally independent. But this is not the case with population and migration. The 
number of emigrants affects the number of persons in a household, return migrants, 
etc.  
Fourth, there is little scope for making errors in counting the number of 
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households in a sample locality. There is practically no non-sampling error in the 
number of HHs in a sample locality. But that is not the case with population. There is 
the possibility of making mistakes in enumerating all the eligible and only the eligible 
members of the household.  
Fifth, calculation of the coefficient of variation73 of the ratio of REM, EMI etc. 
indicated no significant difference between the two methods.  
In the following section, data for only REM and EMI were used for analysis in 
conformity with the research questions and objectives.  
3.7  Descriptive Statistics and Data Analysis 
3.7.1  Return Migration: Magnitude, Rate, Origin, and Trends  
Table 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 provides details of the magnitude, rate, origin, and trends of 
the return emigrants in Kerala. On the basis of these tables, the following observations 
may be made:  
 (i) In 1998, there were 739,250 return emigrants in Kerala, accounting for 11.6 
return emigrants per 100 households surveyed (Table 3.5). The migration 
prevalence ratio (MPR), which is the ratio of the sum of all the four type of 
migrants, as discussed above (EMI, OMI, REM, ROM) in an area (district, 
taluk, etc.) to the number of households in the area, was about 60 migrants for 
every 100 households74 (Table 3.5). 
                                                
73 The coefficient of variation represents the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, and it 
is a useful statistic for comparing the degree of variation from one data series to another, even 
if the means are drastically different from each other. 
74 Some households had more than one migrant. Therefore the figure does not imply that 60 
percent of the households have a migrant each. In fact, the percent of households with at least 
one migrant is less. The Household Migration Rate (HMR) was calculated to be 38.5 for 
Kerala, suggesting that some households had more than one migrant.  
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Table 3.5 









Total (REM + EMI 





Malappuram   296,710  123,750   470,937  20.5   78.1 
Thiruvananthapuram 130,705  118,878   403,574  18.1   61.6 
Thrissur   161,102  116,788   556,791  18.6   88.5 
Kollam  102,977   74,106   332,142  13.2   59.4 
Kozhikode  116,026   60,910   255,486  11.5   48.4 
Pathanamthitta  97,505   54,537   290,560  18.5   98.6 
Ernakulam  103,750   45,028  228,255   7.4   37.3 
Palakkad  116,062   39,234  346,411   7.4   65.1 
Alappuzha  62,870   34,572  347,446   7.2   72.7 
Kannur  88,065   28,263  196,520   6.1   42.4 
 Kottayam  35,494   18,164  140,599   4.6   35.9 
 Kasergode  38,747   16,667   122,984  8.2   60.7 
 Idukki   7,390  5,017  29,081   2.0   11.5 
 Wayand   4,552  3,327  30,933   2.1   19.6 
 Kerala (Total) 1,361,955  739,245   3,751,719  11.6   59.0 
 
 Notes: EMI = Emigrants; REM = Return Emigrants; ROM = Return Out-migrants; OMI = Out-migrants. The return emigrants were estimated 
using, REM = [{sum of (Hi*ri/hi)}/sum of Hi]*H, where  
  ri = Number of return emigrants in the sample households in the ith locality = 1st, 2nd, …. Panchayats and municipal wards 
 hi = Number of sample HHs in the sample locality (around 50) 
 Hi = Total number of HHs in the ith sample locality (from census) 
 H = Total number of HHs in the taluk (from census) 
Source: Calculated from KMS dataset.
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Table 3.6 
 Countries from which Emigrants Returned, 1998 
 
Country/City of Origin    Frequency    Percentage   
Saudi Arabia    304395    41.2   
Dubai    84520    11.4   
Muscat    73496    9.9   
Abu Dhabi    63084    8.5   
Sharjah    45322    6.1   
Baharin    44097    6.0   
Kuwait    34910    4.7   
Qatar    23274    3.1   
Oman  (excluding Muscat)   15312    2.1   
South East Asia     7962    1.1  
Iraq, Iran     4900    0.7  
Nepal, Bangladesh     4900    0.7  
Africa     3675    0.5  
USA     1225    0.2  
Europe     612    0.1  
Others    27561    3.7   
Total     739245    100.0  
 
 






































Return emigrants by Year of Return 
 
Year    Number (in thousands)  
 1997    127   
 1996    107   
 1995    73   
 1994    58   
 1993    35   
 1992    43   
 1991    20   
 1990    37   
 1993-97    400   
 1988-92    147   
 1983-87    69   
 Total    739*   
 
Note: * The figure includes the return emigrants who returned 
prior to 1983 and during the first five months of 1998.  
 
















(ii) Data obtained from district-wise distribution of return emigrants revealed that 
about 125,000 or 17 percent of total returnees resided in the Malappuram 
district. For every 100 households in Malappuram there were 20.5 return 
emigrants in 1998. Trivandrum and Thrissur were the other two districts with 
more than 100,000 return emigrants each. The hilly districts, Idukki and 
Wayanad, had very few return emigrants (Table 3.5). 
(iii) Most of the return emigrants in Kerala were those who returned from Saudi 
 Arabia (more than 3 lakh or more than 41 percent of the total). The other 
 major areas from which emigrants have returned were Dubai (85,000 or 11.4 
 percent), Oman (74,000 or 9.9 percent) and Abu Dhabi (64,000 or 8.5 
 percent). A miniscule proportion of the return emigrants were from Southeast 
 Asia, South Asia, and developed regions (Table 3.6).  
(iv) Table 3.7 lists the number of return migrants who returned annually during 
1990-97 and earlier during the four-year periods 1983-87, 1988-91, and 1993-
97. The number of return emigrants increased by over 450 percent during the 
ten year period (1983-87 to 1993-97). Decline in oil prices, economic 
depression in the Gulf, and immigration-discouraging measures taken by the 
Gulf Governments in the post-Gulf War period were some of the reasons that 
could be attributed to emergence of such a trend.   
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3.7.2 Demographic Characteristics of Return Emigrants 
Sex Composition  
The emigrants were predominantly men. So were the return emigrants (90 percent) 
(Table 3.8). This is consistent with the national trend, where males usually outnumber 
females in all migration streams. However, the proportion of females varies 
considerably by district. Kottayam has the highest percent of female emigrants (about 
21 percent). Other districts with a relatively high proportion of female emigrants are 
Pathanamthitta, Ernakulam, and Thrissur. These are the districts where Syrian 
Christians have a relatively high representation.  
 In general, districts with high proportion of females among the emigrants have 
also a high proportion of females among return emigrants, with the exception of the 
district of Kottayam (Table 3.8). The inter-district variations in sex composition of the 




On the basis of data provided in Table 3.9, it may be observed that while external 
migration is more selective of young adult ages75 (clustering around age groups 20-34 
years), return emigrants cluster more towards 25-44 age groups. In particular, they 
were highly concentrated in the 30-39 age group. The average age of the return 
emigrants was calculated to be 34 years, while that of an emigrant 27 years. Thus, on 
an average, the migrants who return were 7 years older that the migrants who moved 
out, which might be indicative of the average duration of a migration episode.   
 
 
                                                
75 Age is defined as the age at the time of migration in the case of emigration, and age at the 
time of return migration in the case of return emigrants.  
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Table 3.8 
Proportion of Females among Emigrants and Return Emigrants by District 
(per cent) 
 
Districts  Proportion of Females 
 EMI REM 
Malappuram   5.3 5.1 
Thiruvananthapuram  3.8 8.3 
Thrissur   16.7 26.4 
Kollam  8.2 8.9 
Kozhikode  3.7 4.8 
Pathanamthitta  16.6 21.1 
Ernakulam  16.9 8.9 
Palakkad  11.3 3.6 
Alappuzha  6.6 7.8 
Kannur  3.7 9.1 
 Kottayam  20.6 3.2 
 Kasergode  3.4 0.0 
 Idukki   11.1 14.3 
 Wayand   12.5 40.0 
 Kerala (Total) 9.3 10.9 
 
 




























Age Distribution of Emigrants and return Emigrants 
(per cent) 
 
Age EMI REM 
<15 5.2 5.9 
15-19 3.5 1.2 
20-24 29.6 6.4 
25-29 28.9 18.4 
30-34 17.0 20.5 
35-39 8.8 18.5 
40-44 4.6 13.8 
45-49 1.9 7.9 
50+ 0.5 7.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
 







































Marital Status REM EMI 
Males 
Unmarried 9.5 49.8 
Married 89.2 49.8 
Widowed 0.5 0.2 
Divorced 0.2 0.2 
Separated 0.6 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Females 
Unmarried 13.0 17.4 
Married 77.8 79.2 
Widowed 8.2 2.7 
Divorced 0.0 0.0 
Separated 1.0 0.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 

















 In case of return migrants, their marital status is that at the time of survey. 
However, for emigrants, it is the status at the time of departure from the state.  
 There were substantial differences between the marital status distribution of 
the emigrants and the return emigrants. Among males, the proportion of the 
unmarried among the return emigrants was less by 40 percentage points than among 
the emigrants. Correspondingly, the proportion of married males among the return 
emigrants was higher by almost the same magnitude than that among married 
emigrants (Table 3.10).   
 In the case of females, the differences in proportions were much lower. The 
proportion of unmarried females was higher by 4.4 percentage points among the 
emigrants and the proportion of widows were lower by an almost equal amount. The 
death of the husband seems to be an important factor in the return of female 
emigrants.  
 
3.7.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics of Return Emigrants 
Distribution by Community 
Table 3.11a and Table 3.11b provide the distribution of return emigrants by 
communities, as calculated from RMS and KMS data respectively. There were no 
significant variations in the findings from a much smaller sample in the RMS study.   
The majority of the return emigrants were Muslims, about 45 percent of the total. 
Ezhawas ranked second with a little less than 20 percent of the total (Table 3.11a and 
Table 3.11b). Muslims have a predominant position in the external migration and 





Distribution of Return Emigrants by Community, 2001 
Community    Percent   
 Hindus    33.6   
 Muslims    43.4   
 Syrian Christian   15.8   
 Latin Christians    5.5   
 Other Non-Hindus    1.7   
 Hindus by Caste    
 SC/ST    1.5   
 Nairs    6.8   
 Ezhavas    18.7   
 Brahmins    0.1   
 Other Hindus    6.5   
Source: Calculated from RMS dataset. 
 
Table 3.11b 
Distribution of Return Emigrants by Community, 1998 
 
Community    Percent   
 SC/ST    1.7   
 Nairs    7.0   
 Ezhavas    19.1   
 Syrian Christian    10.4   
 Latin Christians    10.5   
 Muslims    45.3   
 Others    6.0   




























 Figure 3.3, based on the 1998 survey data, reveals that about 30 percent of the 
return emigrants in Kerala were educated with a secondary school certificate or a 
degree. But almost an equal proportion is not educated beyond the primary level. The 
largest proportion of the return emigrants (41 percent) consist of those who have had 
some secondary school education but have not passed the secondary school certificate 
examination. About 8 percent have a degree.  
 The return emigrants of 2001 had a slightly higher level of education than 
their counterparts in 1998. While only about 25 percent of the return emigrants of 
1998 were secondary certificate holders, as much as 33 percent of the return 
emigrants of 2001 were of this educational category. Only a few of the return 
emigrants (under 20 percent) had any formal training in a technical subject. About 3 
percent had degree, 3.5 percent diploma and 12 percent certificate in technical 
subjects (Table 3.12).  
From the above analysis of selected demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics it may be surmised that, a typical return emigrant in Kerala is a 
married Muslim male in his thirties with an incomplete secondary level education, 















































Educational Attainment of Return Emigrants, 2001 
 
Educational Attainment   2001   
 Below primary    5.6   
 Primary    12.5   
 Below Secondary    41.3   
 Secondary    32.7   
 Degree    7.9   
 TOTAL    100.0   







































3.7.4  Occupational Distribution of Emigrants Before Emigration, at Destination, 
 and after Return 
Religion, sex, and date of birth of a person do not change with migration. 
Therefore, these characteristics of the return emigrants were the same before 
emigration as they were after their return. To some extent this is true of education 
also, as only very few of the emigrants could have improved their educational 
attainment after emigration. The principal personal characteristics, which could have 
changed with emigration, were occupation, industry, salary, etc.  
 Table 3.13 provides the occupational distribution of emigrants before 
emigration, at destination, and after return based on the KMS data. On the basis of 
Table 3.13 the following observations may be made: 
1.  Most of the emigrants had been laborers in agricultural or non-agricultural 
 sectors, job-seekers or students before emigration. These four categories 
 constituted about 64 percent of the total. About 15 percent came from the 
 private sector and about the same proportion came from among the self-
 employed. Less than 3 percent were government or semi-government 
 employees. 
2.  At the destination, two sectors provided the bulk of employment – the non-
 agricultural sector (47.5 percent) and private sector (40.8 percent). While the 
proportion of job-seekers decreased markedly from 26.5 percent to 0.7 







Occupational Distribution of Emigrants and Return Emigrants Before 











 Government Employment   2.2 2.5  2.2   
 Semi-Government   0.6 0.9  0.3   
 Private Sector   15.1 40.8  5.4   
 Self Employment   13.9 4.4  37.8   
 Unpaid worker  0.8 0.0  1.5   
 Agricultural labor   1.8 0.1  4.3   
 Non-agricultural labor   34.1 47.5  26.0   
 Unemployed   26.5 0.6  6.6   
 Unemployed not seeking job   0.2 0.2  6.4   
 Student   1.5 0.4  2.1   
 Household work   3.2 2.6  6.9   
 Pensioners   0.1 0.0  0.4   
 Total   100.0 100.0  100.0   
 






























3. On return, not all of them went back to their original occupations. Self-
employment was the dominant sector for about two-fifths of the returnees. 
More than one-fourth of the return migrants went back to non-agricultural 
labor. The share of voluntarily unemployed increased very sharply from 0.2 
percent before emigration to 6.5 percent on return. The proportion of job-
seekers on the other hand decreased from 26.5 percent to 6.6 percent.   
The return emigrants who had been employed before emigration had worked for 
an average of about 7.7 years before going to the Gulf countries. The largest number 
(36 percent) had worked for periods ranging between 5 and 9 years, 31 percent had 
worked for only less than 5 years.  
Thus, return emigrants are found to have been mainly from among those who 
had worked for some period in Kerala before emigration. A few had been of course 
unemployed.  
The above only provides the broad picture. To gain further insights of 
occupational and sectoral mobility of return emigrants, the rest of the essay analyzes 
the more detailed data obtained from the RMS survey conducted in 2001. As 
indicated earlier, data for RMS were collected from the households, which had an 
emigrant or return migrant as ascertained by the KMS. The sample included about 
1200 return emigrants from the selected households76.  The following analyzes the 
economic activity of return emigrants before emigration, in the Gulf, and after return 
to Kerala.  
 
                                                
76 There were however missing and/or unreported data points, which reduced the sample size 
in some cases (see for example Table 3.14).  
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Economic Activity before Emigration  
The return emigrants had been evenly distributed among the various economic 
sectors before emigration (Table 3.14). Agriculture had been the sector of activity for 
about 23 percent of the return emigrants, before emigration. Trade, commerce and 
hotel business had been the sectors of activity for 19 percent. About 18 percent had 
been engaged in construction industry and 15 percent were in service industry (Table 
3.14). 
The average wage/salary per annum of return emigrants before emigration had 
been Rs. 15,600. More than half of them had earned less than Rs 1,000 per month. 
More than 80 percent had less than Rs 2,000 per month and about 3.5 percent more 
than Rs 3,000 per month (Table 3.15).  
The above analysis another important finding therefore is that a typical return 
emigrant in Kerala had been before emigration a casual employee in the agricultural 
sector who had worked for about 7 years and received an annual wage income of 
about Rs. 15,600.  
Economic Activity in the Gulf  
While in the Gulf countries, the largest number of return emigrants, about 25 
percent of the total was employed in trade, commerce and hotel and restaurants. 
Almost an equal number were employed in construction industry (Table 3.14).  The 
secondary and tertiary sectors together employed more than 70 percent. Compared to 
their sectors of activity prior to emigration, increases were observed in the proportions 
employed in these two sectors, during the period they worked abroad. The largest 
decline was observed to have been in the proportion employed in the primary sector, 
particularly agriculture and animal husbandry.  
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Table 3.14 
Economic Sector Among Employed Persons Before Emigration 
in Kerala, In the Gulf, and After Return to Kerala 
 
Sector  
  Before 
Emigration 
  After 
Emigration   
 After 
Return   
Agricultural, Animal 
Husbandry    22.3    4.5    24.8   
Mining, Quarrying    0.9    1.5    0.2   
Manufacturing    7.6    7.4    7.6   
Trade Commerce, hotels    18.6    25.5    23.8   
Transport    11.0    7.6    14.4   
Construction    18.2    24.8    15.3   
Services    15.4    20.3    8.4   
Others    6.1    8.4    5.5   
Total    100.0    100.0    100.0   
 



































Annual Income of Return Emigrants Before Emigration, 2001 
 
Annual Income (Rs.)   Frequency    Percentage   
 Below 12000    446    55.7   
 12000-24000    236    29.5   
 24000-36000  91    11.3   
 36000-48000    14    1.7   
 48000-60000    7    0.9   
 60000+    7    0.9   
 Total    801    100.0   
Average Income = Rs. 15,584 
 




















Additionally, the RMS data also revealed that the average years of service 
abroad of the return emigrants was 6 years 3 months. About 30 percent of the total 
had served however for less than 2 years, more than 40 percent for more than 5 years 
and nearly 5 percent for more than 10 years.  
While they were in the Gulf countries, the return emigrants had earned on an 
average, about Rs. 120,000 per year, an increase of Rs 104,600 over the amount they 
had been earning (Rs 15,600) in Kerala before emigration. The increase in earnings of 
those who returned in recent years is found to have been higher than that of those who 
had returned earlier.  
In spite of the large differences between what they had earned in Kerala and 
what they earned in the Gulf countries, a large number of emigrants have returned, 
obviously due to a variety of factors, an aspect to which requires further examination 
and analysis.  
The above indicates that a typical return emigrant was a worker in trade, 
commerce or other service activities while in the Gulf countries, for a period of about 
6 years and received an annual income of Rs. 120,000.  
Economic Activity in Kerala After Return  
After return, nearly one-fourth of the gainfully employed return emigrants were 
engaged in the agricultural and allied sectors, an equal number are engaged in trade, 
commerce and other services including the catering business (Table 3.14). Together 
these two sectors accounted for 49 percent of the total gainfully employed return 
emigrants. Construction and transport were the other two sectors in which the return 
emigrants were engaged. Each of these sectors employed nearly 15 percent of the 
total. Manufacturing employed only about 8 percent of the total (Table 3.14). 
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The RMS data revealed that a typical return emigrant had been back in Kerala 
for nearly 8 years. He is either self-employed or is a casual worker in agriculture, 
trade, commerce or other services.  
3.7.5  Occupational Mobility of Return Emigrants 
One of the key questions that the essay seeks to answer is whether the act of 
emigration caused any real change in the economic activity of the return emigrants. 
This is examined in detail. 
Comparing Table 3.14, Table 3.16 and Table 3.17, the following may be 
observed.  
1. Before emigration, about 22.3 percent of the labor force had been engaged in 
agriculture (Table 3.14). In the Gulf countries only about 5.0 percent of them 
were employed in this sector (Table 3.16). After coming back, 24.8 percent 
went back to the agricultural sector (Table 3.17).  Thus, it appears that 
emigration has not had much of an impact on the proportion engaged in 
agriculture.  
2. The proportion of labor force working in the manufacturing sector also did not 
change significantly. About 7.6 percent of the return emigrants had been 
engaged prior to emigration and have found employment after return, in the 
manufacturing sector. The proportion was more or less the same during their 
work in the Gulf countries too.  
3. However some increase was noticed in the proportion working in trade and 
commerce, and transport. 
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Table 3.16 
Economic Sector of Activity of Return Emigrants Before 
Emigration and in the Gulf. 
 
Before Emigration 
In Gulf  Agriculture   Mining  Manufacturing  
Trade, 
Commerce 
etc.    Transport    Construction  Services  Others  Total   
Agriculture   15.8 0.0 3.4 0.7 2.4 0.7 3.4 2.1 5.0 
Mining   0.6 0.0 5.2 1.4 1.2 0.7 2.5 0.0 1.4 
Manufacturing 1.8 28.6 41.4 3.5 6.1 3.6 5.9 10.6 7.3 
Trade, 
Commerce etc.   33.3 14.3 8.6 55.6 12.2 5.8 12.7 17.0 24.0 
Transport   5.3 14.3 1.7 5.6 46.3 0.7 4.2 2.1 8.4 
Construction   21.1 14.3 20.7 10.6 12.2 77.0 10.2 23.4 26.7 
Services   17.0 28.6 12.1 19.0 13.4 5.8 55.1 14.9 20.4 
Others   5.3 0.0 6.9 3.5 6.1 5.8 5.9 29.8 6.8 
 Total   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 












Economic Sector of Activity of Return Emigrants Before 
Emigration and in Kerala after Return 
 
Kerala, Before Emigration 
After Return 
Migration Agriculture   Mining  Manufacturing  
Trade, 
Commerce 
etc.    Transport    Construction  Services  Others  Total   
Agriculture   68.9 16.7 14.3 11.2 4.3 12.9 17.9 13.9 24.8 
Mining   0.8 0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Manufacturing 4.5 16.7 54.8 4.3 0.0 2.6 6.4 16.7 8.2 
Trade, 
Commerce etc.   12.1 0.0 14.3 60.3 15.7 10.3 14.1 27.8 22.8 
Transport   8.3 33.3 2.4 9.5 72.9 6.0 5.1 5.6 14.9 
Construction   3.0 33.3 4.8 5.2 0.0 62.1 11.5 5.6 16.3 
Services   2.3 0.0 7.1 4.3 5.7 0.9 34.6 8.3 7.7 
Others   0.0 0.0 2.4 4.3 1.4 5.2 10.3 22.2 4.9 
 Total   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Calculated from RMS dataset.
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 From the above observations, one broad conclusion that can be drawn is that 
the proportion of workers in the primary sector was more or less the same after 
return as that before emigration. However this relative stability concealed 
considerable mobility among sub-sectors.  
Mobility Among Sectors 
 
 Table 3.17 reveals that while over two-thirds of those who had been employed 
originally in agriculture had ultimately settled down in agriculture, about 12 percent 
moved over to trade and commerce and 8 percent went over to construction. 
Similarly, 55 percent of those who had been in manufacturing before emigration have 
remained in manufacturing after return to Kerala. But the balance 45 percent moved 
to other sectors - 14 percent to agriculture, 14 percent to trade, commerce, hotels, 
restaurants, etc, 7 percent to services, 5 percent to construction, etc. 
  About 60 percent of the workers who had been in trade, commerce have 
reverted to them but 10 percent went over to transport and 11 percent to agriculture. 
Transport retained the largest proportion,73 percent, but even in this case 16 percent 
went over to trade and commerce. Those who had been in the other services before 
emigration have shown the highest degree of mobility. Eighteen percent went to 
agriculture, 14 percent went to trade and commerce, and 12 percent went to 
construction, etc.  
In the analysis above, the starting point was the case before emigration. The 
situation in Kerala after return was compared with that before emigration. An 
alternative approach would be to start from the situation after return to Kerala. We 
can examine what are the industrial sectors after return, of those who were originally 
in agriculture, manufacturing etc. For example, how many of those who are in 
agriculture after return to Kerala came from, manufacturing, construction, etc?. 
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Table 3.18 
Percent of Return Emigrants in an Economic Sector who Moved to other Sectors  




Migration Agriculture   Mining  Manufacturing  
Trade, 
Commerce 
etc.    Transport    Construction  Services  Others  All 
Agriculture   61.5 0.7 4.1 8.8 2.0 10.1 9.5 3.4 100.0 
Mining   50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Manufacturing 12.2 2.0 46.9 10.2 0.0 6.1 10.2 12.2 100.0 
Trade, 
Commerce etc.   11.8 0.0 4.4 51.5 8.1 8.8 8.1 7.4 100.0 
Transport   12.4 2.2 1.1 12.4 57.3 7.9 4.5 2.2 100.0 
Construction   4.1 2.1 2.1 6.2 0.0 74.2 9.3 2.1 100.0 
Services   6.5 0.0 6.5 10.9 8.7 2.2 58.7 6.5 100.0 
Others   0.0 0.0 3.4 17.2 3.4 20.7 27.6 27.6 100.0 
Total  22.1 1.0 7.0 19.5 11.7 19.5 13.1 6.0 100.0 
 
Source: Calculated from RMS dataset.
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Table 3.18 provides the calculations from the RMS dataset. Among the workers 
in the agricultural sector after their return, only 62 percent had been in agriculture 
before emigration. Around 10 percent came from construction, and other service each, 
9 percent from trade and commerce, etc. Thus while 8 percent of agricultural workers 
moved to construction, 10 percent of construction workers moved to agriculture. 
Altogether about 38 percent of workers in the agricultural sector (after return) came to 
agriculture from other sectors.  
Similarly about 53 percent of workers in manufacturing are those who had their 
origins in other sectors. Agricultural sector contributed 12.2 percent, trade commerce 
etc. 10.2 percent, and service 10.2 percent and etc. Workers in trade and commerce 
after the return were made up of 11.8 percent from agriculture and about 8 percent 
each from transport, construction, and services (Table 3.18). Thus, emigration has 
caused considerable industrial redistribution of workers in Kerala.  
If all the sectors are taken together (Table 3.19), it is found that only 57 percent 
of the return emigrants have gone back to their original sectors. An overall index of 
sector mobility was therefore 43 percent77. 
The relatively high sectoral mobility among the return migrants suggests their 
greater employability and willingness to shift employment in line with the emerging 
patterns of demand for labor. The market forces therefore appear to be playing a 
greater role in the labor market. While detailed disaggregated data on the before and 
after employment of return migrants are not available, it appears that broadly the  
                                                
77 The highest rate of sector change has been among the service workers, 77.8 percent. 
Service sector was followed by manufacturing (45.2%), trade and commerce (39.7%), 
construction (37.9%) agriculture (31.1%) and transport (27.1%). The sector which retained 
most of its workers was transport (72.9%). Overall the change in the sector of economic 
activity of return emigrants before emigration and in the Gulf (53.7%) was smaller than 
between Gulf and Kerala after return (64.8%). The lowest degree of change in the sector of 





Proportion of Workers who Retained their Sector of Activity 
Before emigration and after return to Kerala 
 
Sector of Activity    Percentage   
 Agricultural, Animal husbandry    68.9   
 Mining, Quarrying    0.0   
 Manufacturing    54.8   
 Trade Commerce, hotels    60.3   
 Transport    72.9   
 Construction    62.1   
 Services    34.6   
 Others    22.2   
 Total    57.4   
 















occupational shifts are from relatively lower value-added to relatively higher value-
added occupations. This however needs to be confirmed by future research. 
 
3.8  Potential Areas of Policy Initiatives in the Emigration and Return 
 Emigration Process in Kerala  
The process of return emigration begins with emigration. The decision to 
emigrate is determined by the socio-economic conditions78 at home in comparison 
with those at the destinations. In this respect, as indicated earlier, the state’s dynamic 
social and cultural development since Independence, and relative stagnation in its 
productive sectors created an ideal condition for acceleration of out-migration from 
the state, both domestically and internationally (most notably to the Gulf countries).  
 As already pointed out in the review of the theoretical frameworks in Section 
3.2, one of the major challenges in understanding migration is the different levels at 
which it operates; it may be viewed from both an individual and a structural 
perspective. The conventional approach to studies on migration has long assumed the 
primacy of individual as the sole decision-maker. The attempt thus far in this essay 
has been to assess the importance of individual or household level variables.  
However, the social network theory considered migration as a decision, which 
influenced and shaped decisions at the level of the community also. The community 
impact of individual decisions has only recently received some attention in migration 
studies. 
 
                                                
78 High population density and unemployment rate, juxtaposed with high educational level 
among Keralites required an external demand for employment abroad. It took place on a large 
scale in the Gulf countries with the oil boom of 1973.  
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3.8.1 Factors Impacting Emigration in Kerala 
 Although community level impact of migration processes is now largely 
accepted, the major impediment has been the difficulty in capturing its effect 
statistically. Here, a multilevel model to estimate the causes of migration from Kerala 
is adopted for the purpose. The model attempts to answer whether there is any 
significant geographical impact of migration after controlling for individual factors. 
 The analysis uses individual member information on out-migration and 
emigration status obtained from the KMS data. The dependent variable used in the 
analysis is whether a persons is currently an out-migrant (outside state of Kerala but 
within India) or an emigrant. Since migration status is a binary response, a binomial 
model is used for the estimation. 
 For the multilevel analysis, a three-level structure with individual at the first 
level is nested with the Panchayats at the second level, and with the district at the 
third level.   
 There was altogether information from 35,254 individuals coming from 14 
districts of the state, as only those individuals within the age group of 15-59 years 
were considered. Although there were several other socio-economic variables 
available in the survey data, they were not used for the analysis as it is difficult to 
ascertain whether they are causes or consequences of migration. At the district level, 
two variables have been used to test the standard hypothesis on population pressure 






 Table 3.20 
Determinants of Migration in Kerala: Results of the Multilevel Model 
 
Variables Estimate  Std Error 
Individual Level Variables 
Constant -9.781* 0.803 
Age of the Individual 0.429* 0.022 
Age Square -0.008* 0.000 
Family Size -0.242* 0.009 
Sex of the Individual (Male) 1.548* 0.046 
Religion Christian (Ref: 
Hindus) 
0.651* 0.065 
Religion Muslim (Ref: 
Hindus) 
0.763* 0.061 
Caste (Ref: SC/ST) 1.107* 0.122 
Primary School (Ref: Above 
HS) 
0.103 0.131 
High School (HS) (Ref: 
Above HS) 
0.604* 0.132 
District Level Variables 
Density of Population 0.001 0.001 
Unemployment Rate 0.028 0.034 
Random Effect 
District Level 0.711* 0.289 
Panchayat Level 0.281* 0.035 
 
Note: *at 10% level of significance 
























On the basis of Table 3.20, the following observations may be made:  
1. The result shows that most of the individual variables were significant at the 
10 percent level of significance. Interestingly, the family size showed a negative 
relationship indicating that higher the family size, lower the migration. This is against 
the expected notion in Kerala that population pressure drives people out for jobs.  
2.  However, it may be also noted that the family size depicts higher number of 
children in a family. There is direct relationship between higher fertility and poor 
economic status. Thus the negative relationship between family size and migration 
may be also an indication of less mobility among poor sections of the population.  
3. Age shows a negative relationship indicating that more of younger people 
migrate. We have also tested the non-linearity in the relationship between age and 
migration by squaring the age term. It is also found to be significant.  
4. The study also found that more male migrates than females. This is typical of 
the South Asian migration pattern.  
5. In Kerala religious identity also helps in migration pattern as persons 
belonging to Christian and Muslim community migrate more than the rest. The non-
SC/ST also migrate more again indicating strong class relationship in migration. On 
the other hand, among educated categories, the migration is more prevalent among 
medium educated group than highest educated categories. 
6. Apart from individual variables, the model tested the extent to which the 
migration pattern in Kerala could be attributed to unemployment rate and to 
population pressure. The unemployment rate and the density of population was 
entered as district-level variables. But neither of these variables showed significant 
relationship with the dependent variables. The common notion that Kerala’s migration 
is the result of high unemployment and heavy population pressure within the state 
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may be weak. Although these factors would have been responsible for initiating 
migration, they do not explain its perpetuation. 
7.  To measure the network effect of migration, the model tested the district 
impact and the panchayat impact on the extent of migration. The analysis showed that 
district and panchayat are significant determinants of migration. Even after 
considering individual factors, living in certain particular districts or panchayats 
increases the chances of outmigration and emigration from Kerala. Experience 
suggests that when a critical mass of individuals from a particular district or 
panchayat migrates to a particular country or region, they tend to have a positive 
impact on desire to migrate to the same locations by those remaining behind.  
3.8.2 Information Channels  
 Data from RMS questionnaire revealed that prospective emigrants got their 
information about emigration mostly from their friends. More than half the number of 
return emigrants reported friends as their main source. Another important source was 
the local migrant-recruiting agent. More than a third of the return emigrants 
mentioned that they got the information about emigration from the recruiting agents. 
Surprisingly, news media and emigrants on home visits were not very important 
sources.  
 Information about emigration prospects is not a sufficient condition to 
emigrate. The prospective emigrants should get jobs, or some sort of assurance to get 
jobs on arrival at the destinations. The emigrant secured their employment with the 
help from friends, relatives, and recruiting agents. Four out of ten got their first 
employment through the help of friends and relatives. Only one-fourth of the return 
emigrants got their first job with the help of licensed recruiting agents. Another 15 
percent got it through unlicensed recruiting agents.  
 191 
Nearly half the emigrants had a formal contract for employment before they 
went to the Gulf countries, and another 7 percent had a formal letter from the 
prospective employer. Thus, about 55 percent of the emigrants had some form of 
secure contract before they went abroad. This means that as much as 44 percent of the 
emigrants went abroad without a guarantee of secure employment.  
3.8.3 Costs of Emigrating 
 Emigration from Kerala was by no means cheap. In 1998, according to data 
obtained from KMS dataset, on an average an emigrant had to spend about Rs 33,000 
for various purposes connected with emigration. By far the most expensive item of 
expenditure was the cost of visa, which was Rs. Rs 21,000 per emigrant. Next in 
importance was the financial loss undergone due to fraud and cheating. The average 
loss for those who lost through fraud was Rs 12,000. However, only 5 percent of the 
return emigrants had lost any money though fraud. Getting a passport was the 
cheapest among the various items of expenditure, only Rs 868 per emigrant. The other 
items of expenditure were payment to recruiting agents (on an average Rs 8,890), and 
payment to other intermediaries (Rs 6,151 per emigrant). The cost of air ticket was 
only about half the cost of the visa (Table 3.21). This suggests that migrant-receiving 
countries have devised ways to secure a significant share of migrant’s wages. This 
observation is strengthened when variety of charges and levies (such as for driver’s 
license) in various Gulf countries are taken into account.  
 Costs of emigration of return emigrants in 2001 was quite close to that of the 
return emigrants in 1998. The total was Rs 34,600 in 1998 and Rs 33,000 in 2001. 
 The figures were close for most of the individual items also, the major 
exception being loss due to fraud. It was Rs 21,000 among the 1998 return emigrants 
compared to Rs 12,000 among the 2001 return emigrants (Table 3.21). The number of  
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Table 3.21 
Average cost of Emigration from Kerala to the Gulf 
1998 and 2001 (in Rs.) 
 
Cost of Emigration    1998  2001   
Payment to 
recruiting agents    8890    12,454*   
Payment to other 
intermediaries    6151    —   
 Passport    681    —   
 Visa    21203    24,982   
 Air ticket    10968    10,338   
 Emigration 
Clearance    1988    —   
 Loss due to fraud    12097    21,208   
Average Cost    33,003    34,634   
 
   Notes:  - Not Available 
   * include payments to other intermediaries 
 































return emigrants who reported cheating or fraud as one of the expenses of the 
emigration has remained roughly constant in the two years.  
 
3.8.4 Sources  of Financing 
 It is pertinent to note that most of the people who emigrated came from 
relatively poor background and that an amount of over Rs. 30 thousand is likely to 
have been a heavy burden on them. About 60 percent of them had borrowed for 
meeting the cost of emigration; 15 percent borrowed from moneylenders and about 10 
percent sold or mortgaged their landed property. A large proportion of return 
emigrants had sold or pledged their ornaments. Personal savings and parents’ savings 
contributed the balance. Government’s assistance in this matter was insignificant 
(Table 3.22).  
The Government at the Centre and in the State may consider jointly 
contributing to a revolving fund for providing credit to those wishing to work abroad, 
to be administered by the commercial banks. The assistance would be in the form of a 
loan, which would need to be repaid, and not a grant. As loans are repaid with 
interest, the funds can then be re-lent to the other migrants. This could reduce the role 










Sources of Financing of Emigration of the Returned Emigrants 
 
Major Source of Financing    Percent   
 Personal savings    28.6   
 Parents savings    20.1   
 Borrowing    59.5   
 Loans, money lenders    14.7   
 Loans from Banks    5.2   
 Sale/mortgage land    10.1   
 Sale/pledge financial assets    4.5   
 Sale/pledge ornaments    36.2   
 Government assistance    1.2   
 Others    5.4   
 
 


















3.8.5 Working Conditions Abroad  
According to the returned emigrants in the RMS survey, very few had any major 
problem when they landed in the Gulf countries. Less than 1 percent had any problem 
with passports79; less than 3 percent had any problem with visas and less than 5 
percent had any problem with work permit.  
 Two-thirds of the return emigrants received the same job that had been 
promised to them. Three-fourths of them thought that they received the same or even 
better treatment from their employers than that received by their counterparts from 
other nationalities. About one-fourth of them had to sign a second contract but three-
fourths did not have to do so.  
 Most of the return emigrants (more than 80 percent) felt that their housing 
accommodation was adequate or good and only 14 percent had to share housing 
accommodation with friends. 
 The medical care they received in the Gulf countries was good (20 percent) or 
satisfactory (61 percent). Similarly, the educational facilities that their children 
received were characterised as good by one-third of the return emigrants and as 
satisfactory by another 42 percent of them.  
Very few of the return emigrants (nearly 10 percent) had taken their wives with 
them to the Gulf countries. In half the number of cases in which wives lived with the 
return emigrants in the Gulf countries, wives were also workers. Insufficient income 
of the emigrant was the main reason mentioned for not taking their wives to the Gulf 
countries. Only 5 percent mentioned lack of accommodation as a reason for not taking 
their wives to their place of work.  
                                                
79 Most of the return emigrants, an overwhelming 88 percent, were not allowed to keep their 
passports. This is the most glaring violation of freedom that the emigrants had to undergo in 
the Gulf countries. 
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Only about 10 percent of the return emigrants sought any help from the embassy. 
In cases in which emigrants sought help from the embassy, the reason was redressal 
of grievances with employers or legal problems. The persons who sought help were 
mostly satisfied with the services they received from the embassy.  
3.8.6 Reasons for Return  
The reasons for return were several. Table 3.23 enumerates them from the survey 
data. Some have returned because their contract expired or their employer terminated 
their job. This was the reason for the largest number of them (about 41 percent) to 
return.  
Second in importance were difficult working conditions in Gulf countries. More 
than a fifth of the return emigrants came back because they could not stand any longer 
the difficult working conditions.  They had been accustomed to easy working 
conditions back home. Difficult living conditions, the heat in some seasons for 
example, was another reason for return. Ill health, injury and accidents accounted for 
another one-eighth of the return. In another one-eighth of the cases, the conditions 
back home required the migrants’ presence. Thus, most of the return was due to 
involuntary reasons.  
3.8.7 Returns from Emigration 
 
The RMS questionnaire also provided some scope of examining the potential 
returns from emigration, as perceived by the return emigrants.  
Only about a fifth of the return emigrants thought that they have received any 
special skills from work abroad - craft skills, supervisory skills, professional skills 
and skills in public relations. And only about 14 percent of them thought that their 
work experience abroad had been of any use in their life back in Kerala.  
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Table 3.23 
Distribution of Returned Emigrants by Reasons for Return 
 
Reasons for Return Percent 
Expiry of contract    30.3   
Resigned due to difficult living condition    12.9   
Resigned due to difficult working 
condition    22.9   
 Job terminated by employer    10.3   
 Political upheaval    1.9   
 Illegal stay abroad compulsory 
repatriation    5.4   
 Condition at home required presence    13.7   
 Ill-health    11.1   
 Injury/accident/ incapacitation    1.2   
 












































Purchase of agricultural land    8273176  266    31,102  
Construction of buildings    10386482 381    27,261  
Marriage (son, daughters,  
sisters, brothers)    7772960  277    28,061  
Higher Education    2344560 127    18,461  
 Total    28777178   1019  56,760   
 















The return emigrants have very little financial savings left with them for 
investment, or to start a business. They had spent most of their savings on other 
purposes of greater priority in their reckoning.  
After data cleaning, of the total 1019 return emigrants in the sample, 381 (37 
percent) persons spent their savings on construction of buildings, 277 (27 percent) on 
wedding celebrations, 266 (26 percent) on purchase of land and 127 (12 percent) on 
higher education. The largest amount was spent on construction of houses, about 36 
percent of the total. About 29 percent was spent for purchasing agricultural land. 
Almost an equal amount was spent on marriage of daughters, sisters and other close 
relatives. Only a small proportion (8 percent) was spent on higher education (Table 
3.24).  
On an average a return emigrant spent Rs 31,000 for agricultural land,  
Rs.28,000 for marriage, Rs. 27,000 on building construction and Rs. 18,000 for higher 
education.  
An important point to note is that only about 507 of the 1001 (or nearly 51 
percent) return emigrants spent part of their savings on purchasing of land, 
construction of buildings, marriage, and higher education. The foreign savings of the 
other half were entirely used for such purposes as subsistence, and loan repayments, 
rather than for investments, providing very limited avenues for future income. The 
public policies should encourage productive use, whether of consumption or the 
investment type of these savings.  
3.8.8 Perceptions on Rehabilitation among Return Emigrants  
 Two questions which are uppermost in the minds of return emigrants and 
Government planners are rehabilitation of return emigrants and the ways in which the 
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return emigrant’s expertise and accumulated wealth could be used for developmental 
activities in Kerala. These two are not separate questions. If the return emigrant’s 
skills and foreign saving could be used for developmental purposes, the process could 
lead to the rehabilitation of a majority of the return emigrants. 
In RMS, respondents were queried on the role that they expect Kerala 
Government to play in their rehabilitation. An overwhelming 85 percent of the return 
emigrants thought that the Government should help them, and only about 15 percent 
thought that the Government should keep out of such activities.  
 A break-up of the respondents (by community) revealed that among the three 
major religious communities in the state, the Muslims wanted Government assistance 
the most (83 percent of them) and the Syrian Christians (most of India’s nurses going 
abroad are from this community) wanted the least from the Government (60 percent 
of them wanted public assistance). Even the 60 percent is a fairly high percentage.  
Perhaps the important way in which government can render assistance is through 
totalization agreements, involving reciprocity in contributions for social security; and 
in ensuring that the Indian workers abroad have reasonable working and living 
conditions (Asher and Nandy, 2008). The government could also assist by 
streamlining the labor recruitment policies within India to ensure that the workers are 
not subjected to exploitative and fraudulent practices.  
 Among the return emigrants classified by education, those with a degree 
wanted the least help from the Government and those with below secondary level 
school education wanted most (83 percent of them wanted help).   
 The most desired form of public assistance was financial assistance. More 
than half of the return emigrants wanted financial assistance from the Government in 
their rehabilitation. A little more than one-fifth wanted pension, and about the same 
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proportion wanted Government jobs, or assistance to get a paid job. Thus, what the 
return emigrants wanted most from the Government was economic assistance.  
 They return emigrants wanted financial assistance for several purposes. 
Financial assistance was sought to start new businesses, workshops, self-employment 
schemes, small scale industries, tailoring shop, bakery, to buy automobiles, auto-
rickshaws, boats and nets, carpentry tools; to improve business, to develop 
agricultural land, to raise industrial loans, and to educate their children. 
Some of the return emigrants have taken up the task of rehabilitating themselves. 
It is instructive to see what happened to them. In the sample of a little over 1000 
return emigrants, 289 invested in some sort of self-employment. Together they 
invested Rs 7,543,148 or about Rs 26,101 per investor.  The amount they invested 
varied from Rs 1,000 to Rs. 125,000.  
In 73 percent of the cases, they invested from their own funds. In 23 percent of 
the cases, part of the funds belonged to others. In only a few cases the entire funds 
were borrowed.  
In more than 30 percent cases, the return emigrant sought help from public 
institutions, mostly commercial banks. The type of assistance they sought was mostly 
financial in nature. In fact, very few return emigrants wanted assistance other than 
financial. Some of the return emigrants tried more than once to start some self-
employment schemes. They gave up because, those that they started were found to be 
unprofitable.  It appears from the responses in the RMS that inability to identify a 
profit-making self-employment project was the single most reason why the return 
emigrants were not able to re-establish themselves. This is however a complex issue. 
In any country, it is not easy to generate good livelihood opportunities from self-
employment. However, in the case of Kerala it may be useful for the Government to 
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review the costs of doing business, particularly the procedures for establishing a new 
business, and labor and other statutory costs.  
Some of the return emigrants (17 percent) who were not gainfully employed 
never tried to start a store, a small-scale industry or any economic activity whatever. 
None of them approached Government agencies to help them in starting a business of 
their own. Many of them thought that they were too old to work (25 percent); some 
(10 percent) thought that they had enough money to get along and there was no real 
need to work. About 15 percent wanted to lead an easy life in Kerala; they did not 
want to be bothered with any regular work. About 40 percent had other unspecified 
reasons not to work.  
As discussed earlier, among the return emigrants, there were a few (about 6.6 
percent) degree holders or in absolute numbers about 50,000 in the state as a whole 
during the survey period. The number of degree holders in a technical subject is 
estimated to be 2.9 percent or about 21,000. Including certificate and diploma holders, 
the number of return emigrants with some form of formal technical training was about 
18.6 percent or 140,000 persons. Thus, there existed a proportion of return emigrants 
with technical know-how.  
 Comparison of the educational levels of return emigrants with those of the 
emigrants who have not returned shows that those who came back are, on average, of 
lower educational levels and technical skills than those who have not come back. 
Similarly those emigrants who returned had lower status occupations in the Gulf than 
those who did not come back. Those who had been self-employed in Kerala before 
emigration had a higher propensity to return than those who had not been engaged in 
self-employment.  
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 Secondly, those who had been unemployed in Kerala before emigration had a 
lower propensity to return than those who had been employed before emigration. 
From the human resource point of view the return emigrants occupied a lower 
position than the emigrants who did not return. Most of the return emigrants came 
back because they had to for one reason or the other such as loss of job, ill heath or 
family problems.  
3.9 Past Policy Intiatives and Future Imperatives 
 Policy attention at the national or the state level with regards to emigration and 
return migration issues have been conspicuous by its absence in India. In 1994, the 
Central government issued directions to state governments to address the issue of 
rehabilitation of returning migrants, by setting up societies to guide and assist them in 
their rehabilitation through self employment, skill upgradation or wage employment 
programmes. Employment exchanges were asked to keep separate registers of 
returning migrants and provide assistance for placement in jobs (Government of 
India, 1996). These however were not implemented. The Government of Kerala did 
set up an institution named Overseas Development and Employment Promotion 
Consultants, which made efforts to secure foreign jobs for Keralites. However, those 
jobs were mainly confined to para-medical jobs (Nair, 1999). 
 In 1996, the Government of Kerala began to examine the problems of 
returning migrants in the context of the repatriation of several thousand amnesty 
returnees from the UAE. In August 1996, it set up a separate department to address 
the problems of Non-Resident Keralites (NRKs). The department’s major areas of 
concern were the welfare of migrants and investment facilitation for them80. 
                                                
80 The issues listed under welfare were problems relating to visa, accidents or deaths and 
grievances of non-resident Keralites as well as matters concerning their families back home. 
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 Specifically, under welfare, the major concerns listed were (i) assistance 
during cases of accidents or death of workers while abroad, (ii) repatriation of persons 
in cases in which workers happen to be trapped abroad without valid emigration 
documents and (iii) assistance to workers’ families in educational, medical and health, 
housing and legal problems. Rehabilitation referred to provisions for placement in 
jobs or assistance for self-employment of migrants who return without adequate 
means of living. Under investment facilitation, the objective was, obviously, to 
channel migrants’ savings into productive sectors: infrastructure and tourism. The 
importance of investment in other industries, as well as developing entrepreneurship 
among return migrants, was also emphasized. On the basis of these suggestions, a 
separate department for Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs (NORKA) was set up in 
December 1996. 
 The NORKA launched an accident and death insurance scheme for non-
resident Keralites in May 1997. Called the Pravasi Suraksha (Non-Resident Safety) 
Insurance Scheme, it provided for payment of a lump sum to persons (or their 
claimants) who meet with accident or death while abroad. The scheme had two 
components. According to scheme A, a person who enroled has to pay a membership 
fee of Rs 990 and was entitled to a maximum amount of Rs 50,000 in case of death or 
total disablement; in the other scheme, the membership fee was Rs 650 and the 
maximum amount of compensation was Rs 250,000. A person was entitled to 
compensation if the accident or death occurs within five years of becoming a member 
of the scheme. 
 Apart from the above initiative, however, the government did little to generate 
                                                                                                                                       
Under investment facilitation, the focal point was to be the channelling of remittances of non-




employment for returned emigrants or formualte a structured policy on migration or 
return migration. Nor has any attempt been made to utilize available migrants’ 
savings for the development of the state’s economy when about two-fifths of total 
bank deposits in Kerala is accounted for by the non-resident external accounts of 
Keralites (Zachariah et al., 2007).  
Policy Directions  
The analysis in the previous sections undertaken from a close examination of 
household survey data collected under KMS and RMS suggests that migration from 
Kerala to the Gulf countries is predominantly by persons in poor economic 
conditions, with relatively low educational background and little vocational or 
technical training. Flows, both onward and return, continue unabated. Some of the 
policy measures which could assist the return migrants have already been indicated in 
the previous section. Therefore only broad policy directions are discussed here.  
 Though evidence from the above analysis suggests that emigration caused a 
fair amount of industrial redistribution of workers in the state, a good proportion of 
return emigrants worked in low-paid, unskilled employment. Those who had 
substantial savings, and desired to make productive investments found the home 
climate investment-unfriendly.  
 A large proportion of returned migrants desired small business and self-
employment, but they did not have the required savings and the technical competence 
to translate their dreams into action. With the above background, and findings in 
previous sections, several policy imperatives emerge.  
Developing an Information Base: The most basic requirement for the success of 
programmes designed to assist return migrants is a reliable information base. There is 
very little monitoring process at the central or state-level. It is not difficult, 
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administratively speaking, for the state to keep up-to-date employment exchange 
registers of persons going abroad as contract workers and persons returning home 
after various periods of stay and work abroad, with details on education, skills, 
countries of destination and types of work. Such registers should be prepared at the 
lowest level self-government agency and consolidated at the higher levels of the 
district and the state, as may be required for administrative purposes. 
Organizational and Institutional Arrangements: Most return migrants would, if 
assisted, establish small production or service units on a self-employment basis or as 
small proprietors of firms. While the majority was poor, they constituted a disciplined 
and hard working group. In order to assist them to establish small business units, there 
should be agencies functioning at the local levels. As in other states of India, in 
Kerala too development plans are prepared at the level of the lowest self-governing 
agency, namely the Panchayat, as the unit, taking into account resource endowments 
(men, materials and finance) of the locality, and with various time perspectives of 
development. In this context it should be possible to take account of the capabilities, 
needs and aspirations of return migrants on the one hand, and their employment and 
entrepreneurial potentials on the other, and to incorporate schemes for their 
rehabilitation in local development plans.  
 In Kerala, large numbers of cooperative societies are functioning in 
agricultural marketing, agricultural credit, industrial production and banking. Under 
the aegis of the local level plan, and within the cooperative framework, return 
migrants could be mobilized on cooperative lines for maximizing their development 
potential.  
 It should be also possible to mobilize their savings for granting loans (for 
establishing small production and service units) and financing medium and large-
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scale industry, provided such loans were underwritten by an appropriate governmental 
agency. 
Earmarking investments for return migrants:  In Kerala, no scheme exists for the 
mobilization of savings and the development potential of return migrants. It is 
therefore suggested that some types of investments be earmarked for return migrants 
in specific localities. One major area proposed for preferential treatment is tourism 
development. Kerala has large untapped potential for attracting tourists. However, 
tourism infrastructure needs to be developed. According to the survey findings, return 
emigrants were also interested to make investments (with loan finance) in agriculture 
(e.g., dairy, fish, and poultry farming, agro-processing, etc.). Several schemes already 
exist in the state (and in the country) of concessional loans and other encouragement 
for the small-scale investor, but experience of the return migrants suggests that these 
are paper schemes, hardly ever accessible to them, with the government and the banks 
turning them away whenever approached for assistance. Such conditions may not be a 
feature peculiar to Kerala, but common in most developing societies. 
Counseling and Training:  There is near total absence of facilities for counseling 
return migrants who aspire to make investments or take up new employment or 
engage in unfamiliar economic activities. There is need to ascertain their requirements 
and aspirations, provide them proper guidance, and make training accessible and 
affordable to augment their skills. The government has limited idea as to who the 
returnees are, where they live, their skills, experience and aspirations, and what type 
of assistance they are looking for. The government must commit resources to develop 
a robust and timely database, which is regularly updated on return migrants; and give 
higher priority the existing returned and potential migrants.  
 The community organizations are currently an important source of networking 
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for both returned and other migrants of Kerala. One of the examples is the 
Malayali_Friends, an online group 
(http://groups.google.co.in/group/Malayali_Friends), which provides a forum for 
communicating information on employment opportunities, government programmes, 
health, education, and other personal aspects. Given appropriate state initiatives, these 
community organizations could become far more effective in enhancing the 
contribution of returned migrants to the development of Kerala, Keralites, and of 
India.  
Creation of an Investment-friendly Climate in the State: Potential and actual 
entrepreneurs among return emigrants surveyed in RMS were unanimous in their 
lament of the investment climate in the state which is mainly attributed to short-
sighted political leadership, irresponsible trade union activities, corrupt officials, 
unhelpful banks, undisciplined and insincere workers, harassing tax officials and 
inscrutable rules of procedure. Investors seldom risk capital in such an inhospitable 
environment. While the “climate” has changed to some extent in recent years, the 
image persists. Investors, including those among return migrants, need to be reassured 
of an orderly and congenial investment atmosphere in the state. In this matter, strong 
political commitment is required. This in turn is more likely to be forthcoming if the 
general public assigns higher preference to the development results obtained by the 







3.10 Concluding Remarks 
 As migration policy has developed, it has become very apparent that an 
effective returns policy requires a multi-disciplinary approach to ensure the 
sustainability and effectiveness of a wider migration policy. This requires coherent 
cross-government, department, and agency co-operation. This should not be seen as 
an “optional extra”, but an essential part of a returns programme. The convergence of 
inter-related policy areas in the policy-making process is a challenging, but important 
part of a comprehensive and fully effective migration policy. 
 Return migration has significant impact on countries of origin, transit, and 
destination. For destination and transit countries, the impact is felt on national 
immigration systems. For countries of return, whether of origin, transit, or third 
countries, large influxes of returning migrants may pose specific challenges to the 
“absorption” capacity in terms of reintegration and socio-economic stabilization. 
Countries of return may also experience changes to remittance patterns. It is clear that 
the reintegration of returnees needs careful planning and greater cooperation between 
sending countries and receiving ones. 
 In analyzing data from two surveys on in 1998 and 2001 respectively, with 
specific reference to return migrants, the study maps the occupational shifts that occur 
in the Indian state of Kerala, along with many other relevant and related aspects of the 
phenomenon. The study finds strong evidence to occupational mobility among return 
migrants, establishing that the act of emigration has been instrumental in bringing 
about industrial redistribution of workers in the State. The study also highlights 
various policy areas that warrant well-designed initiatives by the government. Various 
policy imperatives are also discussed. 
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 Though the study uses data from surveys done in 1998 and 2001, broadly the 
conclusions and areas of policy thrusts are unlikely to alter in the current times. 
However, it will be interesting to study the impact of current global economic crisis 
on the phenomenon of return migration from the Gulf.    
 The “Kerala model” is widely regarded as not sustainable. Low growth and 
productivity, limited industrialization, and high level of social indicators cannot be 
sustained in the current phase of globalization. The current global crisis, severest in 
over 70 years is hastening the need for increasing emphasis on economic growth, and 
for undertaking public policy initiatives discussed in this essay for utilizing the 
migrants savings, skills and energies, to bring about structural transformation of 




Migration to the Gulf: The Indian Experience 
 
 Although Indians manned the clerical and technical positions of the oil 
companies in the Gulf after oil was discovered in the region during the 1930s, the 
overall numbers were still small. Between 1948 and the early 1970s, these numbers 
gradually increased from about 1,400 to 40,000. When large-scale development 
activities started following the 1973 spurt in oil prices in the six Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the 
UAE, an upsurge in the flow of workers and laborers began from India to the Gulf.  
 India and Pakistan supplied most of such unskilled labor, registering almost 200 
percent growth between 1970 and 1975. In 1975, Indian expatriates constituted 39.1 
percent, Pakistanis 58.1 percent, and other Asians 2.8 percent of the total non–Arab 
expatriates in the Gulf. Since then, Indian migration has overtaken that of Pakistan 
and other Asian countries of origin.  
 Further, since the Kuwait war of 1990-91, Indians have replaced even the non–
national Arabs in the Gulf, viz., the Jordanians, Yemenis, Palestinians and Egyptians. 
From less than 258,000 in 1975, migrant Indian population in the Gulf went up to 
3.318 million in 2001 (Table 3.1), which is now estimated to have crossed 3.5 million. 
A large majority of 70 per cent of the Indian migrants in the Gulf has comprised the 
semi–skilled and unskilled workers, the rest being white–collar workers and 
professionals. 
 Admission to the GCC countries was not as difficult prior to the mid-1970s, but 
thereafter restrictions have been imposed by the host countries due to the fear of rapid 
growth of non–national population. Thus it has been difficult for families to 
accompany the non–nationals workers to these countries, particularly the unskilled 
contract workers. Foreigners are not allowed to own businesses or immovable 
property in the Gulf countries; for running business enterprises they are required to 
have local citizens or agencies as major partners in their ventures.  
 The demand for low category of workers like housemaids, cooks, bearers, 
gardeners, etc. has been large, though systematic all–India data are not easily 
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available, except for the state of Kerala where an exclusive state-level ministry for 
overseas Keralite affairs exists for many years. Some data are now in the process of 
being collected and compiled by the newly formed Union Ministry of Overseas 
Indians Affairs.  
 The unskilled and semi–skilled workers have a high rate of turnover as their 
contracts are for short periods of employment and work, usually not more than two 
years at a time. Those completing their contracts must return home, although a large 
proportion of them manage to come back with new contracts, which are not available 
before a gap of one year. This has facilitated the proliferation of recruitment and 
placement agencies, sometimes colluding with the prospective employers and 
exploiting illiterate job seekers. The various forms of exploitation range from 
withholding of the passports; refusal of promised employment, wages, and over–time 
wages; undue deduction of permit fee from wages; unsuitable transport; inadequate 
medical facilities; denial of legal rights for redressal of complaints; use of migrants as 
carriers of smuggled goods; victimisation and harassment of women recruits in 
household jobs like maids, cooks, governesses, etc. 











Some Examples of Policy Initiatives in Home Countries to  
Encourage Return Migration 
 
 Some countries make great efforts to attract back their nationals residing 
abroad. They may institute systems of information and cultural outreach to expatriate 
communities, and they may also encourage migrants to seek representation in 
institutional structures, and particularly in parliament. They may even offer incentives 
to encourage return (special access to certain social services, permission to hold 
convertible foreign-currency accounts or to earn premium interest rates, etc.), as well 
as reintegration assistance. A few examples can be cited to illustrate the variety of 
approaches.  
 In Jamaica, a government programme has been in place since 1993, which 
encourages Jamaicans to come home by providing information, facilitating their 
move, and helping them enter the labor market (Thomas-Hope, 1999).  
 The Philippines is another interesting example. The reintegration of returning 
migrants is one of the government’s priority objectives (Go, 2007). The economic 
component of the reintegration programme consists essentially of training and 
expedited access to credit for creating a business, while the “psycho-social” 
component offers returning migrants services such as family counselling and capacity 
development training. A “one-stop-shop” for the reintegration of migrant workers was 
established at the beginning of 2007, providing access to the full range of services that 
migrant families are likely to need.  
 In Argentina, following the post-crisis economic recovery, several programmes 
were introduced to revive scientific and technical activities and resources. One of 
these is a postdoctoral fellowship programme targeted at Ph.D. holders who have 
completed their thesis work abroad and are seeking a research position in Argentina 
(Meyer et. al., 2007).  
 Colombia has also introduced measures to assist reintegration of expatriate 
scientists. Returning doctoral candidates are enlisted for ongoing research projects. 
Loans for professionals to set up shop or to create innovative enterprises have been 
established, together with recruitment campaigns targeted at Colombians living 
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abroad. Particular attention is given to recognition of diplomas acquired abroad81 
(Meyer et. al., 2007).  
 Tunisia has a system to facilitate the return and reintegration of emigrants and 
their families. The economic dimension of this system is designed primarily to 
encourage Tunisians living abroad to invest in economic projects in Tunisia.  They 
are eligible for tax holidays and import permits for capital goods for such projects, 
and definitive return is not a precondition. Moreover, Tunisians residing abroad can 
open a tax-free bank account in foreign-currency or in convertible dinars, and they are 
free to transfer assets (Bel Haj Zekri, 2007).  
 In Algeria, returning migrants can repatriate all their personal belongings duty-
free, and if they create a business they are exempt from tax on the import of 
equipment (Saib Musette, 2007).  
 Finally, there is the example of China, which since 2002 has extended its 
provisions for encouraging the return of young graduates by offering them 
preferential treatment in terms of job placement, social advancement, wages and 
salaries, taxation, and social programmes in general. In addition, returnees can retain 
their dual nationality if they were naturalised in the host country, and they have the 









                                                
81 This is very important for attracting young people studying in other countries. Indeed, it is a 
growing issue for many developing countries, as students’ international mobility has 
































































District ……………………………………. Taluk 
………………………………………… 
 
City/Panchayat ……………………………. Ward 
………………………………………… 
 
Number ……………………………………  House No. /House Name 
…………………… 
 














Date (s) of Interview 
   
 
Time taken 
   
 
Name of Investigator 
 
 
Signature of the investigator 
 
 
Name of the supervisor 
 
 





201 Name  
 
202  Sex (Male – 1, Female - 2) 
 
 
203  Religion:  (Hindu – 1, Muslim  - 2, Syrian Christian – 3, 
     Latin Christian – 4, Others – 5) 
 
204 Caste   (Hindus) 
    (SC/ST – 1,  Nair – 2, Ezhava – 3,  
     Brahmin – 4, Others – 5) 
 
205 Year of birth  
 
206  Age (in Completed Years)  
 
207 Year of first emigration  
  
208   Relationship of the REM to the head of the household  
   (Head of the household – 1, Wife of head –2,  
  Unmarried Children – 3, Married Children – 4,  
     Brother/Sister – 5, Others-6) 
 
209 Marital Status: 
(Never married – 1, Currently Married – 2, Widowed – 3,  
 Divorced / Separated – 4) 
 
210 Educational Status 
(Below Primary – 1, Primary – 2, Less than Secondary – 3,   
   Secondary – 4, Degree – 5)  
 
211 Education: Professional/technical/vocational  
  No technical training  or Work experience – 1  
  Work experience without any  
formal training in*    - 2    
Certificate in *  - 3 
  Diploma in *    - 4 
  Degree in *    - 5  
 
 * carpentry- (a),   masonry - (b),   electrician - (c),  civil engineering-(d), 
     mechanical engineering - (e),   architect-(f)  medicine-(g)  laboratory  
   technician(h), accountancy -(i),  book keeping-(j),  computer-(k)   
   any other (specify)  













212 Economic activity status before emigration 
(Regular employment – 1 Casual employment – 
2, self employed- 3, Unemployed seeking work – 
4, Unemployed available for work – 5,Others – 
6) 
 
213 Current Occupation   (Describe)  
  
214 Period of service  ( years and months  
 
215 If code 1,2 or 3 against item 212 Economic 
sector in which worked:  
(Agriculture, Animal Husbandary, Fisheries etc – 
1, Mining and quarrying – 2, Manufacturing – 3,  
Trade commerce, hotels and Restaurants – 4, 
Transport – 5, Construction – 6, Service – 7, 
Others – 8) 
  
216 Annual Salary  or wages or income: (Rs) 
 
217 How many times you have gone outside India? 
 
218  Which are the countries? 
 
 Country No. of years 
1st Trip   
2nd Trip   
3rd Trip   
4th Trip   
5th Trip   
 
Details of Employment abroad (Last job only) 
 
219 Country where employed  
 
 
220 Occupation (Describe) 
 
 
221 Period of service:    (Years and months) 











222     Economic sector in which the last job was 
pursed:  
[Agriculture and other primary sector – 1, 
Mining and quarrying – 2, Manufacturing    - 3, 
Trade, Commerce, Hotels and restaurants – 4, 
transport – 5, Construction – 6, Service – 7, 
Others – 8] 
 
223 Annual salary   or wages or income (Rs) 
 
 
Block C: Pre-emigration phase 
 
301 Reasons for seeking employment abroad 
(Write the first three reasons according to 
priority) 
    
First       Second         Third    
 
Reasons 
[Lack of employment opportunities in Kerala – 1, 
To improve living standards (such as higher level 
of consumption, better housing, own a car, and 
modern consumer durable) – 2, To redeem 
personal/family debts – 3, To discharge family 
responsibilities (eg. marriage, higher education of 
daughters, sisters, brothers, etc) – 4, To 
accumulate funds for investment in business – 5, 
To experience pleasures of travel and life in 
foreign countries – 6, others (specify) -7] 
 
 
302 Sources of Information about Employment Opportunities abroad  
(Circle yes or no against relevant item) 
 
Media:  Newspapers/ TV/ Radio Yes No 
Friends/relatives employed abroad Yes No 
Recruiting Agencies Yes No 
Emigrants on home leave or Emigrants who 
had returned 
Yes No 
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303 Means by which first employment was secured  
(write the code in the box space) 
 
(direct application –1, through Government Agencies 
– 2, through licensed recruiting agencies – 3, through 
unlicensed recruiting agencies – 4, through 
construction firms – 5, through friends and relatives 
– 6, through other contacts – 7, by means of visiting 
visa – 8, through pilgrimage – 9, other means –10) 
 
 
304 Type of contract of employment entered into with 
the code in this box space 
 
[formal contract specifying terms and conditions of 
work and living- 1, letter or other communications 
from employer mentioning major terms of 
employment – 2, no formal contract/only informal 
arrangements – 3, others (specify) – 4] 
 
 
305 Language of contract:   
[English – 1, Arabic – 2, Others – 3] 
 
 
306 Whether advice/counselling received regarding 
terms and conditions before  signing the  




306 If Yes, from which source (Circle the appropriate entries) 
1 friends Yes No 
2 relatives Yes No 
3 previous employer Yes No 
4 voluntary agencies Yes No 
5 governmental agencies Yes No 
6 others(specify) Yes No 
 
 









401  In connection with your emigration what were your 
costs. Give the costs under the following items. Write 
‘Nil” if no payment is made under any item 
 
401a. Payment to recruitment agencies Rs  
401b. Payment to other intermediaries Rs  
401c. Passport Rs  
401d. Visa Rs  
401e. Air Ticket Rs  
401f. Emigration Clearance  Rs  




 402  Total cost of your last emigration  Rs.  
 
 
 403 Sources of financing (circle the relevant 
items) 
 
403a. Personal Savings Yes No 
403b. Parents Savings Yes No 
403c. Borrowing from friends/relatives  Yes No 
403d. Loans from moneylenders Yes No 
403e. Loans from Banks Yes No 
403f. Sale/mortgage of landed  property Yes No 
403g. Sale/pledging of financial assets Yes No 
403h. Sale/pledging of ornaments or jewellery Yes No 
403i. Government assistance Yes No 




501 Did you have any problems on arrival with the following (Circle the 
relevant items) 
 
501a. Passport Yes No 
501b. Visa Yes No 
501c. Work permit Yes No 
 
502 Whom did you make contact with on arrival? (Circle the relevant 
items) 
   
1 Employer/employer’s representatives Yes No 
2 Friends/relatives Yes No 
3 Indian embassy Yes No 
 
Block D:  Costs and financing of migration 
 
Block E:  Employment, Work and living Condition Abroad 
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503 Was the employment you received the same as the one 
promised at the time of recruitment?  
   [Yes – 1,  No - 2] 
 
504 In comparison with contracts offered to persons from 
other countries were the terms and conditions of your 
contract  
[More Favourable-1, The Same – 2, Less Favourable 
– 3] 
 
505 Did you have to sign a second contract after arrival 
abroad? 
[Yes – 1, No –2] 
 
506 Were you allowed to keep your passport and other 
documents with you or were they taken away by the 
employer 
[Allowed to keep with me – 1, Not allowed to keep 
with me – 2] 
 
507 How was your housing accommodation   
[Good quality – 1, Adequate – 2, Poor –3] 
 
 
508 Did you share your housing accommodation with 
others? 
[With none, had independent accommodation – 1, 









How was the quality your food 
[Excellent  - 1, Good – 2, Poor – 3] 
 
509 Was your food free , subsidised, or of market value? 
  [Free – 1, Subsidised – 2, Market value – 3] 
  
510 How was the medical care you received 
  [Good – 1, Satisfactory – 2, Poor – 3, No medical help  -
4] 
 
511 How was educational facilities in your place of work 
 [Good – 1, Satisfactory – 2, Poor – 3, No facilities  -4] 
 
512 Were there facilities/ freedom for religious observances
  
  [Yes – 1, No  - 2] 
 
513 Did your spouse live with you in the host  
country/countries  
  [Yes – 1, No – 2] 
 
514 If yes it item 514, Was she employed 
 [Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
516 If no in item 514, What were the reasons for not taking 
the wife. Choose the appropriate one from the following 
 [Lack of accommodation – 1, Insufficient income – 2, 
Desire to maximize savings – 3, Difficulty in getting job 
for the spouse – 4, Spouse employed at home – 5, 
Restrictions by host country – 6, Permission denied by 
India – 7, Education of children – 8, Unwillingness of 
spouse – 9] 
 
517 Did you ever sought assistance from Indian consulate in 
the host country for any matters? 
  [Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
518 If ‘Yes’ in item 517 what sort of assistance?  
  Circle the appropriate ones 
About grievances and dispute with employer  
Problems of remittances   
Problems of communication with people at home  
Legal problems in the host country   












 519  Were you satisfied with the assistance got from the 
consulate  
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
 520   Your average income per month 
 
520a. Salary or from Business Rs.  
520b. Income from other sources Rs.  
520c. Total income Rs.  
 
521 Your average living expense per month 
 
522 Your average monthly remittance to home 
 
523  Who was mainly responsible in managing your 
household when you were away  
[Spouse – 1, Parents of emigrants  - 2, 
Parents of Spouse – 3, other relative 
(specify)  - 4] 
 
524  Did you send any remittance home when you were
 working abroad?  
  [Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
525 If YES, To whom did you send the money 
 [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
Spouse 1 
Your parents 2 
Spouse’s parents 3 
Others 4 
 
 526  What was the channel through which the money was sent?   [Circle all the 
appropriate codes] 
Through friends  1 
Through banks  2 
Mail transfer 3 
NRI deposits 4 
 
527 Did the you have any experience of getting 
cheated by in the transfer of remittances? 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
 528 If yes, in item 524, which agency ? 
[Friends/relatives/neighbour – 1, Financial 









 529 Do you have any of the following bank accounts 
now?  
  [Yes –1, No – 2] [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
 
529a. Current Account  1 2 
529b. Savings Account 1 2 
529c. Fixed Account   1 2 
 
530 Did you have any of the following bank accounts before emigration?  
[Yes –1, No – 2] [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
 
530a. Current Account  1 2 
530b. Savings Account 1 2 
530c. Fixed Account   1 2 
 
531 What were the problems faced by your household back home during your 
stay abroad?  
[Yes –1, No – 2] [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
 
531a. Illness in the family 1 2 
531b. Death 1 2 
531c. Loss of Assets 1 2 
531d. Threats to personal safety 1 2 




601 Year of your return from abroad. 
 
 
602 What was the reasons for your final return 
  [Yes –1, No – 2] [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
 
602a. Expiry of contract 1 2 
602b. Resigned job due to difficult living conditions abroad 1 2 
602c. Resigned job due to difficult working conditions abroad 1 2 
602d. Job terminated by employer before termination of contract 1 2 
602e. Political upheaval 1 2 
602f. Illegal stay abroad and compulsory repatriation 1 2 
602g. Conditions at home required the RM’s presence 1 2 
602h. Ill- health 1 2 
602i. Injury/accident/ Incapacitation 1 2 
 
 
603. Did you receive any special skills while working abroad 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
 
604 If ‘yes’, in item 603 what was the type of skills ? 
 [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
 
Craft skills 1 
Technical skills 2 
Supervisory/managerial skills 3 
Professional 4 
House keeping 5 




605.  Has the experience/skills acquired abroad been of use 
to you on your return? 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
606. What form you  keep your savings? 
[Yes –1, No – 2] [Circle all the appropriate codes] 
  
In  banks 1 2 
In other financial asserts 1 2 
mutual funds, shares, savings, certificates 1 2 
In other non-banking financial institutions 1 2 
with private financiers, blade companies etc 1 2 
 






 607 Have you invested money on any of the following items.  Write the 
amount spent. Write “Nil” in case no amount was spent 
 
607a. purchase of agricultural land  Rs.  
607b. Construction of buildings Rs.  
607c. Marriage of sisters/Brothers/daughters  Rs.  
607d. Higher education of children  Rs.  
 
 
608  What is your activity status now? That is, Are you now: 
[Self Employed/Employee – 1, Unemployed seeking 
employment – 2, Unemployed not seeking but 
available for employment – 3,  Not in labor force 
(students, housewife, pensioner etc) –4] 
 
609  If gainfully employed, i.e. code 1 in item 608, have you a  
 [Regular employment – 1, Casual employment – 2, 
Self employment-3] 
 
610  In what economic sector are you employed now? 
[Agriculture, Animal Husbandary, Fisheries etc – 1, 
Mining and quarrying – 2, Manufacturing – 3,  Trade 
commerce, hotels and Restaurants – 4, Transport – 5, 






611 What is your occupation (describe) 
 
If self employed: 
 
 




613  Was the money entirely your own or others also? 




614 Did you seek any assistance from public institutions? 
 [Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
 
615  If ‘yes’ to item 614 from what source did you seek assistance? 
 [Government  -1, Banks – 2, NGOs – 3, Others-4,  
 More than one source - 5] 
 
 
616  What type of assistance you sought from these institutions ? 
 
Type of assistance 616 Circle 
appropriate 
ones 
617 If circle in 
616, Did you 
get assistance  
[Yes-1, No-2] 
618. If ‘Yes’ in 
item 617, from 
which agency 
[Code] 
Financial 1   
Technical 2   
Marketing 3   
Raw material 4   
Identification of business 5   
Job placement 6   
Training 7   
 
[Agency code: Banks – 1, State agencies (specify) – 2, Voluntary agencies 







619 Were you engaged in any economic activity other 
than the present one between the time you returned 
and the present employment 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
620 If yes to item 619 during which years? 
 
621 If yes to item 619 what type of employment did you 
have? 
[Self employment – 1, Regular employment – 2, 
Casual Employment – 3] 
 
622 Why did you give that employment? 
[not profitable enough – 1, had labor problems – 2, 







623 After you return from abroad, were you at any time 
engaged in gainful employment 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
624 Why did you discontinue that activity ? 
[Not remunerative enough – 1, had labor problems – 
2, financial problems – 3, Other reasons(specify) – 4] 
 
625 After your return did you ever try to start a shop, or 
industry or some other business of your own in which 
you could be  self employed? 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
626 If yes to item 625 why it did not succeed? 
[Not enough money – 1, Scarcity of workers – 2, 
Labor militancy- 3, High wage rate – 4, Marketing 
Problem – 5, Power shortage – 6, Lack of 
transportation facilities  - 7,  politicians’ interference 
– 8, Lack of credit facilities – 9, Lack of Raw 
materials – 10, Other(Specify) – 11] 
 
627 Did you ever approach Government agencies for help 
in starting a business of your own? 
[Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
628 If Yes, to item 627 what was the result? 













If the persons is unemployed and did not seek employment or was available for 
employment 
 
629 Why you did not seek employment? 
[Too old to work – 1, Wanted to study – 2, Enough 
money, and there was no need to get money by working 
– 3, Can’t cope with the working conditions in Kerala – 
4, Labor militancy in Kerala – 5, Political interference  - 
6, High wage rates – 7,  Want to follow an easy life –8, 
Other reasons(Specify) – 9] 
 
 
Ask all Return Migrants 
 
630 Some people think that the Government should do more 
than what they are doing now to rehabilitate and resettle 
the Return Emigrants.  What is your view in this matter 
[Yes, Government should do more – 1, No, there is no 
need – 2, No comments – 3] 
 
631 What do you expect from the Government to 

































701  What is the opinion about Employment prospects 
in Gulf countries  
 [Declining-1,  Remain unchanged – 2, increasing – 
3] 
 
702  In your opinion what type of skills are most in 
demand now? 
 [Unskilled labor –1, Skilled – 2] 
 
703  Is the average salary/wages for the migrants  
 [Falling –1, Remain unchanged – 2, Rising – 3] 
 
704   Is the living expenses of the migrants in Gulf 
countries? 
 [Declining-1,  Remain unchanged – 2, increasing – 
3] 
 
705  Is Competition from other migrant - sending 
countries? 
 [Declining-1,  Remain unchanged – 2, increasing – 
3] 
 
706  What is your overall assignment of emigration 
experience: 
[Was very good  - 1, Was not good – 2, Was harmful 
– 3] 
 
707  If you get an offer now to emigrate, would you 
accept the offer 
 [Yes –1, No – 2] 
 
708   If your son or brother ask your advice about 
migrating to one of the Gulf countries, will you? 






















 REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
PUBLIC POLICY IMPERATIVES 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The close relationship between economic development and migration has been 
recognized for some time. In recent years, however, there has been a discernible shift 
in conventional thinking and research priorities concerning the relationship between 
migration and development. Traditionally, migration was seen as a problem with 
negative implications for development. Today, there is a growing recognition that 
migration and migrants can enhance a country’s development in a variety of ways. 
 One of the factors, which contributed to this change in thinking, is the growing 
recognition82 of the importance of remittances. After decades of pessimism and 
concerns about brain drain, governments of migrant sending countries have put 
renewed hopes on transnational migrants and ‘Diasporas’ as potential investors and 
actors of development (De Haas & Plug 2006; Gamlen 2006). 
 The extent to which migration and remittances can bring about sustained human 
development and economic growth in migrant-sending areas and countries has been 
the subject of heated debate over the past four decades, and it is possible to 
distinguish five periods in the post-Second World War thinking on migration and 
development. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the main phases in migration and 
development research and policies.   
 
                                                
82 At the Sea Island Summit in June 2004, leaders of the Group of Eight (G8), for example, 
called for more coordinated international efforts to enhance the development impact of 
remittance receipts. Attempts to juxtapose the benefits of remittances against the losses that 
the poor countries suffer from large-scale skill emigration have added to the intensity of the 




Main Phases in Migration and Development Research and Policies 








Before 1973 Development and 
migration optimism 
Developmental optimism; 
capital and knowledge 
transfers by migrants would 
help developing countries in 
development take-off.  




Growing skepticism; concerns 
about brain drain; after 
experiments with return 
migration policies  
focused on integration in 
receiving countries;  
migration largely out of sight 
in development field 
1990-2001 Readjustment to more 
subtle views under 
influence of increasing 
empirical research  
Persistent skepticism; 
tightening of immigration 
policies.  
 
2001-2008 Boom in publications: 
mixed, but generally 
positive views 
 
Resurgence of migration and 
development optimism and a 
sudden turnaround of views: 
brain gain, remittances and 
diaspora involvement; further 
tightening of immigration 
policies but greater tolerance 
for high-skilled immigration. 
2008 - Current Enhancing contributions 
of return migrants to 
economic development; 
international policies 
towards migrants living 







 While developmental optimism dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, large-scale 
pessimism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s. This changed with the emergence of 
more nuanced views in the 1990s, and with the rediscovery of remittances since the 
beginning of the current century, concomitant resurgence of optimism on migration 
and development was observed until recently. However, the current global economic 
crisis83 (since 2008) appears to have given rise to economic nationalism, and less 
welcoming attitude to immigrants in many parts of the developed world. In 
accordance with the views in different phases, areas of policy thrusts have also 
undergone attendant changes, enumerated in Table 4.1. 
  This essay reviews relevant analytical and empirical literature concerning the 
possible role of remittances in economic development of recipient countries. 
Specifically, it surveys the channels through which remittance flows can impact on 
intermediate goals of economic development such as macro-economic stability, 
efficiency, savings and investment intermediation, and household capital formation. 
The survey illustrates the channels by references to various countries. To bring out the 
relationships in sharper focus in a particular context, the essay has developed a case 
study of India, which is among the top remittance-recipient countries in the world.  
 To make the essay manageable, it limits the scope. Obviously, remittances 
cannot be separated from migration; and migration no doubt entails both benefits and 
costs, which, it is widely recognized, are shared differently both between and within 
the sending and receiving countries. Remittances are an integral part of these benefits 
and costs. However, these latter and much wider issues of migration are not taken up 
                                                
83 The current global economic crisis is the severest that the world has experienced since the 
Great Depression in the 1930s. The IMF expects the world growth to stagnate in 2009, while 
global trade is expected to fall by 3 percent (IMF, 2009). The severity of the crisis is also 
indicated by the fact that global stock market capitalization declined from $57.6 trillion in 
May 2008 to $29.8 trillion in March 2009 (www.world-exchanges.org).    
 235 
in this essay as they remain outside its scope. Also, even in examining the impact of 
remittances on development in this limited context, the study essentially deals with 
migrant-sending developing countries or areas while discussing the general analytical 
and empirical context, and develops a specific case study of India to illustrate the role 
of remittances in the country’s selected developmental aspects. The essay does not 
explicitly analyze issues relating to internal migration, voluntary or involuntary84.   
 The essay is organized as follows. In the following section (Section 4.2), 
definitional and conceptual aspects of remittances, and the manner in which global 
data are collected and reported are analyzed. It is widely accepted that good quality 
and timely data are essential for sound public policies in any area. Remittances are no 
exception to this observation. This is followed by a discussion of the contemporary 
trends in global remittance flows, including their absolute and relative importance 
across geographical locations in Section 4.3. The section also examines the impact of 
the current global economic crisis on future remittance flows across major regions of 
the world. Section 4.4 provides a survey of the analytical and empirical literature on 
the link between remittances and development. The aim is to able to draw nuances 
from the literature, recognizing time and context specific nature of the findings.  This 
is followed by a case study of remittance trends in India, and analyzes the economic 
and developmental impact of such flows in the country in Section 4.5. The section 
also briefly discusses possible public policy lessons for India from global experiences 
in enhancing contribution of remittances to India’s economic development. The final 




                                                
84 See however Ammassari (1994), and Deshingkar (2005) for analysis on internal migration.  
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4.2  REMITTANCES: CONCEPTUAL AND DATA ISSUES 
4.2.1 Nature and Importance of Remittances 
Remittances are financial transfers sent by private individuals living and employed85 
in a foreign economy to persons, usually family members in their country of origin 
(Adams, 2005). Therefore, remittances are financial resource flows arising from 
cross-border movement of residents of a country.  
 The term “remittances” is used in different ways. Typically, remittances are 
frequent small payments made through wire transfers or a variety of informal 
channels, sometimes even carried by hand. The major characteristics of the 
remittances is that these are “unrequited transfers” - referring primarily to money sent 
by migrants to family and friends on which there are no formal claims by the sender, 
(unlike other financial flows such as debt or equity flows) (Kapur, 2004).  
 Another feature of remittances is that these are regular flows generally in small 
denominations. Analysis of remittances generally also includes compensation of 
employees86 and migrants’ transfers87.  
 Although remittances are most recognizable in the form of private transfers, 
they are generally measured in a country’s Balance of Payments (BoP) accounts as 
the sum of three types of foreign exchange flows - wages and benefits earned by 
workers abroad; current transfers sent by individuals living as residents in a foreign 
economy; and the assets relocated by migrants from home to host country (Reinke 
                                                
85 For purposes of Balance of Payments (BoP) accounting, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) classifies a migrant worker as a resident of the new economy if he or she has lived 
there for a year or longer (Reinke and Patterson, 2005).  
 
86 Compensation of employees is funds sent back by temporary workers, who work abroad for 
less than a year.  
 
87 Migrants’ transfers arise from migration, change of residence for at least a year from one 
economy to another and are equal to the net worth of the migrant. 
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and Patterson, 2005).  
Migrant remittances represent the largest direct positive impact of migration 
on migration sending areas, and are central to the debates about costs and benefits of 
emigration. If labor is considered as an exportable commodity, remittances represent a 
part of the payment for exporting labor services that returns to the country of origin. 
 Remittances also represent a relatively stable, market-based external source of 
development finance, surpassing direct and portfolio investments, and foreign aid in 
many countries88. Some evidence indicates that remittances flows have positive 
macroeconomic effects in recipient countries.  
 Remittances generate foreign exchange, which complement national savings 
and provide a source of finance for capital formation, including for small-scale 
projects (to the extent remittances go in the banking system, any project can be 
financed). This is one of the channel through which remittances can support economic 
growth in recipient countries. Large remittances flows also improve a country’s 
creditworthiness for external borrowing and, hence, enhance the country’s access to 
international capital markets.  
 In the last few decades the volume of migrants’ remittances worldwide has risen 
steadily (in nominal and relative terms) and currently represents a substantial source 
of revenue for many poor states around the world. Because remittance arrangements 
are often based on personal rather than business ties, the flow of funds from sender to 
recipient tends to be more stable and long-term.  
 Unlike Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), remittances have exhibited 
countercyclical pattern even for developing countries with relatively mature financial 
                                                
88 Remittances account for about 30 percent of total financial flows to the developing world 
and provide significant foreign exchange earnings. They are more than twice as large as 
official development assistance (ODA) flows, and are equivalent to 2.5 percent of the gross 
national income of the developing world in 2006 (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).  
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sectors where more opportunities to insure against adverse economic shocks are 
available (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005).  However, whether remittances hold up 
in a crisis appears to depend on the type of crisis itself89 (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009). 
 For this reason, multilateral funding agencies like the World Bank, various 
regional development banks, and the developing country governments90 have stressed 
obtaining as much benefit from remittances as possible. The instruments include 
facilitating the use of remittance savings in small-scale loans commonly known as 
micro-finance arrangements; and allowing banks to securitize or issue bonds backed 




                                                
89 Crises caused by natural disasters often bring about a rise in remittances. Thus, countries in 
Asia that were hit by the tsunami in December 2004 collectively experienced a 33 percent 
surge in remittances in 2005 to $21 billion. Similarly, the massive earthquakes in Turkey in 
August 1999 and Gujarat, India, in January 2001 raised rather than reduced remittances to 
Turkey and India, though by not as much as the rise in remittances to the tsunami-affected 
countries in the Asia. However, crises caused by economic mismanagement, in contrast, seem 
to yield mixed results. Mexico’s currency crisis at the end of 1994 did not lead to a decline in 
remittances. In fact, remittances rose from $3.98 billion in 1994 to $4.12 billion in 1995. But 
the currency crisis in the Asia in 1997-98 did result in a modest decline in remittances. The 
combined remittances in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand fell 
to $8.5 billion in 1998 from $10 billion in 1997; however, remittances recovered quickly and 
returned to their pre-crisis level in 1999. In contrast, Russia’s debt default in 1998 caused a 
sizable 33 percent reduction in remittances, to $1.3 billion in 1999, and the flows did not 
overtake their pre-crisis level until 2004 (Ketkar and Ratha, 2009).  
 
90 The private sector also appears to be taking a more active interest in remittances than in the 
past. Major private sector banks and global financial agencies have begun to view remittances 
not only as a source of potential profits generated by a rising level of cross-country money 
transfer business and from their securitization, but also as a promising channel to reach 
migrants as prospective future customers. According to an old estimate, in 2001 banks and 
other transfer agencies had collected some US$ 12 billion in transfer fees (Maldonado and 
Robeldo, 2002). Western Union alone is estimated to move about $35 billion across 15,000 
currency corridors, yielding $4 billion in annual revenues. A study by World Bank in 2005 
suggest that by securitizing these resource flows, developing countries could have raised up to 
US$ 9 billion in the international capital markets (World Bank, 2005). This has no doubt 
opened up prospects for closer cooperation between the public and private sectors, as well as 
financial authorities, in both migrant sending and receiving countries to harness the 
development potential of remittance   flows. 
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4.2.2 Remittance Data: Issues and Challenges 
 
 Much of the confusion in the debate on migrants’ remittances and their impact 
on development starts with the very estimates of remittances91. For most countries, 
information on remittances and research on their effects tend to be less developed 
than for other major international flows, such as exports, investment, or foreign aid 
(Kapur, 2003). Data for remittances are sparser and less reliable92 than are most 
economic data for industrialized countries, as are most data on the entire process of 
international migration and on economic activity in developing countries in general.  
  The most extensive and consistent collection of data on remittances is found in 
the BoP statistics assembled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from data 
contributed by approximately 160 member countries. The World Bank also assembles 
national accounts, relying primarily on data provided by the IMF but also using data 
provided by approximately 20 countries that belong to the World Bank but not to the 
IMF.  
 As indicated earlier, the official flows are reported in the IMF’s balance of 
payments statistics under three different headings - transfers from workers staying 
abroad for one year or more (“workers’ remittances” shown under the heading 
“current transfers”); transfers from persons staying abroad for less than one year 
(“compensation of employees”, prior to 1993 dubbed “labor income” recorded under 
the “income” sub-category of “current account”); and flows of goods and financial 
assets linked to the migrants’ cross-border movements (“migrants’ transfers” reported 
                                                
91 See Section 4.3 for trends in contemporary remittance flows and their future estimates. 
92 As indicated earlier, official statistics on remittances tend to underestimate the size of 
remittance flows. Following a request from the G7 nations in June 2004, the World Bank 
together with the IMF and the UN led an international working group to improve remittance 
statistics. This working group, which now functions as the “Luxembourg Group”, has 
recommended that three new items – personal remittances, total remittances, and total 
remittances and transfers to nonprofit institutions serving households – be added to the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Manual, 6th Edition (BPM6). 
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under “capital transfer”). A general tendency in much of the migration literature is to 
focus exclusively on the first category, “workers’ remittances” (Ghosh, 2006). 
Consistent with its own definition of a migrant (absence from home country for one 
year or more) the United Nations generally does the same. This, however, fails to 
capture the overall size or the full impact of remittances associated with cross-border 
movements of people, including those of shorter duration93.   
 The accuracy of official estimates is weakened by limitations of the official 
remittance data themselves, two of which as noted in the policy literature, are worth 
emphasizing.  
 First, according to the World Bank, several countries with significant emigrant 
populations do not report official data on remittances at all (World Bank, 2006)94. In 
fact, many countries have incomplete statistics thus affecting remittance statistics for 
entire regions or income-level country groups. This observation is particularly true in 
countries suffering from severe political instability. 
 Second, even in countries that managed to report official flows to the IMF, the 
data could be less reliable than desired due to technical problems in data collection. 
The World Bank (2006), for example, noted that reports from banks or money transfer 
companies often lack the details required to distinguish remittances from other kinds 
of transfers. Thus, as the World Bank’s survey of 40 central banks in developing 
countries revealed, the balance of payment statistics frequently do not cover 
remittances paid directly by non-bank financial institutions such as money transfer 
                                                
93 While potentially of similar significance, the amounts of internal remittances, sent largely 
by urban migrants back to rural communities of origin, as cash or kind, are not regularly 
recorded and are difficult to estimate.  More migrants move internally than internationally, 
but their earnings tend to be lower (World Bank, 2006). 
94 Many countries do not report data on remittances in the IMF BoP statistics, even though it 
is known that emigration from those countries took place. Several developing countries (for 
example, Lebanon) do not report to the IMF. Some high-income countries (notably Canada, 
Singapore, and United Arab Emirates) also do not report remittance data. 
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companies, exchange bureaus, credit unions, and post offices (Martinez, 2005)95. 
Sometimes, the reporting also suffers from confusion between migrant remittances 
and other resource flows, such as tourism receipts and non-resident deposits. 
 Another source of technical difficulty is the one-year residency rule in the 
balance of payments framework that requires migrants to be classified either as 
residents or nonresidents. If the migrants live in the host country for a year or longer, 
they are considered residents, regardless of their immigration status. If the migrants 
have lived in the host country for less than a year, their entire income in the host 
country should be classified as compensation of employees. This, as the World Bank 
(2006) emphasizes, is often difficult to apply in practice. Many countries compile data 
based on the citizenship of the migrant worker rather than on their residency status. 
 Further, data are shown entirely as either compensation of employees or as 
worker remittances, although they should be split between the two categories if the 
guidelines were correctly followed96. The distinction between these two categories 
appears to be entirely arbitrary, depending on country preference, convenience, and 
tax laws, or data availability97. The model-based estimation methods that some 
                                                
95 Specifically, the study finds that in the 20 of 40 countries surveyed, exchange bureaus, 
credit unions, and other non-bank financial institutions pay remittances, but only 65 percent 
collect remittance data from those institutions. Even more striking is the finding that in 39 of 
40 countries, money transfer companies pay remittances, but only 38 percent of central banks 
collect data from them. Likewise, post offices pay remittances in 26 of 40 countries, but only 
35 percent of those countries collect remittances from post offices. What is even more 
troubling is that although commercial banks participate in the payment of remittances in all 
40 countries surveyed, two countries do not collect remittance data from commercial banks at 
all (Martinez, 2005). 
96 Indian data for example shows very little compensation of employees, but large workers’ 
remittances, although it is well known that India supplies a large number of temporary IT 
workers to the United States and European countries. On the other hand, the Philippines data 
show large compensation of employees and very few migrants’ transfers.  
 
97 Due to the difficulty in classifications, countries have often classified workers’ remittances 
either as other current transfers or as transfers from other sectors. In some countries, notably 
China, remittances may have been misclassified as FDI. In the case of India and many other 
countries, remittances may have been classified as nonresident deposits, especially those in 
local currency terms. 
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countries have developed to counter this problem require good demographic and labor 
statistics and information on remittances from household surveys, which, 
unfortunately, most developing countries do not have.  
 Even when data are available and properly classified, in many cases, these data 
are often weak or out of date. Also the methodology for preparing estimates is not the 
same in all countries, and it is not always described in the country notes in the 
publicly available balance of payments data.  
 Perhaps the most difficult aspect of remittance data is estimating informal 
flows. One way to estimate the true size of remittances is to undertake surveys of 
remittance senders and recipients. Unless new, adequately randomized and 
representative surveys of recipients and senders are carried out, evidence from 
existing household surveys would only be indicative rather than comprehensive.  
 Informal transfers apart, an important complication in assessing the actual 
volume of remittances lies in the fact that a part of the remittances can, and often 
does, take the form of transfers in kind instead of cash, but remains largely 
unrecorded in official statistics. The increased awareness about the importance of 
remittances and the shortcomings in both the remittance and migrant workers’ data 
will hopefully result in efforts to improve the data collection and transmission. 
Determination of the actual volume of remittances, though not easy, should continue 
to be a priority concern for purposes of policy formulation.  
   Notwithstanding the above limitations in data collection and reporting, and the 
fact that figures vary by source98 and assumptions, most studies on the magnitude and 
direction of remittance flows usually arrive at two key unambiguous observations.  
                                                
98 For the purpose of this essay, the most accessed global data source has been the online 
database of the World Bank at www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances, and 
the Reserve Bank of India (www.rbi.org.in/) for the Indian case study.    
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 First, remittances are considered substantial and increasingly important sources 
of external finance that are growing not only nominally but also relatively in relation 
to other transfers to developing countries. Second, even though high-income countries 
remain the dominant sources of remittances, a non-negligible portion originate from 
developing countries. The trends in contemporary and future remittance flows are 
discussed in Section 4.3.  
 
4.3 Trends In Global Remittance Flows  
Though the policy thrust in this essay is on India - its importance in India’s 
macroeconomic management, and the policy implications thereof, it is nevertheless 
useful to analyze the broader global context and trends. Since India is among the top 
remittance-recipient countries of the world, the broader global context and future 
trends have a bearing on the sustainability of such flows to India. This section 
therefore outlines both the contemporary trends in remittance flows, and discusses the 
probable impact of global economic crisis on global remittance flows. 
4.3.1 Contemporary Trends in Remittance Flows 
 In the past few years, there has been a remarkable renaissance in remittances 
and their behavior. This interest has undoubtedly been triggered by a striking increase 
in remittance flows since the beginning of the current century. Remittances sent back 
to developing countries through formal channels rose from $31.1 billion in 1990 to 
$76.8 billion in 2000 to $265 billion in 200799, more than three times the 2000’s level 
(Ratha et al., 2008) (Figure 4.1). Over the 2006-2008 period, remittances received by 
developing countries cumulatively increased by 23 percent. It is important to note that 
because a significant proportion of remittances are still sent through informal  
                                                
99 In 2008, estimated remittance flows were $283 billion, a 7 percent increase from the 2007 
level (Table 4.2).  
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Figure 4.1 
Global Trends in Remittances, FDI, ODA, and Portfolio Flows, 1990-2008 
 
 
Source: Based on Online World Bank Remittance Database at 













channels100, any estimation of the size of recorded flows is generally considered an 
under-estimation101.  
The contemporary trend of remittance flows to developing countries exhibited 
in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 suggests that the regional pattern of remittance flows 
appear to be shifting. Flows from the US to Latin America and the Caribbean and 
those from Western Europe to Europe and Central Asia are becoming less 
prominent102. In contrast, flows from GCC countries to East Asia and South Asia have 
grown rapidly. Flows to Middle East and North Africa were estimated to have 
remained strong and relatively stable, but those to Sub-Saharan Africa appeared to  
 
 
                                                
100 Formal channels are utilized mostly in countries with well-functioning financial systems. 
In some countries with large exchange-rate spreads however, the informal sector may be 
much larger (Freund and Spatafora, 2005). Lucas (2003) notes that the relative proportion of 
funds passing through informal channels is greater where the illegal or underground market 
premium on foreign exchange is higher. 
 
101 Estimates of remittance flows through informal flows vary across studies. Freund and 
Spatafora (2005) find that official figures on remittances to developing countries are 
underestimated by as much as 35 to 75 percent. A 2003 International Monetary Fund study 
simulated unrecorded transfers to 15 developing countries that have high rates of out-
migration and a history of parallel exchange markets and finds that 40 percent of total 
remittances were conveyed through informal channels. Considerable variation, however, 
exists between countries. Informal flows to Algeria, Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and 
Tanzania account for more than half of total remittances while India, the Philippines, and 
Turkey registered less informal flows. A particularly interesting case is Nepal wherein 90 
percent of remittance flows are believed to be unrecorded (Seddon, 2004). Estimates by Page 
and Plaza (2005) suggest that the share of unrecorded remittances in total remittances 
averages 48 per cent worldwide, with significant regional variations (for example, 73% for 
sub-Saharan Africa). And, most recently, based on econometric analyses and available 
surveys, the World Bank estimated that unrecorded flows might add 50 per cent or more to 
total recorded remittances (World Bank, 2005).  
 
102 Ratha et al. (2008) attribute three primary factors for the slowdown in Latin America and 
the Caribbean in 2008: (a) a slowdown in the US economy, especially in the construction 
sector, has affected the employment and incomes of Latin American (especially Mexican) 
migrants in the US; (b) tighter enforcement of immigration rules in the United States is likely 
to have caused a shift in remittance flows to hand carry and unrecorded channels; and (c) after 
more than doubling during 2002-2007, the rate of growth of remittances is beginning to slow 




Recent Trends in Remittance flows to Developing Countries 
 
                                                                           2006                  2007               2008e 
(US $ billion) 
Developing Countries                                     229 (100.0)       265(100.0)    283(100.0)     
      (as share of GDP, %)*              (2.1) (2.0) (1.8) 
 East Asia and Pacific                              53 (23.1)             58(21.9)        62 (21.9) 
          Europe and Central Asia                         39 (17.0)             51(19.3)       54 (19.1) 
 Latin America and Caribbean                 57 (24.9)             61(23.0)       61 (21.6) 
 Middle-East and North America             27 (11.9)             32 (12.1)      35 (12.4) 
 South Asia                                               40 (17.5)             44 (16.6)      51 (18.0) 
 Sub-Saharan Africa                                 13  (5.7)              19  (7.2)       20 ( 7.1) 
Growth Rate (%) 
Developing Countries                                      18                          16                   7 
East Asia and Pacific                                   13                          10                   7 
Europe and Central Asia                              23                          31                   5 
Latin America and Caribbean                      18                           6                    0 
Middle-East and North America                  10                          20                   8 
South Asia                                                    20                          11                 16 
Sub-Saharan Africa                                      35                          42 6 
 
Note: e = estimate   
* Including the revision to Nigeria data in 2007. Excluding that, remittance flows 
to Sub‐Saharan Africa would have experienced more modest growth rate of 14.4 
percent, and to developing countries, 14.1 percent in 2007.     
 
Sources: Calculations 
based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 2008 and Online 
World Bank Database at 













Sources of Remittances by Recipient Regions, 2008  
 
 






























have decelerated sharply to 6 percent in 2008 from a high growth rate of 42 percent in 
2007103.  
 In 2008, the top four recipients of remittances - India104, China, Mexico, and the 
Philippines – received remittances totaling $100 billion, about 35 percent of total 
estimated remittance flows of $283 billion in 2008 (Figure 4.3).  
 As may be expected, contemporary trends also suggest that smaller and poorer 
countries tend to receive relatively larger remittances in proportion to the size of their 
economies. Expressing remittances as a share of GDP, the top recipients (share in 
GDP of one-fifth and above) in 2007 were Tajikistan (46 percent), Moldova (38 
percent), Tonga (35 percent), Lesotho (29 percent), Honduras, Lebanon, and Guyana 
(24 percent), Jordan (23 percent), and Haiti (20 percent) (Figure 3.3). Remittances are 
thus more evenly distributed across developing countries than are private capital 
flows.  
 A good proportion of remittance flows also originate in developing countries. 
The World Bank (2006) notes that these so-called South-South remittance flows make 
up between 30 and 45 percent of total remittances received by developing countries. 
In fact, remittance flows to poor countries actually originate largely in the middle-
income developing countries. China, Malaysia, and the Russian Federation, for 
example, are among the top 20 sources of remittances (World Bank, 2006)105. This,  
                                                
103 Ratha et al. (2008) attribute a part of such sharp deceleration to moderation of remittance 
flows to Nigeria following a 70 percent increase in remittance flows in 2007. Nigeria revised 
upwards the data it reports to the IMF Balance of Payments to $18 billion in 2007, a 450 
percent increase over the inflows for 2005, raising concerns that such increase may reflect 
inclusion of other type of private flows, such as trade payments (Ratha et al., 2008).  
 
104 From the 1990s onwards, remittances to India surged not only because of the significant 
rise in the number of in-migrants to industrialized countries such as the US, Canada and 
Australia, but also due to the easing of regulations on the flow of capital and the exchange 
rates (World Bank, 2006).  
 
105 Other studies confirm this trend. Carling (2005) notes that about one-third of global 
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Figure 4.3 
Top Ten Remittance-recipient Developing Countries  
(In US$ and As Share of GDP), 2008 
 
 












                                                                                                                                       
remittances are estimated to flow between Asian countries with the world’s third largest flow 
of remittances going from Malaysia to Indonesia. African countries also receive more 
remittances from elsewhere in Africa than they do from other continents. This is particularly 
true in Sub-Saharan Africa since the inflows from Europe and Asia are concentrated to North 
Africa. Carling (2005) particularly finds Côte d’Ivoire and Angola as important source of 
remittances, in addition to South Africa. 
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according to Ratha (2006), reflects the fact that over half of migrants from developing 
countries migrate to other developing countries. 
 The tripling of officially recorded global remittances since the beginning of the 
current century may be attributed to a combination of factors including better 
measurement of flows; increased scrutiny since the terrorist attacks of September 
2001; reduction in remittance costs and expanding networks in the money transfer 
industry; depreciation of the US dollar (raising the dollar value of remittances in other 
currencies until recently); and growth in the migrant stock and incomes.  
 
4.3.2 The Global Economic Crisis and Its Impact Migration Policies and Future 
Remittance Flows 
 
 The current global economic crisis is the severest that the world has experienced 
since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The IMF expects the world growth to 
stagnate in 2009 (IMF, 2009). The severity of the crisis is also indicated by the fact 
that global stock market capitalization declined from $57.6 trillion in May 2008 to 
$29.8 trillion in March 2009 (www.world-exchanges.org). Figures from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) claim that as many as 200 millions workers 
could be pushed into extreme poverty, with more than fifty million jobs set to be lost 
worldwide (ILO, 2009). Overall world trade is set to drop by about 2.1%, the first 
drop in overall global figures since 1982. All the projections have been qualified by 
the respective organizations proviso that they carry significant downside risks. 
 In the backdrop of the economic crisis, it seems likely that migration to 
advanced economies will decrease, and there will be an upsurge in the number of 
migrants coming back home106. Greater economic nationalism being exhibited by 
                                                
106 However, there is no reason to assume that migrants in advanced economies will begin 
returning home en masse as a result of the crisis, as some migrants have compelling reasons 
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many countries may led to much more stringent immigration regimes, thereby 
impacting migration (and in turn) and remittance flows107. 
 As the current fiscal quandary effects every region throughout the world, many 
of the destination countries that have a history of profiting from foreign labor may 
now108 seek to minimize their losses by deporting workers. 
  One of the main examples of this is the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), 
whose six nations have had a symbiotic relationship with many of the developing 
countries in the region109. There are currently an estimated 18-20 million migrant 
workers employed within the region. As a result of the crisis, and resulting decrease 
in the global price of oil, estimates suggest that as many as 6 million migrants now 
face losing their jobs, most of these affecting Indian migrant workers. This would also 
impact migrants from other parts of Asia, who are largely employed in the 
development and construction sectors in the Gulf.  
 In Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia, the policies are no 
different. Singapore, a country that is already in recession, has already announced that 
                                                                                                                                       
to stay, particularly if economic prospects at home remain dim.  
 
107 In the UK for example, immigration from Poland for the summer of 2008 was at its lowest 
level since 2004, down 36 per cent from 2007, reflecting an overall decline in immigration to 
the UK. The UK has also recently tightened its immigration policies and guidelines, making it 
more difficult for skilled migrants from outside the EU to get visas if they work as doctors, 
nurses or secondary-school teachers. 
 
108 This however is not a new practice and has been used by various nations for decades.  
When the Asian Financial Crisis first struck in 1997, governments throughout the region 
deported hundreds of thousands of foreign workers to safeguard the political and economic 
status quo. As unemployment rose to about 10 percent in South Korea, 200,000 migrants 
were deported. In Malaysia, the crisis led to some 850,000 foreign permits not being renewed 
by the government as their GDP had fallen by some 6.2 percent. In Thailand, the authorities 
took measures to deport about 600,000 as the unemployment rate doubled during the crisis.  
 
109 Migrants accounted for about 40 percent of the total workforce within these six states. 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have an estimated 63 percent and 52 percent of all their remittances 
originating from the GCC countries (IOM, 2008).   
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it intends to deport some 300,000 foreign workers in 2009 according to its official 
body the Ministry of Manpower (MOM). Singapore is also increasingly enacting 
policies, which discriminate against non-citizens. In Malaysia plans are in place to 
remove some 800,000 foreign workers by 2010. In order to limit their dependency on 
foreign labor, the Malaysian government has initiated a process of only renewing 
unskilled work permits for a maximum of five years (Kuppusamy, 2008).   
 As the number of migrants who face deportation and retrenchment from 
destination countries continues to rise, it would in turn impact on the levels of 
remittances sent back to the migrant’s country of origin. 
 According to March 2009 World Bank revised estimates, with rising 
unemployment and fluctuating international exchange rates largely unfavorable to 
developing countries, global migrant remittances is estimated to decline by only 5 per 
cent in 2009, to $290 billion, down from $305 billion in 2008. In the ‘worst case 
scenario’, remittances will decrease by 8.2 per cent globally in 2009 to $280 billion, 
before rebounding in 2010. The obvious caveat to the above projections would be that 
if the crisis were deeper and lasts longer, the decline in remittance and migration 
flows  would  be  larger.  
 Remittance inflows in US dollar terms are expected to decrease in five of the six 
developing regions during 2009-10, with sharp declines compared with recent years. 
At the same time, the regional shifts in remittances are likely to become more 
pronounced (Ratha et al., 2008).  
 However, despite a decline in the share of remittances in GDP, the contribution 
of remittances to the external position of developing countries is estimated to increase 
significantly during 2009-10. The decline in the share of remittances in GDP is 
expected to be much smaller than the decline (equivalent to 2 percent of GDP) in the 
 253 
current account balance of developing countries. Officially recorded inward 
remittances were 54 percent of the current account balance in 2007; they are expected 
to be at least as large by 2010 (Ratha et al., 2008).  
 Therefore, the outlook for future remittance flows to developing countries 
appears to be uncertain for at least five primary reasons. First, economic slowdown in 
the high income OECD destination countries including the United States and Western 
Europe (which account for almost two third of remittance flows to developing 
countries (Figure 4.2); second, the impact of the economic crisis on developing 
countries (which account for half of migrants from developing countries)110; third, the 
impact of a fall in oil prices on the economies of the GCC countries, a major 
destination of  migrants from developing countries in South Asia and the Middle East 
and North Africa; fourth,  uncertainty about exchange rates111; and fifth, the  political  
reaction  to  weak  job  markets  in  destination  countries  could  lead  to  more  
tightening  of  immigration  controls. However, due to the crisis, in many developing 
countries, remittances could become even more important source of external finance, 
as private flows to these countries decline (Ratha et al. 2008).  
                                                
110 Several developing countries (for example, India, Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa) are 
both migrant receiving and remittance‐source countries. Developing countries host almost 
half of emigrants from all developing countries and account for at least a tenth of recorded 
remittance flows to developing countries in US dollar terms (Figure 3.2). These countries are 
being affected by the financial crisis through several channels, including trade linkages, a 
reversal of foreign investment flows and banking channels. Economic performance of these 
countries will continue to impact remittance flows to many poorer developing countries in 
different regions, especially in Europe and Central Asia. There are also political and public 
pressures to tackle the issue of illegal migrants in countries such as India, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and South Africa.     
111 Unpredictable movements in the exchange rates pose a risk to dollar‐denominated 
forecasts. The base case scenario projections by the World Bank assumes that during the 
course of 2009, other currencies will revert back to a level similar to the average in the 
previous year, with  a  modest  depreciation  of  the  U.S  dollar  by  the  end  of  the  year. 
However, if the exchange rates of the remittance sources continue  to  remain  weak  (i.e.  at  
their current levels) relative to the U.S dollar, it would result in an even greater decline in 
remittance flows to  developing  countries.   
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 From a public policy perspective, it is important for governments of migrant-
originating countries to engage in talks with destination governments to provide 
appropriate safeguard mechanisms for its nationals, and mitigate dysfunctional 
tendencies towards economic nationalism, and intolerance rising from the current 
global economic crisis. 
4.4  Remittances and Development 
4.4.1 Main Channels of Impact of Remittances on Recipient Countries 
The impact of remittances on the recipient countries may be analyzed at three levels – 
at the micro or household level; community level; and macro or the national level. 
The micro level impact is a direct one, where the remitted money flows from 
workers abroad to their families, raising the household income level. Remittances 
may also flow to organizations (instead of households) to finance social purposes, in 
which case the impact is at the meso level. If individual remittance transactions, when 
aggregated at a national level will have macroeconomic impacts, balance of 
payments, foreign exchange reserves, and current accounts of the balance of 
payments. Table 4.3 summarizes a list of major potential benefits and cost of 
remittance flows at all the three levels.   
 Given the nature and magnitude of remittances flows, development practitioners 
view remittances as having a potentially important role to play in supporting the 
development efforts of recipient countries. Remittances can essentially support these 
efforts through two main channels.  
 First, remittances could potentially flow to the low-income groups of the 
population and, therefore, directly contribute to poverty reduction. Indeed, in many 
countries around the world, remittances are the most important poverty alleviation 
program and represent a considerable economic force. Even if these flows are fully  
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Table 4.3 
Potential Benefits and Costs of Remittance Flows 
Benefits Costs 
1. Ease foreign exchange constraints, and 
improve Balance of Payments (BOP) 
1. The flow is unpredictable/volatile. 
2. Permit import of capital goods and raw 
materials for industrial development 
2. Mostly spent on consumer goods, 
which increases demand, increases 
inflation, and increases wage levels. 
3. Potential source of savings and investment for 
development 
3. Result in little or no investment in 
capital generating activities 
4. Cushion adverse impact of increases in oil 
prices 
4. High import content of consumption 
demand might increase import 
dependency, and thereby exacerbate 
BOP problems 
5. Raise immediate standard of living of the 
recipients 
5. Replace other sources of income, 
thereby creating moral hazard 
problems 
6. Improve income distribution (if poor/less 
skilled migrate) 
6. Are spent on “unproductive” or 
“personal” investment (e.g. real estate, 
housing) 
7. Net addition to resources 7. Create envy and resentment and 
induce consumption spending among 
non-migrants 














consumed, a concern of many development practitioners, they could have significant 
positive welfare effects. This is because productive consumption, in the form of 
adequate nutrition for all family members, particularly girls and women, education, 
health, and housing expenditures can help improve current and future productive 
capacities. 
 Second, with imperfect insurance and financial markets in remittance receiving 
countries, remittances could contribute to increased investment in human and physical 
capital. For example, they could remove some of the financial constraints to 
investment faced by households and small-scale entrepreneurs. Similarly, remittances 
can provide insurance and, therefore, allow households and entrepreneurs to pursue 
riskier asset-accumulation strategies. In this regard, remittances could help raise the 
country’s long-run growth potential through higher rates of capital accumulation. Not 
surprisingly then that such flows have become a focal point in the ongoing debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of international migration. 
 Figure 4.4 shows illustration of the broader links between remittance usage at 
present, and development and consumption in the future. If remittances today are only 
spent on consumption, future consumption has to be financed by future remittances 
(or other sources of income). If remittances are invested or saved, however, this could 
help finance future consumption. When remittances are saved in financial institutions, 
this increases credit availability and can enable entrepreneurs to realize investments 
that have a positive impact on development. While this is an important way of making 
remittances contribute to investment without relying on entrepreneurship by the 
migrants or their relatives themselves, there is always a chance that investors will 
channel funds into uses with high yields, which might be different from uses with 
high development impacts. When migrants do invest, their emotional attachment to  
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Figure 4.4: 


















their (often marginal) regions of origin can help compensate for the disadvantages of 
these regions in the eyes of purely profit-seeking investors.  
 Before exploring in some detail the empirical literature on how remittances and 
development aspects are related, or implications of different country experiences, it 
would be useful to provide an overview of the theoretical approaches concerning 
remittances and the development paradigm, and also briefly examine at the 
motivations that determine migrants’ decision to remit.  
4.4.2 Brief Overview of Theoretical Approaches 
 The remittance flows and their implications for development are linked to the 
theory of migration since remittances are a derived product of the export of labor 
from labor surplus to the labor deficient regions - a process of bringing price of labor 
to an equilibrium level over a long term.  
 There are two main theoretical approaches to migrant remittances. The first 
approach is known as “Migrant Syndrome” (Reichart, 1981), popularly called the 
“Dutch Disease”. According to this approach the inward remittances resulting from 
migration can only partially compensate for the loss of human capital. It is contended 
that migration carries “Dutch disease” effect on the migration source economies, as 
there is competition for limited labor by the local production entities that may result 
in decline in the production of tradable goods. 
 Furthermore, the deterioration in the local production conditions may have 
adverse spillovers for the poorer households. This view could be relevant if migration 
takes place from an economy, which is at or near full employment. Labor surplus 
developing countries, which are the main source of international labor migration, may 
not fit into this framework. Apart from open unemployment, these economies 
generally have enclaves of disguised unemployment and seasonal unemployment. In 
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particular, use of family labor in agriculture and informal services sector is 
widespread in many of these economies. Therefore, migration of such workers is in 
fact likely to increase rather than decrease the per capita income of the country in 
general and poorer families in particular.   
 The contrasting view on the migration and remittances is provided by the 
developmental perspective rooted in the New Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM) (Stark and Bloom, 1985). This approach considers migration as an integral 
part of the household objective to enhance income levels, investment capacity and 
acquire insurance against risk. It is argued that remittances can ease the production 
and investment constraints, setting in motion a development dynamics. A 
fundamental departure of the NELM migration model from that of the individual 
model (Todaro, 1969) is that under the NELM household model, decision-making is 
based on a larger context with collective decisions. Unlike the individual models, 
where there is no rationale to share remittances with the households of migration 
source economy, the household approach of the NELM models emphasizes 
maximization of income, mitigation of risk and release the constraints on the domestic 
production capacity. It may be added that in the household approach to migration and 
remittance behavior, the objective function is to maximize expected utility by 
allocating the household labor between migration and non-migration activity.  
 In a life cycle perspective, remittance inflows can be negative during the initial 
period of migration of worker as it involves the cost of migration to be borne by the 
source economy household. This phase is followed by increasing flow of remittance 
as the migrant worker starts generating income. Subsequently, the decision of migrant 
worker to settle down in the destination country can reduce the flow of remittances as 
themigrant is likely to act as an insurance against adverse shocks to the household of 
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the source country.    
 Poirine (1997) viewed remittances an implicit family loan arrangement, 
exhibiting “three waves” shape. Under this perspective, remittances are repayment 
made by the migrant worker to the source household for the loan contract made for 
human capital development of the migrant worker. In the first stage, migrant worker 
remits a significant portion of income to the source family in order to repay the 
implicit loan obligations. During the second stage, the migrant remittances are 
implicit loans to siblings to finance their education in the source country.   
 On the basis of the theoretical framework discussed above, the important points 
that emerge are – first, worker’s remittances, after paying for the migration cost, 
contribute to the household income; second, remittances release financial constraints 
on the household production, leading to first round indirect effect on income. The 
remittances release the borrowing constraints/budget constraint, particularly for the 
small scale investments or unorganised business enterprises; third, the aggregate 
demand effect generated by the remittance inflows has a linkage effect to raise 
economic activity in non-migrant household; and fourth, remittances have investment  
and growth enhancing impact if the migrant returns to the source country once the 
implicit loan is fully repaid. 
4.4.3 Factors Impacting on Decision to Remit   
 The importance of remittances as a means of development finance and 
household income in developing countries has sparked substantial interest in how the 
decision to remit is determined and what influences the volume and duration of 
remittances. It is important to underline that not all immigrants send home 
remittances, and equally, not all migrant households receive remittances. Remitting 
behavior varies depending, among other things, upon age, education, occupation, 
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employment, motive for remitting, gender, size of the household, access to credit, and 
years since migration. 
 There is a growing body of literature, which sheds some light on the micro-
economic motives behind remittances (Stark, 1992; Brown, 1997; Poirine, 1997; 
Smith, 2003; Rapoport and Docquier, 2004, 2005; Russell, 1986, 1992; and Solimano, 
2003, 2004). These surveys list three basic motives for remittances - altruism (family 
obligations, assistance and inheritance); insurance (indemnifying the human and 
social development of the family left behind against income shocks); and investment 
(asset accumulation back home as part of migration life-cycle planning). 
 Table 4.4 provides a summary of the different models and the variables 
proposed to explain why emigrants send part of their income to family and relatives in  
source countries. The Table provides the expected signs for the effects of explanatory 
variables on the decision to remit. For example, the altruistic model predicts that the 
migrant, is motivated by the well being of the family in the home country, would tend 
to decrease his remittances over time. This expectation is shown with a negative sign 
in Table 4.4.  
 Similarly, macro-economic factors also appear to influence the volume of 
remittances, once the decision to remit has been made. Remittances are perceived to 
be responsive to changes in the interest rate differential between home and host 
country, government policies, the level of economic activity both in the host and the 
home country, wages, political risk factors in the sending country, and the rate of 
inflation. 
 Several studies have found that the flow of remittances is positively correlated 
with growth in the host countries. The income and employment situation in the 
remittance source country affect the migrant’s disposable income, as well as saving  
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Table 4.4 
Variables Associated with Migrants’ Desire to Remit 
Source: Rapoport and Docquier (2005) 
 












Motives                                     Individual Motives                                       Familial Arrangements  
Expl. Variables            Altruism   Exchange  Inheritance     Strategic         Insurance   Investment 
                                                                                                      Motive  
  
Migrant’s income                +               +               +                        +                     ND               + 
Migrant’s education           ND             -               ND                     +                     ND               + 
Time since arrival             - or = 0       ND           ND               - or = 0                  ND              ND 
Distance from family        - or = 0       ND             -                      ND                    ND               + 
Number of  
migrants/heirs                     -                ND          Inverse              ND                    ND              ND 
                                                                             U-shape 
                                                                              effect 
Recipient’s long  
run income                         -               + or -          ND                    -                        ND           = or -                 
Adverse short run shocks 
in recipients’ income         +              + or -          ND                   +                          +               + 
Recipient’s assess  
(Land, cattle, etc)              ND            ND             +                     ND                       ND            ND 
 
 
ND = Not Determined 
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behavior, both of which affect the size of remittances (IMF, 2005). The cost of living 
in the recipient country is also an important factor affecting a migrant’s remittance 
decision. Surveys suggest that the same remitter may reduce flows to destinations 
where the cost of living is lower112. Interest rates are also found to be relevant. An 
increase in the interest costs of lending lowers remittances, as do unfavorable 
exchange rates (Orozco et al., 2006). 
 Relatively recent studies support the hypothesis that remitters may respond to 
homeland crises (Blue, 2004). As a country situation deteriorates, emigration numbers 
may rise and remittances increase. Kapur and McHale (2003), and Kapur (2004) 
reviews the effects of the economic downturn in Ecuador in the late 1990s on the 
increase in remittances received. Remittances more than doubled, from US$ 643 
million in 1997 to US$ 1.4 billion in 2001. The experience of the Philippines during 
the Asian crisis demonstrates how exchange rate movements can affect the amount of 
remittances. Yang (2004) and Yang and Choi (2005) find that the appreciation of a 
migrant’s currency against the Philippine peso led to an increase in the amount of 
remittances received from abroad.  
 The following sub-sections take a closer look at the different linkages with 
relevant country experiences, as suggested in the empirical literature.  
 
4.4.4 Remittances and Economic Growth – Empirical Evidence 
 
 Despite the significant size and stability of remittance flows, researchers have 
found it difficult to determine the effects of remittances on the growth of recipient 
economies in the developing world. So far, empirical research on the relationship 
between remittances and economic growth has yielded mixed results. 
                                                
112 On the other hand, Orozco et al.’s (2006) data analysis of Mexico, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Jamaica, for example, finds that a 1 percent increase 
in the Consumer Price Index is associated with a threefold increase in remittance volume. 
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 Spatafora, Aggrawal and Cabugao (2005) try to estimate the impact of 
remittances on real output per capita using the latest data from 101 countries covering 
the period 1970 to 2003. Even with the advantage of a large and comprehensive 
country sample, they find no statistically significant relationship between remittance 
flows and per capita income. However, their study does show that remittance flows 
are associated with reduced volatility in aggregate output, consumption and 
investment (Spatafora, Aggrawal and Cabugao, 2005).  
 Faini (2002, 2003) finds a positive relationship between growth and remittances 
using cross-country data, although his results are not robust to alternative 
specifications (IMF, 2005). Bougha-Hagbe (2004) find evidence of increased 
construction activity is correlated with remittances. Adelman and Taylor (1990) find 
that ‘every dollar Mexican migrants send back home or bring back with them 
increases Mexico’s GNP from anywhere between US$ 2.69 and US$ 3.17, depending 
on which household income group received the remittances’, and Durand et al. 
(1996), Massey and Parrado (1998) suggest that for every US$ 2 billion in 
remittances that entered Mexico, there was over a US$ 6.5 billion dollar production 
increase in agriculture, manufacturing and services.  
 A widely cited study of Chami et al. (2005) however is more skeptical.  Using 
panel of data for 113 developing countries, the authors find that remittances have a 
negative effect on economic growth, after controlling for the investment/GDP ratio, 
regional dummies, and other control variables. The authors blame this negative 
association on the moral hazard problem remittances creates. They argued that 
receiving remittances might lower recipient households’ labor force participation or 
savings rates and limit their job search efforts.  
 Given the rather provocative results of Chami et al.’s 2005 study, a number of 
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scholars have reviewed their findings and expressed some reservations. Ozden and 
Schiff (2006), for example, note that a decline in labor supply because of remittances 
may actually lead to higher productivity, as shown by the study of Rozelle et al. 
(1999) and a much earlier study by Lucas (1987). Rapoport and Docquier (2006) also 
noted that Chami et al. (2005) disregard the possibility that remittances could affect 
investments and human capital formation. The latter was not even addressed in their 
analysis. 
 Interestingly, an IMF study using data covering 100 developing countries from 
1975 to 2002 finds strong evidence that remittances boost growth in countries with 
less developed financial systems. Remittances, in this scenario, provide an alternative 
way to finance investment, and thus act as a substitute for the very limited domestic 
financial system. The study, however, finds no similar effect on countries with well-
functioning domestic financial markets. 
4.4.5 Remittances and Macro-Economic Stability 
Remittances have also been characterized as a more stable and less cyclical form of 
capital flows, thereby enabling to lower the risk of macroeconomic instability in the 
receiving country (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2006).  The Report of the Inter-American 
Dialogue Task Force on Remittances, for example, emphasized how remittances 
promoted a “steadily increasing stream of capital” to Latin America and the 
Caribbean since 1998. The report notes:  
This contrasts with the extreme volatility of most other capital flows to 
the region. That volatility, incidentally, has been a prominent cause of 
Latin America’s erratic economic performance in the past decade and 
the origin of several devastating financial crises in the region. … In 
the past decade of great financial volatility in Latin America, 
remittances have become a vital safety net, particularly for the 
region’s poor citizens (Inter-American Dialogue, 2006, p.4).  
  
 Indeed, remittances have been found to rise when the recipient economy suffers 
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a downturn in activity or macroeconomic shocks due to financial crisis, natural 
disaster, or political conflict. By making up for foreign exchange losses due to these 
shocks, remittances may smooth consumption and thus play a part in maintaining the 
economic stability of recipient countries (Ratha, 2006).   
 A number of studies further revealed that a natural disaster, conflict, or 
economic downturns are followed by an increase in remittance inflows. Mishra 
(2005), for example, looking at 13 Caribbean countries from the period of 1980-2002, 
finds a 3 percent increase in remittances two years after a 1 percent decrease in real 
GDP. 
 Natural disasters in Bangladesh, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Honduras were 
also followed by an increase in remittance flows (Ratha, 2006). Yang’s (2005) 
empirical study finds that within a year of a hurricane, 13 percent of lost income is 
compensated by the increase in remittances. Within four years, this figure jumped to 
28 percent, a higher percentage compared to ODA and FDI that make up for roughly 
26 and 21 percent, respectively.  
 Remittances also responded positively to the financial crisis in Mexico in 1995 
and in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1997, following the East Asian 
Financial Crisis (Ratha, 2006). More recently, Bugamelli and Paternò (2006) find that 
remittances can help reduce the probability of current account reversals. The authors 
describe how the great stability and low cyclicality of remittances relative to other 
private capital flows made foreign investors less likely to suddenly flee emerging 
markets and developing economies113.   
 There are also evidences to show that remittances also respond to dramatic 
                                                
113 However, Bugamelli and Paterno (2006) emphasize that a threshold does exist. The 
mechanism they point to is much stronger when remittances are more than 3 percent of the 
GDP. 
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economic changes in recipient countries. As Ratha (2006) notes, remittances rose 
steadily in the Philippines during the early part of the 1990s, due to improvement in 
the investment climate only to become more volatile a few years later in the wake of 
the 1997 financial crisis. Similarly, as Turkey’s economy slipped into crisis in 1999 
and 2000, remittances decreased after a recording a steady increase in the early 1990s. 
The author however emphasizes that in both cases, the decline in remittances, and the 
volatility, was smaller than those of capital flows (Ratha, 2006).  
 However, one question that still remains is the sustainability of remittances over 
time. Recent studies have indicated that the long term flow of remittances depends on 
various factors such as the anticipated flow of migration, whether the migrants come 
alone or with their family, and how this changes over time (Solimano, 2004).  
4.4.6  Remittances and Exchange Rate 
 Large and sustained remittance inflows, like other sources of exogenous foreign 
exchange, such as official development assistance (ODAs) can cause an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate, making tradable goods production less competitive overall, 
and perhaps making low cost manufacturing unprofitable.  
 Although empirical evidence on this so-called remittance-led Dutch disease 
remains limited, Ratha (2006) noted the plausibility that this effect exists particularly 
in some small economies receiving large inflows of remittances. Amuedo-Dorantes et 
al. (2004) for example, find that a doubling of worker ’s remittances results in real 
exchange rate appreciation of about 22 percent in a panel of 13 Latin American 
countries. Likewise, Lucas (2004), looking into Albania and Moldova, describes how 
the massive inflow of remittances caused either a real appreciation or a delay in the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. 
 Other studies, however, conclude otherwise. Rajan and Subramanian (2005), for 
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example, find no systematic adverse effects on a country’s competitiveness resulting 
from remittances. Indeed, some experts contend that unlike natural resource windfalls 
and other cyclical flows, the Dutch disease effects of remittances should be less of a 
concern. Governments receiving large remittances can opt to allocate a larger portion 
of government expenditures on infrastructure and practice more liberal trade policies. 
Supposedly, these measures would tend to increase exports and also contribute to 
improved labor productivity and competitiveness (Ratha, 2006).  
 Whether exchange rate appreciation has a longer-term impact on growth, 
however depends on the consequences of the shift in the structure of the economy for 
savings, investment and productivity change. 
4.4.7  Remittance as a Source of Foreign Exchange 
 International data reveal that workers’ remittances are a major source of foreign 
exchange in many developing countries. Almost every discussion of remittances 
includes at least a reference to the fact that they make up for the shortfall in foreign 
direct investment, portfolio investment, and even exports in a number of developing 
countries.  
 Remittances contribute considerably to the balance of payments of a number of 
countries, especially in Africa. Ratha (2006), looking at 2004 estimates, notes that 
remittances were equal to about 6.7 percent of developing countries’ imports and 7.5 
percent of domestic investment. Remittances were also larger than public and private 
capital inflows in 36 developing countries.  
 Specifically, Ratha (2006) finds that remittance receipts were larger than total 
merchandise exports in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Gaza, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Kiribati, Lebanon, Nepal, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, and Tonga. They 
were even larger than the earnings from the most important commodity exports of 28 
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countries. For example, remittances dwarf FDI in Mexico, tea exports in Sri Lanka, 
and tourism receipts in Morocco (Ratha, 2006).  
 This aspect is analyzed further with respect to the case of India in the next 
Section (Section 4.5).  
4.4.8 Remittances and their Impact on Health and Education Outcomes 
 A few empirical studies have found positive linkages between migration, and 
remittances and education or health outcomes. Rapoport and Docquier (2005) 
reported that the remittances could have positive effects on the educational attainment 
of children from households with migrant members.  
 Hanson and Woodruff (2002), using Mexico’s 2000 Census data find that 
children in households with a migrant family member completed more years of 
schooling. Cox Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that in households with at least one 
family member living abroad in El Salvador, remittances significantly contributed to a 
reduction in the probability of children leaving school.  
 When Yang (2003) analyzed the impact of remittances on Filipino households 
he found that ‘a rise in remittances of 10 percent of initial income will increase the 
fraction of children, aged 17-21, attending school, by more than 10 percentage 
points’.  
 Remittances also play an important role if the public health care system is 
unable to provide universal health insurance or adequate treatment and preventative 
care. Lopez-Cordova (2004) uses a cross-section of all Mexican municipalities (over 
2400) in the year 2000 to look at the impact of migration on education and health 
outcomes. He finds that as the proportion of households receiving remittances rises in 
a community, developmental outcomes improve, ‘If the fraction of remittance-
receiving households increased by 5% points, starting from zero, infant mortality falls 
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by almost 5%, children’s school attendance rises by more than 3%, while illiteracy 
drops by 34%’. Similarly, Frank and Hummer (2002) reports a positive correlation 
between remittances and health profiles for Mexican households receiving 
remittances. They concluded that children born in remittance receiving migrant 
households are less likely to be exposed to health risks at birth.  
 Hildebrant and McKenzie (2005) found that the migration from Mexico to the 
United States improved child health outcomes in Mexico, resulting in lower rates of 
infant mortality and higher birth weights. An interesting finding of the authors’ 
research is that mothers in migrant households have more health knowledge than their 
counterparts in non-migrant households. They also find significantly higher levels of 
health knowledge among non-migrant households in high migration communities, 
supporting the hypothesis that knowledge spillovers exist within these communities. 
 A study by Kanaiaupuni and Donato (1999), however, finds acute infant 
mortality rates among communities with historically high record of emigration to the 
United States. Lopez-Cordova (2004), in looking at this study, however, warns that 
they only looked into 27 communities in five Mexican states. He further notes that the 
authors did not address potential endogeneity problems114. 
  From a development standpoint, the results of the aforementioned studies are 
clearly very promising. Since the increased investments in education and health 
contribute to human capital formation, it is likely that remittances may benefit 
developing countries’ long-term growth prospects. 
 
                                                
114 Indeed, endogeneity is quite a difficult challenge to overcome in studies aiming to 
establish causality. As Ozden and Schiff (2006) observed, “most studies in the literature 
suffer from a severe endogeneity bias.” In most cases, the direction of causality can be quite 
ambiguous. Studies that involve truly exogenous changes in migration or remittance flows are 
quite hard to come by. 
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4.4.9  Impact of Remittances on Poverty 
 The expansion of the remittance economy in the last decade or so has led some 
to question how these flows impact poverty reduction. There is growing evidence that  
remittances have reduced the incidence and severity of poverty in several low-income  
countries. Several studies are unanimous in this regard115.  
 In a widely cited study of 71 developing countries, Adams and Page (2005) find 
that a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances leads to a 3.5 
percent decline in the share of people living in poverty. Their results also indicate that 
the depth and severity of poverty were even more strongly reduced by increases in 
migration and remittances. They speculate, that the reason for the impact of 
remittances on poverty, independent of changes in mean survey income, may reflect a 
positive distributional bias in the targeting of remittances that is not captured in 
changes in the Gini coefficient, their measure of income inequality, due to the lack of 
frequency of household surveys on which the distributional data are based. An IMF 
study using a sample of 101 countries for the period 1970–2003 reflects similar 
findings (IMF, 2005). 
 A number of studies with a country or community-wide focus have yielded 
similar results. Taylor, Mora, and Adams (2005) using data from a 2003 survey, find 
that international remittances account for 15 percent of per capita household income 
in rural Mexico. Thus, they conclude that an increase in international remittances 
                                                
115 There is however a clear danger of unrestrained optimism concerning the potential of 
remittances to reduce poverty and inequality. The observation that remittances significantly 
contribute to income stability and welfare in developing countries does not necessarily imply 
that they contribute to poverty alleviation. This issue is related to the selectivity of migration. 
Because of the costs and risks associated with migration, it is generally not the poorest that 
migrate the most, and certainly not internationally. As migration is a selective process, most 
direct benefits of remittances are also selective and tend not to flow to the poorest members of 
communities (Centre for Development Research, 2002; Schiff 1994) nor to the poorest 
countries (Kapur, 2003). 
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would reduce both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. 
 Adams’s 2006 study on Guatemala likewise produced positive results. He finds 
that remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of poverty in Guatemala. 
However, he noted that the extent of poverty reduction is largely dependent on the 
measure of poverty used. For example, the inclusion of remittances in household 
expenditure actually increases the level of poverty by 1.6 percent if the poverty 
headcount measure is used. However, when poverty is measured by indicators 
focusing on the depth and severity of poverty, such as the square poverty gap, 
remittances reduced poverty by almost 22 percentage points (Adams, 2006). 
 Evidence outside of Latin America appears promising as well. Using a large 
dataset from the Overseas Filipino Survey, Yang and Martinez (2004) find that an 
depreciation of the Philippine peso during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to an 
increase in remittance flows, which then contributed to the reduction in poverty. Yang 
and Martinez surmised that the direct transfers from remittance-receiving households 
to households not receiving remittances as well as the overall increase in economic 
activity driven by remittance flows caused the broad decline. Indeed, they find 
spillovers to households without migrant members. 
 Maimbo et al.’s 2005 study on South Asia also finds that remittances clearly 
reduce the level of poverty once the estimated values for unofficial remittances are 
added to official remittance figures. Specifically, they find that, on average, a 10 
percent increase in total remittances reduce the poverty incidence by almost 1 percent 
(Maimbo et al., 2005). Given that unofficial remittances are more likely to be earned 
by the poor, the authors emphasized that the impact of remittance transfers could be 
underestimated if only official remittances are studied. This observation is argued to 
be particularly relevant to regions where large shares of remittance monies have 
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tended to flow informally, such as South Asia116. 
4.4.10  Impact of Remittances on Inequality 
 Evidence of the impact of remittances on income inequality remains 
inconclusive. Some studies argue that remittances may have had an equalizing effect 
as a number of studies on Mexico reveal (Adelman and Taylor, 1990; Taylor, 1999).  
Others, however, found either the opposite or no significant effect at all.   
 Using the 1991 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) as the main data 
source, Rodriguez (1996) finds evidence that remittances in fact worsen the income 
distribution in the Philippines. Saith (2006) analyzes the same FIES survey and also 
notes the “clear evidence that, at least as far as the direct effect of migration is 
concerned; the benefits accrue disproportionately to the richer regions, sectors and 
classes.” 
 Likewise, studies within the rural sectors of both Egypt and Pakistan reveal that 
remittances sharpen inequality. Adams (1991) finds that while the poorest quintile of 
Egyptian households produces a proportionate share of still-abroad migrants, the 
second and third quintiles are under-represented while the richest 40 percent of 
households produce more than their share. The under-representation of poorer 
migrants may reflect the high cost involved in financing international migration that 
then explains the lack of remittances sent to poor rural areas.  
  However, there are also some studies that find no significant effect at all. World 
Bank research in Guatemala and Ghana, for example, reveal that including 
remittances in household income resulted in only a “slight increase in income 
                                                
116 In a similar vein, Munzele (2005) used a cross-country data set composed of 71 developing 
countries to estimate a growth-poverty model and results shows that ‘official international 
remittances reduce poverty in the developing world’, but he finds that ‘in South Asia, official 
remittances have no statistical impact on the level and depth of poverty’. When he adds 
estimated values for unofficial remittances to official remittances figures, however he finds 
that total remittances reduce the level of poverty in South Asia. 
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inequality.” (Adams, 2006). De and Ratha (2005) likewise find that in Sri Lanka, the 
Gini coefficient, a measure of the inequality in income distribution within a country, 
drops from 0.46 to 0.40 as a result of remittance receipt.  
 Some scholars have hypothesized that remittances from new streams of 
migration may raise inequality in the short term. Eventually, however, migrants will 
come from a wider social spectrum as “network effects spread information about 
migration opportunities and lower the costs of moving.” In this long-term scenario, 
remittances can be equalizing (Lucas, 2003). Stark et al. (1986) in particular, argued 
that remittances would worsen inequality as long as international migration is 
confined to an elite few.   
 MacKenzie and Rapoport (2004) present a model with the same assumption and 
find empirical support in Mexico. Using two detailed data sets, they find that 
remittances reduce inequality for communities with relatively high levels of past 
migration. The relationship of remittances to economic inequality is, therefore, likely  
to vary over time, exhibiting some sort of a “trickle down” effect (Rapoport and 
Docquier, 2005). 
 Beyond the contradictory or inconclusive results, Ratha (2006) in a 
comprehensive study of remittances, also raised the question of whether the impact of 
remittances on inequality is “really that important.” He noted that inequality matters 
only when it interferes with the functioning of the economy and the political system 
and badly impacts social welfare. He notes:    
But it should be kept in mind that in the context of remittances, 
inequality relates to income differences among groups that would all 
be viewed as relatively poor in an industrial-country context. The rich 
in developing countries probably receive little in the way of 
remittances; the rich who migrate tend to take their families with them 
(Ratha, 2006, p.121).  
 
The above review of analytical and empirical literature on remittances and economic 
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development impacts does suggest that the impacts are time period and context 
specific. The review was by its very nature broad, and did not deal with many country 
specific nuances. It is therefore useful to analyze linkages between remittances and 
development for a specific country. India, a major remittances-receiving country is 
chosen as a case study (section 4.5).    
4.5  Remittances And Development: The Indian Context 
4.5.1  Measuring Workers’ Remittances in India 
 The statistics on remittances in India are compiled according to the guidelines 
set out in IMF’s balance of payments (BoP) manual and disseminated on a quarterly 
basis as part of the release of the data on India’s BoP. The disaggregated data on 
remittances are released on an annual basis in the article on “India’s Invisibles” in the 
RBI Bulletin.  
 The Reserve Bank of India treats remittances as “private transfers”. Private 
transfers are classified into four categories117: (a) inward remittances from Indian 
workers abroad for family maintenance; (b) local withdrawals/redemptions from non-
resident (NRI) deposits; (c) gold and silver brought through passenger baggage; and 
(d) personal gifts and donations to charitable and religious institutions in India. This 
presentation of the data is mostly in consistent with the definition of workers’ 
remittance as given in Balance of Payments Manual, 5th Edition (BPM-5). The items 
under (a) and (d) are compiled from the Foreign Exchange Transactions- Electronic 
Reporting System (FET-ERS) reported by the authorized dealers (AD) branches; 
information on (b) is compiled based on STAT-Returns, and (c) is compiled based on 
custom data. The information on compensation to employees is compiled based on 
FET-ERS, as well as from the information obtained from National Association of 
                                                
117 Refer to Table 4.5.  
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Software Computer Manufactures and Maintenance (NASCOMM).  
 In the Indian context, the workers’ remittances, placed in a broader framework, 
are also linked to export of a number of professional and business services which 
entail movement of natural persons to render such services abroad (Singh, 2005). 
Remittances by migrant workers also include repatriation of funds for family 
maintenance and local withdrawals from the non-resident Indian (NRI) deposits, 
which have grown in significance, which currently constitute about half of the 
remittance flows to India118.  
 In India, during the decade of the 1980s a number of instruments were designed 
to mobilize inward remittances from migrants by offering attractive returns, options 
for denomination in domestic/foreign currency, repatriability and liquidity (Jadhav, 
2004).  These are channelized through NRI deposit schemes, namely, Foreign 
Currency Non-Resident (Bank) Account and Non-Resident (External) Rupee 
Account. The inflows by way of NRI deposits subsequently assume the form of “local 
withdrawal” from these deposits denominated in Indian rupees (Figure 4.5). While in 
the ‘first lag’ of inflow, funds remitted form part of NRI deposits, in the ‘second lag’, 
the funds withdrawn locally get included as component of private transfers. Since the 
funds remitted by NRI’s through this channel are characteristically not different from 
worker’s remittances, the exclusion of such remittances from the statistics of worker’s 
remittances masks the actual magnitude of such remittances and their economic  
                                                
118 Indian banks have established NRI deposit accounts exclusively for NRIs. These deposit 
schemes, which the government of India authorized in the 1970s, have been used to attract 
foreign capital when the Indian government felt the need to shore up its foreign-exchange 
reserves. To make the accounts attractive, NRI depositors are given the choice of holding 
deposits in foreign currency denominations or in Indian rupees. Depositors in foreign 
denominations can “repatriate” (transfer abroad) their principal and interest in foreign 
currency when they choose. Thus, repatriable deposits are treated like a debt. On the other 
hand, RBI treats funds that NRIs locally withdraw from rupee-denominated deposits as 
remittances; to RBI, these transactions cease to be a liability and assume the form of 




































impact. The local withdrawal of NRI deposits denominated in rupees is reported 
through a separate reporting system outside the ITRS, where ADs submit monthly 
returns on details of these transactions. 
 
4.5.1.1 Mode 4 and Remittances - Compensation of Employees  
 
 Another form of BoP labour related flows to assess services delivered via Mode 
4 is compensation of employees, which comprise wages, salaries and other benefits 
(in cash or kind) earned by individuals for work performed for and paid by residents 
of new economies. Employees in this context include seasonal or other short-term 
workers (employed for less than one year) who have centers of economic interest in 
their own economy.  
 Discussions on setting up a statistical framework for the measurement of 
services rendered through the movement of natural person - Mode 4 is on its high in 
international forums. The objective of the framework is to obtain a more in-depth 
picture of the economic impacts of temporary movements of persons in the home and 
host countries as well as more reliable estimates of economic indicators, such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), remittances and by extension, Gross National 
Income (GNI) and Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI).  
 An underlying assumption under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) framework to measure delivery of services through Mode 4 is that the 
migrant workers’ remittances mirror the export of services. It may be noted that all 
the funds remitted by migrants are not treated as workers' remittance for the 
compilation of BoP. As per BPM-5, the money remitted by a migrant for the purpose 
of making a deposit in his or her account with a bank located abroad represents a 
financial transaction rather than a remittance. Such remittances may also be out of the 
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income the migrant received, for rendering a service and as such related to trade in 
services through Mode 4.     
 In India, receipts under the head ‘compensation of employees’ are recorded 
through the ITRS. These are also supplemented by a Survey of Unclassified Receipts. 
Payments are captured mainly through the ITRS.  However, India does not have a 
proper statistical system so as to classify the workers' remittance into various service 
categories based on the economic activities performed by the migrant workers. 
Therefore, a proper identification, classification and measurements of remittance 
repatriated by the migrant workers are a need of the situation under the GATS to 
assess the magnitude of services delivered under Mode 4.  
4.5.1.2 Data Issues: Some Policy Imperatives 
 
The compilation of data on workers’ remittances and compensation of employees in 
India are relatively comprehensive in nature and based on sound recording systems of 
the formal channels, which mainly relies on information on transaction data from the 
banking system. There are, however, some challenges that need to be resolved in 
order to further enhance the data reporting systems. These are outlined below.   
 First, progressive liberalization in foreign exchange transactions with easing of 
documentary requirements for the entities engaged in cross-border transactions has 
resulted in some deterioration in the quality of data reported.  
 Second, a major challenge emanates from the threshold for reporting the 
purpose of the transactions. While the trade and service transactions tend to be higher 
in value, the average size of a personal remittance transaction tend to be much smaller 
than the limit set for reporting the purpose of transaction. These are classified based 
on the survey results. Any biased reporting in the periodical surveys may affect the 
quality of remittance data.        
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 Third, under the extant regulations, a returning NRI is allowed to carry without  
Customs declaration amounts in cash component up to US $ 5,000 (or equivalent in 
other foreign currencies) along with traveller’s cheques with the sum total of the two 
aggregating US $ 10,000 or equivalent in other foreign currencies. NRIs may also 
bring any amount after declaring at the customs counter. Such inflows are difficult to 
capture statistically.   
 Fourth, similarly the goods brought by the returning workers in passenger 
baggage, except gold and silver, are not captured. Furthermore, at the Custom 
clearance, the goods brought in passenger baggage may be difficult to classify 
between the returning Indian tourists and the migrants.    
 Fifth, treatment of compensation of employees in country specific situations is 
also an issue. For instance, in the Gulf region, which is one of the important sources 
of remittances to India through unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the workers are 
generally employed on contract normally for a period of 2 to 3 years. Although these 
are essentially short-term contract workers, their compensation gets classified as 
remittances.  
 As indicated earlier, India does not have a requisite statistical system so as to 
classify the workers' remittance into various service categories based on the economic 
activities performed by the migrant workers. Therefore, a proper identification, 
classification and measurements of remittance repatriated by the migrant workers are 
a need of the situation under the GATS to assess the magnitude of services delivered 
under Mode 4.  
  The RBI has carried out steps towards maintaining a systematic data on foreign 
exchange transactions, in particular workers’ remittance. However, more initiatives 
are required to refine the existing statistical system. It may be in the lines of 
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supplementing the present reporting system, like periodical surveys among selected 
branches collecting detailed information, introduction of households surveys 
specifically for the purpose of collecting data on workers' remittance, etc. In addition 
to the above, maintaining a database relying on the information collected from Money 
Transfer companies is a need of the situation. Another very important statistical 
system to develop is regarding the migration statistics, which is vital for countries like 
India where enormous rise in the remittances (both inward and outward) has been 
observed. 
 Currently, three ministries in India deal with emigration-related issues - the 
Ministry of External Affairs is responsible for the issuance of passports for Indian 
citizens traveling abroad for any purpose; the Ministry of Home Affairs, through the 
Bureau of Emigration, maintains data sets on all persons leaving and entering India 
through legal channels; and the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, which aims to 
provide protection and welfare to emigrants, is responsible for providing clearance for 
foreign employment to less skilled workers. To date, the three ministries do not 
coordinate their activities, including data-gathering activities on emigrants from India.  
 In India, there is no NGO devoted to producing international migration 
statistics. The Centre for Development Studies (CDS), a research institute under the 
aegis of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, Government of India, has 
conducted several studies on the micro and macro aspects of international migration 
from Kerala during the past three decades, among other research projects. 
Recognizing the work of CDS on international migration, the Ministry of Overseas 
Indian Affairs has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to set up a 
Research Unit on International Migration with core funding for the period 2006-2011.  
 There is an ongoing effort to coordinate the database of inflows and outflows of 
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migrants from and to India by the Ministry of Indian Overseas Affairs. However, the 
Ministry has not been successful in the implementation of this project. The 
coordination of the three ministries dealing with international migration will be a 
major step in improving the database in India, in turn, aiding in informed 
policymaking. 
 
4.5.2  Trends in Private Transfers (Workers’ Remittances) in India and Its Role 
 in Macroeconomic Management 
 
 Large and growing cross-border remittances have emerged as an important 
aspect of India’s engagement with the world economy. With remittances from 
overseas Indians growing in size and assuming the shape of stable financial flows, the 
subject has been the focus of policy makers as well as academic researchers.  
Workers’ remittances have remained buoyant in recent years reflecting the 
favorable impact of macroeconomic outcomes, both domestically and globally. The 
surge in workers’ remittances to India, responding to oil boom in the Middle East 
during the 1980s, and the information technology revolution in the 1990s, has placed 
India among the highest remittance-receiving countries in the World. The demand for 
semi-skilled/unskilled labor from the Middle East started in the mid-1970s and 
peaked in the early 1980s, which was followed by the second wave since the mid-
1990s, led by the information technology boom. Thus, the labor migration pattern 
shifted from unskilled/semi-skilled labor to increasingly high skilled categories, 
mostly to America and Europe.  
4.5.2.1 Current Trends in Composition of Remittances in India 
 According to RBI figures, remittance inflows from overseas Indians increased 





Trend and Composition of Remittances to India, 1999-2000 to 2007-08 




Sources: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), “Invisibles in India's Balance of Payments”,  










The details of private transfers comprising those of remittances for Family 
Maintenance, Local Withdrawals from Non-Resident Rupee Account, Gold and Silver 
brought through Passenger Baggage, and Personal gifts/donations to charitable/ 
religious institutions are provided in Table 4.5.  
Remittances for Family Maintenance 
 The share of remittances repatriated by the overseas Indians for family 
maintenance, which contributed a significant share of remittance flows to India at 
about 60 per cent in 1999-2000 declined to around 42 per cent in 2005-06. 
Subsequently, however, its share increased and reached 50.4 per cent during 2007-08. 
Local Withdrawals from Non- Resident Rupee Deposit Schemes 
  Local withdrawals from non-resident rupee deposit schemes, as part of 
workers’ remittances, are the withdrawals from Non-Resident (External) Rupee 
Account [NR(E)RA] and Non-Resident Ordinary (NRO) Rupee Account by the non-
resident or his dependent for local use. Such local withdrawals/redemptions   from   
NRI deposits cease to exist as liability in the capital account of the balance of 
payments and assume the form of private transfers, which is included in the current 
account of the balance of payments. 
Although the average contribution of local withdrawals to total private 
transfers declined from 50 per cent in the first half of the 1990s to only 29 per cent in 
the latter half, a reversal in this trend has been witnessed in the recent period. Since 
2003-04, there has been relatively rising significance of the local withdrawal route as 
a conduit to remittance inflows to India (Table 4.6). The share of local withdrawals in 
the total private transfers increased to 43.5 per cent during 2007-08 as compared to 




Trends in Inflows and Outflows from NRI Deposits, Local Withdrawals and 





Sources: Reserve Bank of India (RBI), “Invisibles in India's Balance of 








The rising trend in local withdrawals could be attributed to higher income 
levels of migrants in the recent past as well as better domestic investment 
opportunities on the back of robust growth and relatively benign inflation conditions. 
Even under the current global financial and economic crisis, the gross inflows to NRI 
deposits and the steady trend in local withdrawals indicate that remittance inflows 
may be sustainable over the medium term. It may be noted that a major part of 
outflows from NRI deposits (constituting about 85 per cent, on an average) is in the 
form of local withdrawals from NRI deposits. However, during 2007-08, the share 
declined significantly to around 65 per cent reflecting higher outflows under the 
FCNR (B) accounts. 
Gold and Silver brought through Passenger Baggage 
 Under the liberalized policy for imports, the Government of India permits 
import of gold by certain nominated agencies for sale to jewellery manufacturers, 
exporters, NRIs, holders of special import licences and domestic users. Nominated 
agencies/banks were permitted to import gold under different arrangements such as 
suppliers/buyers credit basis, consignment basis and outright purchase. Thus, after 
1997-98 gold imports through passenger baggage by the returning Indians lost its 
importance as a conduit of remittance flows (Table 4.5).  
Personal gifts/donations to charitable/religious institutions 
In recent years, the inflows under this channel have also increased, albeit with 
some moderation in 2007-08. The money repatriated is predominantly donations to 





4.5.2.2  Role of Remittances in India’s Macroeconomic Management 
According to RBI figures, remittance inflows from overseas Indians increased 
to US $ 43.5 billion during 2007-08 as compared to US $ 30.8 billion in 2006-07 
(Table 4.7). The share of private transfers in the current receipts rose to 13.8 per cent 
as against 12.7 per cent during 2006-07. Private transfers continued to be around three 
per cent of India’s GDP since 1999-2000119, about one-tenth of global remittance 
flows, and helped in offsetting India’s merchandise trade deficit to a large extent120 
(Table 4.8, Figure 4.6).   
However, India’s dominant position in remittance receipts is a relatively 
recent one. From a modest $2.1 billion in 1990-91, remittance receipts rose to $13.1 
billion a decade later; and partially revised RBI estimates for 2007-08 suggests that 
since then they have more than tripled in a span of seven years (Table 4.7).  
Figure 4.6 traces remittance inflows into India over the period 1990-91 to 
2005-06. It exhibits how remittances have risen steadily in a span of 15 years, and 
dramatically in the preceding ten years preeceding 2005-06 (Figure 4.6)121. 
 
                                                
119 This is a sharp increase from the time when India embarked on the path of economic 
liberalization. Thus in 1990-91, cross-border remittances were only a modest $2.1 billion, 0.7 
percent of GDP. The impact of remittances is more pronounced in parts of the country that 
have experienced higher volumes of emigration. In the southern state of Kerala, for example, 
remittances constitutes close to a quarter of the state domestic product. 
120 India's current account balance has remained in deficit since Independence in 1947 except 
for few intervening years. The trade balance has always been negative owing to imports 
exceeding exports. In a developing country such as India, current account deficit is often seen 
as a policy choice to augment domestic investment - by supplementing domestic savings by 
foreign saving. One component, which has consistently lent considerable support to India’s 
balance of payments by financing trade deficit, has been workers’ remittances. The full 
impact of the merchandise deficit has not been felt on current account deficit because of the 
appreciable increase in invisible receipts over the years, especially through private unrequited 
transfers, mainly workers’ remittances.   
 
121 It is the remittance flows through formal channels, which are usually captured, in the 
recorded data. So the above figures tend to understate the magnitude of the flows. The 
importance of informal channels appears to have decreased over time due to competent 
exchange rate management (which reflects external value of the Rupee according to market 




Remittances to India as Share in Current Receipts and GDP, 1990-91 to 2007-08 
 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: RBI Bulletin December 1997, December 2004, 
January 2005, February 2007, "Invisibles in India's Balance of Payments." RBI 
Bulletin, November 2006, March 2009; Reserve Bank of India: "Handbook of 























The Role of Remittances in India's Balance of Payments 
 
  1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 
Private Transfers, net (US$ million) 8507 12854 24905 
             - as % of GDP 2.4 2.8 3.1 
             - as % of Merchandise Trade Deficit 74.9 103.2 46.7 
             - as % of Total Trade Deficit* 73.6 119.4 82.3 
             - as % of total household savings N.A. 13.9 15.8** 
             - as % of household financial savings N.A. 28.8 33.9** 
Foreign Direct Investment, inflows ((US$ million) 2144 4029 7751 
             - as % of GDP 0.6 0.9 1.0 
Foreign Portfolio Investment, inflows (US$ million) 2748 2760 12492 
            - as % of GDP 0.8 0.6 1.6 
Official Development Assistance (US$ million) 1739  1724 691** 
             - as % of GDP 0.5 0.4 0.1** 
Notes: *includes merchandise trade and services;  ** Figures are for 2004-05 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, Accessed: April 4, 2009, 
16:20 hrs; Reserve Bank of India (2006), Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 















India: Trends in Private Transfers, Trade Balance and Overall Balance,  




Source: Author, based on World Development Indicators (WDI) Online, Accessed: 













 The relative stability in such transfers122, compared to other capital account 
items such as NRI deposits, foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, has 
also enabled the containment of the current account deficit at modest levels through 
the 1990s. RBI (2006) notes that remittances recorded the lowest volatility measured 
by coefficient of variation after merchandise exports during the period 1992 to 2004 
vis-à-vis other components of current receipts such as income and services exports. 
Private transfers were also less volatile in relation to other capital account items such 
as NRI deposits and foreign direct investment and portfolio investment (RBI, 2006).  
In 2005-06, remittances exceeded the combined inflows from FDI (1 percent 
of GDP), foreign portfolio investment (1.6 percent of GDP), and foreign aid (0.1 
percent of GDP) (Table 4.8).    
In 2005-06, remittances financed nearly half of the merchandise trade 
deficit123; four-fifths of the total trade deficit; constituted about a sixth of total 
household savings and one-third of total household financial savings in India. 
Remittances emerged as the single largest contributor to net foreign exchange inflows 
in the country (Table 4.8). 
The above figures illustrate intricate linkages between cross-border 
remittances on the one hand and management of external sector imbalances on the 
other. They also suggest that remittances are an important component of household 
budgets and savings decisions. The manner in which these savings are channeled (e.g. 
                                                
122 The relative stability in private transfers reflected the steady increase in inward 
remittances for family maintenance and higher local withdrawals on the back of better 
domestic investment opportunities (Table 4.5). RBI (2006) attributes the relative stability of 
workers’ remittances to the low interest rate and exchange rate sensitivity of such flows.  
 
123 By 2008-09, merchandise trade deficit widened to $119 billion, while the remittances, 
while remittances were $43.5 billion in 2007-08. So, though time frames are not strictly 
comparable, it does suggest a lower share of remittances in financing India’s trade balance. 
However, inspite of the lower share, due to the sheer size of the trade deficit, the remittances 
remain critical for managing India’s prosperity.    
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whether in financial or physical form), and ultimate allocation of these savings has 
important implications for saving-investment intermediation efficiency, and therefore 
on efficient allocation of capital.  
 
4.5.2.3 India’s Comparative Position on Remittances 
 As outlined in the Introduction section of this essay, in recent years, there has 
been a significant increase in workers’ remittances particularly in developing 
countries. As indicated, according to latest available estimates, officially recorded 
remittance flows to developing countries were US $ 283 billion in 2008 in nominal 
terms.  
In real terms, however, remittances as a share of GDP of the recipient 
countries were expected to fall to 1.8 per cent in 2008 from 2.0 per cent in 2007. 
Given the uncertain outlook for global growth, commodity prices and exchange rates, 
the outlook for remittances remains uncertain.  
A cross-country comparison of the recent flow of remittances to developing 
countries reveals that at US $ 38.2 billion124, India was the leading remittance 
receiving country in the world during 2007 with relative stability in such inflows 
(Table 4.9).  
Several factors account for the remarkable increase in workers’ remittances in 
India. First, in the 1990s, migration to Australia, Canada, and the United States, 
increased significantly, particularly among information technology (IT) workers on 
temporary work permits.  
 
                                                
124 There is discrepancy between the remittance figures reported by the World Bank and the 
Reserve Bank of India. Notwithstanding the discrepancy, the relative position of India in 
global remittance flows remains unchanged. This essay uses RBI figures for India throughout 








^: Ranking is based on the data for 2007.  
* : Sourced from data on India’s balance of payments published in RBI Monthly 
Bulletin. 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of India (2009), "Invisibles in India's Balance of Payments." 














Second, the increase of migrants’ ranks coincided with structural reforms of 
the Indian economy since 1991125, including a market determined exchange rate, 
current account convertibility, spreading capital account liberalization, better 
incentives to send and invest money regulations and controls, as well as the 
information technology revolution and labor outflow from semi-skilled to 
increasingly the new stream of highly skilled migrants in technology sectors has 
enabled this phenomenon. The convenient remittance services provided by Indian and 
international banks have also shifted such remittance flows from informal hawala 
channels to formal channels (The Economist, 2008).  
Third, non-resident Indians have also responded to several attractive deposit 
schemes and the policy initiatives on this front. The deposit schemes for non-resident 
Indians with tax incentives and positive interest rate margins have also contributed to 
the inflows of remittances.  
However, with oil prices falling significantly and the advanced economies 
such as the US, Europe and Japan already into recession following the global 
economic crisis in 2009, the outlook for remittances into India remain uncertain at the 
current juncture (Appendix 4.1). 
4.5.2.4 Primary Source Regions 
 A survey prepared by the Department of Economic Analysis and Policy 
(DEAP), Reserve Bank of India in 2006 involving data collected through a random 
sampling of the bank branches across major centres in India126 revealed the following 
patterns of source regions (Figure 4.7). 
                                                
125 Ketkar and Rao (1996) provide an incisive discussion on India’s development policy 
imperatives in the current phase of globalization.  
126 These included the cities of Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chandigarh, Chennai & Pondicherry, 
Delhi, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Kolkata, Mumbai, Kochi. These cities are not only representative 
of the major remittances receiving cities in India, but are also the corridors for delivering 
remittances in the interior areas of the States. 
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Figure 4.7 
Remittance Inflows to India: By Source (2006) 
 
 




























1. North America is the most important source region of remittances to India 
(about 44 per cent of the total remittances). This is in line with the fact that 
the migration to North America (US and Canada) in software and other ICT 
related areas has been North America increasing and the average earning 
levels of migrants in such areas are relatively higher. 
2. The Gulf region accounts for an average 24 per cent of the total remittance 
inflows to India, with major source countries being UAE and Saudi Arabia. 
3.  The Asian region (Gulf and East Asia) together contributes about 32 per 
cent of remittance flows to India and emerge as the second most important 
region for remittances to India. 
4.  Europe, on an average, accounts for 13 per cent of the remittance inflows to 
India.  
5. Within the broad contours of remittance inflows to India, the remittance 
inflows pattern reveals that Kochi (Kerala) receives 56 per cent of the 
remittances from the Gulf region, while Bangalore, Hyderabad, Kolkata and 
Delhi receive a predominant portion their remittances from North America127 











                                                
127 These variations in sources of remittances are also indicative of the migration pattern. For 
instance, one-third of NRIs in Gulf countries are from Kerala, whereas for the latter group, 
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4.5.2.5 Utilization Pattern of Remittances in India: Evidence from RBI  
  Survey 
 
 RBI (2006) analyzes the possible end-use of the funds remitted by the overseas 
Indians to their families back home.  
 An analysis of the utilization of remittances sent by the overseas Indians reveal 
the following pattern (Figure 4.8):  
1. A predominant portion of the remittances received (54 per cent) is utilized for 
family maintenance, i.e., to meet the requirements of migrant families regarding 
food, education, health, etc. 
2. On an average, about 20 per cent of the funds received are deposited in the bank 
accounts. Relatively higher portions of remittances are put in bank deposits in 
centres such as Delhi, Chandigarh, Kochi and Mumbai.  
3.  About 13 per cent of the funds received were invested in 
land/property/securities.  
4. The regional pattern of investment in land/property/ equity shares reveals that a 
relatively higher portion (20-25 per cent) is invested in such assets in centres 
such as Bangalore, Jaipur and Mumbai (Table 4.11, Figure 4.9).   
 The issue of consumption versus investment enhancing effect of worker’s 
remittances is widely debated. Cross-country studies provide conflicting evidence on 
this issue and no consensus has been reached so far (Jadhav, 2003). Assuming the 
consumption bias of workers’ remittances, there is definite second round effect on 
investment as the rising consumption demand from the remittance-receiving 







Utilization Pattern of Remittances, 2006 
(Percentage share in Total Remittances) 
 














 Figure 4.9 
Utilization Pattern of Remittances for Family 
Maintenance and Investment in Property/Shares 
 

















 The significance of remittances to India (including local withdrawal from NRI 
deposits) can be visualized from the fact that these amount to more than 3 per cent of 
GDP. In the Indian context, since a significant portion of total remittance inflows 
from NRIs comes through the route of local withdrawal from NRI deposits, it would 
be safe to assume that these withdrawals might be getting transformed into domestic 
savings/investments. During the financial year 2006-07, such remittance inflows 
amounted to around 1.6 per cent of GDP (Table 4.5).  
 
4.6 Remittance Policy Imperatives for India 
Cross-border remittances represent a source of strength for India as well as a 
source of vulnerability.  To maximize India’s strategic leverage, policy measures 
should aim at to enhance the former, while mitigating the factors giving rise to 
vulnerability. Table 4.12 provides summary of broad policy objectives and measures 
to enhance the impact of remittances. More specific measures are outlined below.   
The analysis in the previous sections of India’s remittances and economic 
development linkages suggests several policy imperatives for the future: 
1. India needs to simultaneously pursue policies, which maintain robust 
remittance flows; better utilize them for enhancing trend rate of growth as well as for 
social development; and reduce dependence on them to finance uncomfortably high 
merchandise trade deficit, which was $119 billion in 2008-09. The robust remittance 
flows are however dependent on India being perceived as managing globalization in 
calibrated and inclusive manner, with due emphasis on visible improvements in the 





Summary of Policy Measures to Enhance the Impact of Remittances 
Objective Measure 
Capture a share of remittance for developing purposes Taxation of emigrants/Exit tax 
Duties or levies on remittances transfer 
Voluntary  heck-off for charitable purposes (on transfer 
forms) 
Stimulating transfers through formal channels and/or 
stimulating capital availability  
Remittances bonds 
Foreign currency accounts 
Premium interest rate accounts 
Promoting/enabling transfers through mircofinance 
institutions (MFIs) 
Promoting financial literacy / banking the unbanked 
Stimulating investment of remittances  
 
Outreach through MFI infrastructure 
Outreach through migrant’s service bureaus 
Tax breaks on imported capital goods 
SME schemes (financial, infrastructural, or innovative)1 
Productizing of Remittances 
Outreach to migrant collectives/ Hometown 
associations (HTAs)1 
Matched funding  
Public-private venture 
Competitive bidding for development projects 
Influencing consumption patterns 
 
Promoting consumption of local goods and services3 
Enabling migrants to spend on their relatives’ behalf 
Securing future remittances Promoting continued migration3 
Promoting transnationalism / diaspora management3 
Notes:  
1    Schemes to support small and medium enterprises.  
2   Migrant collectives can also benefit from policies for stimulating the investment of remittances, listed above.  
3 These are not policy measures in their own right, but require further operationalization.  
Source: Adapted from Carling (2004)
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2. For India’s economic development, it would be useful to encourage a 
revolving pool of workers at all levels working abroad for a period, and then bringing 
their skills and enterprise to their home communities. Paradoxically, the current 
global crisis, which will force some Indian migrants to return home, could provide 
such as opportunity. But this would require local and state economies where migrants 
return to provide an attractive environment where their skills and capital can thrive. 
Inter-state migration in India is high.  
India is already experiencing a shortage of manpower at all levels. This is 
therefore an ideal opportunity to urgently focus on augmenting the supply of 
employable manpower. Education and livelihood opportunities must be vastly 
expanded for all sections of Indians, without artificial and divisive restrictions; while 
ensuring merit-based demand for education from all sections of the society to be 
met128.  
3. In the short-run, concerted efforts are required to further reduce the transaction 
costs of remittances through formal channels by allowing more liberal norms of 
technology usage in sending remittances. This requires increasing the access and 
choice of the recipients to banking, and in general strengthening competition in the 
remittance industry. The public-sector banks, with a wide network of branches across 
the country, can play an important role in providing a cheaper, faster, and a safer 
alternative as they enjoy sufficient economies of scale and scope; and retain high 
degree of public trust from the general public.  Increasing partnerships of Indian 
banks and other financial institutions with their foreign counterparts is also having 
                                                
128 It is in the above context that education institutions at all levels must focus on increasing 
the supply while maintaining standards and integrity of the educational system. Those in 
charge of the managing and regulating national institutions such as the IIMs , AIIMS, and 
IITs must become more determined to enhance their autonomy and to sustain the brand value 
of their institutions. 
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positive impact on reducing transaction costs due to greater competition and use of 
technology. Such partnerships should be widened geographically so that greater 
proportion of Indians abroad can benefit.  As remittance cost decreases, the exchange 
rate offered by various financial institutions becomes more important. Exchange rate 
management, and hedging facilities and costs therefore have become more critical. 
Financial literacy on the part of the workers has also acquired greater importance.   
4. In the medium-term, efforts must be made to ensure that the size and 
composition of the Indian Diaspora increasingly reflects regional and global 
ambitions of its businesses and professional class. The Diaspora must be encouraged 
to become embedded in the recipient societies. This will also improve the quality and 
sustainability of remittance flows129.  
It is the steady deregulation and liberalization of the economy, along with 
greater confidence in competing with the rest of the world that has vastly expanded 
scope for Indian Diaspora and workers abroad. Uncertainties in political and 
economic management however can have adverse impact on the remittance flows. 
This in turn could increase the vulnerability of the economy.  The Indian workers 
abroad must be distinguished from those Indians who have settled abroad 
permanently. Both the groups are important for India’s development, but the 
strategies and incentive structures for each need to be different. 
                                                
129 In India, Non-Resident Indian (NRI) deposits have been one of the main sources of 
attracting savings of Indian migrants. Various NRI deposit schemes have been in place since 
1970. A series of incentives were provided including higher interest rates, exchange rate 
guarantees, repatriation facilities and exemption of wealth and income tax on the amount and 
interest. The incentives were provided mainly with a view to augment foreign exchange 
reserves and with this being achieved, many of the incentives have been withdrawn since the 
1990s (Varma and Sasikumar, 2005). One of the most important initiatives to attract the 
savings of Indian Diaspora has been through floating specialized bonds. Two such bonds, 
Resurgent India Bonds (1998) and the Indian Millennium Deposits (2000) raised US$ 4.2 
billion and US$ 5.5 billion respectively (Varma and Sasikumar, 2005). 
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India has taken the initiative to grant dual citizenship to its Diaspora in more 
than a dozen countries who recognize such an arrangement. The countries include, 
Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Cyprus, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. This policy has been driven by the desire to deepen and broaden the 
Indian diaspora’s linkages with India, while increasing migration and other 
opportunities for the Indian citizens (Rao, 2005) 
There is a strong case for adding breadth and depth to Indian Diaspora in 
many other countries and regions. As for example, the Indian Diaspora numbers less 
than 20,000 in Japan. As there are opportunities for diversification of global economic 
and security risk through much closer partnership between the two countries, 
substantially large Diaspora could assist in India’s leverage. Similar opportunities 
exist in other countries and regions such as Africa, particularly southern Africa and 
Nigeria, in Latin America, and Russia. 
 5. Out-migration, both domestic and international, does adversely impact on the 
availability of skills and enterprise in the originating communities.  Ideally, out-
migration should be for a shorter period by each cohort to minimize family and social 
disruption, and adverse economic impact. The originating communities therefore 
should take measures, which enable social and economic mobility, and improving 
quality of life. In addition, India needs to guard against potential moral hazard 
problems arising from remittances, and create conditions, which are conducive for 
fully utilizing the initiative, enterprise, and talents of out-migrants. 
6. Financial institutions have an important role to play in mobilizing savings in 
local communities. Financial intermediation services may involve providing improved 
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access to banking; more instruments to channel savings into physical and financial 
assets (including insurance and housing finance); and greater access to credit.  
Currently, financial intermediation is primarily limited to processing 
remittance transfers. Little emphasis is on transforming remittance senders and 
receivers into financial asset builders. There is a significant role of both public and 
private sector financial companies in this regard. Financial innovations designed to 
significantly reduce intermediation costs should also receive attention, and this will 
require combined efforts of all the stakeholders. 
7. In addition to improving financial access generally, micro-finance institutions 
could be used to channel some of the remittances into access to credit for businesses. 
It is estimated that micro-finance institutions in India need around US$50 billion to 
satisfy demand, but only a tenth of that amount has been attracted so far. The RBI’s 
goal of improved financial access to most of India’s population should be given great 
impetus (Asher and Vasudevan, 2008). 
8. Grassroot migrant organizations130 or Home Town Associations (HTAs) 
should be encouraged to pool their resources for investing collectively in income-
generating activities in their respective communities in India. 
9. Rapid inflow of remittances has been one of the factors, albeit relatively 
minor, in contributing to the appreciation of the Indian rupee vis-à-vis US dollar131. 
                                                
130 Home Town Associations (HTAs) are generally voluntary associations of migrants to 
achieve specified social and philanthropic purposes. The derive their name from the fact that 
in many cases the migrant communities that form them come from the same geographical 
area. HTAs residing in the US, France and Africa support community development projects in 
the home country. Donations by HTAs are often as much or more than the municipal budget 
for public works of the municipalities from which the members are drawn, particularly in 
towns with small populations (Orozco, 2003). A few governments have offered matching 
grants for remittances from diaspora groups or home-town associations to attract funding for 
specific community projects. The best-known of these matching schemes is Mexico’s 3-for-1 
program, under which, the local, state and federal governments all contribute $1 for every $1 
of remittances sent to a community for a designated development project. 
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More efficient hedging instruments and financial engineering has therefore become 
essential.  
10. Remittances represent the most direct and observable benefit from 
international migration. Therefore, it is important for India to ensure that Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs) with other countries or regional groups should incorporate 
movement of natural persons. In negotiating economic agreements with countries 
with very low fertility rates such as Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore, there are 
obvious mutual benefits in exploring easier but well-structured manpower flows from 
India. 
11. Relatively easy availability of remittance financing has perhaps 
subconsciously weakened the resolve to pursue export-expanding policies. This is 
particularly evident in slow progress in reducing logistics, infrastructural, and 
bureaucratic constraints on making India’s export more competitive and in 
broadening, deepening, and diversifying India’s export market.  
12. External conditions for sustained large flows of remittances are favorable, but 
there are many other countries, which plan to expand out-migration from their 
countries. In 2008, China and Mexico for example, received only slightly less 
remittance than India, and in 22 countries, remittances exceeded a tenth of GDP. 
Sustaining India’s current share of about one-eighth in total global remittance flows 
will therefore pose challenges for all stakeholders.  
13. It is time for more concrete low-key private and public initiatives to enhance 
the size, depth, and sophistication of Indian Diaspora. This will not only sustain the 
                                                                                                                                       
131 The combined effect of inward flows, including portfolio investments (in March 2007, the 
cumulative value was US$ 52 billion at cost price and US$ 119 billion at market price out of 
total market capitalization of US$850 billion); and FDI (in 2006-07 it jumped sharply to US$ 
16 billion) has complicated the exchange rate management for the Central Bank as well 
individuals and businesses 
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flow of remittances, but also widen and deepen Indian Diaspora’s contribution to 
rising India.  
There are many organizations, which facilitate networking among overseas 
Indians, and some of which engage in policy dialogues with Indian policymakers. 
Annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, which brings together Indian policymakers and 
Diaspora should be more forward-looking in deliberating on extending Diaspora’s 
reach and strength rather than be a lobbying forum for concessions to the Diaspora. 
Ultimately, it is Diaspora’s resources, skills, and embeddedness in their respective 
countries, which can provide win-win opportunities for all.  
India must pursue policies along the lines outlined above to maximize its 
strategic leverage from remittances. It is imperative that remittances should be 
analyzed in a much wider context of overall policies for economic and social 
development. Political leadership and vision, paucity of which is felt in various key 
decisions taken recently, is crucial for better management of India’s remittance 
earnings. 
14. There is much scope of innovation in the sphere of linking remittances, Diaspora, 
and development objectives. Productizing remittances provides a real development 
opportunity by moving beyond the transaction itself to addressing how these transfers 
are managed. There have been several private initiatives in countries like Nepal, 
Philippines, and Mexico to move beyond mere cash-to-cash transactions by 
identifying situations where the desired final output is not cash, but acquisition of 
tangible products and services132. Such initiatives are instructive, and have much 
potential in the Indian context. The public sector banks in India can take a lead role in 
                                                
132 See Box 4.2 on such initiatives.  
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encouraging such initiatives in product development and delivery process in which 
remittances are directly turned into the value for which the money is intended.  
15. With the backing of the U.S. and Mexican governments, Mexican Consular 
Identification Cards (CICs) issued in the U.S. are becoming an accepted form of 
identification for opening U.S. bank accounts – thus introducing irregular migrants to 
the formal financial sector.  Mexican officials have successfully negotiated with 
banks and transfer agencies in the U.S. so that from December 2001, 15 banking 
institutions and their branches allow migrants from Mexico, whether legal or illegal, 
to open bank accounts on presentation of identity cards provided by the Mexican 
consulates. Migrants’ relatives at home can then use the ATM cards to withdraw 
funds for about USD 3 per transaction – far less than the usual money transfer fee 
(Russel, 2002). Such initiatives are instructive, and Indian policymakers can negotiate 
similar agreements with key countries that attract and employ Indian workers.  
14. It is however important to stress the most important measure the government 
can take to stimulate remittance flows and realize its development potential is to 
create a sound policy environment that minimizes macro-economic uncertainty and 
ensures the transparency and standard regulation of financial institutions. 
Governments need to pursue sound monetary policies – including correctly valued 
exchange rates, ensuring a positive real interest rate and, liberalize foreign trade.  
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
 Remittances are one of the most visible and beneficial aspects of how 
international migration is reshaping the countries of origin. In a variety of settings 
they are quietly transforming societies and regions and are the most manifest example 
of self-help undertaken by poor households in the global arena. 
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 Given current global trends, the world will witness many changes in the next 
two to three decades. Migration pressures are expected to rise with growing 
demographic and economic differences. Both sending and receiving countries are 
beginning to realize that the volume of resources currently being channeled through 
immigrant communities will continue to grow, and that public policies must be jointly 
developed to increase the development impact of both migratory movements and the 
remittances they generate.  
 Remittance flows are complementary to the poverty reduction, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction objectives of development assistance in 
developing countries. It is therefore unsurprising that both developed and developing 
countries are beginning to search for ways to increase the development impact of 
financial transfers between host and origin countries. 
 Given their importance, rigorous data and research on the effects of remittances 
is surprisingly limited, in stark contrast to the substantial body of literature on the 
other principal sources of development finance - foreign aid, flows from the Bretton 
Woods institutions, and foreign direct investment and private debt flows.  
 However, the long-term impact of remittances may be more questionable, 
especially if few productive assets are being created. Thus, it would appear that 
remittances are a better instrument to address transient poverty, which arises due to 
shocks whether at households or national level, rather than structural poverty. To 
alleviate structural poverty, broad economic transformation may still require external 
financial resources in the form of budgetary support to governments in many poor 
countries.    If remittances were to become the principal mechanism to transfer 
resources to poor countries, it would require more liberal, open-door immigration 
policies in industrialized countries. 
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 An analysis of India’s global remittance experience suggests that to enhance the 
developmental impact of remittances, India should try and get a better handle on the 
magnitudes and sources of these flows through domestic efforts and international 
cooperation.  
 In contrast to the massive effort devoted to monitoring and managing foreign 
aid flows, policymakers have devoted little attention to these flows. This involves 
creating a spatial mapping of Indian overseas communities, not just by country but 
specific geographical location. This would allow financial intermediaries to better 
target these communities. Moreover, they should, with the efforts of international 
financial institutions, get more robust data of remittance outflows from sending 
countries. This would allow them to cross-check inflows, similar to what is currently 
done in trade flows.   
  Increasing the long-term productive impact of remittances in India would 
require promoting greater competition and using a carrot and stick approach to 
increase the penetration of formal financial intermediaries, especially banks, in areas 
with higher levels of emigration. This is especially the case if the propensity to save is 
higher among remittance-receiving households than in others. This would suggest that 
the presence of an extensive network of financial intermediaries in these areas, could 
help leverage remittances for broader economic development. For one, it could help 
augment national savings rates. Remittances could also be used to underpin mortgage 
markets, or securitized as future receivables to augment foreign credit ratings (Ketkar 
and Ratha, 2001).  
 Indian policymakers also need to more actively monitor and regulate labor 
market intermediaries, who often fleece potential migrants. Intermediaries lubricate 
flows, but can also divert a substantial stream of income to themselves.  
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 The Indian government has tried to increase remittances by offering various 
preferential schemes under the capital account. Such preferential treatment, such as 
tax-free status, inevitably leads to round tripping. Instead policymakers should direct 
their efforts to the financial sector.   
 Finally, they should be aware that active government attempts to encourage or 
require investments of remittances are unlikely to have significant economic benefits. 
The best way for recipient country governments to ensure that a greater proportion of 
remittances are utilized for productive investments (rather than simply consumption) 



















Impact of Global Financial Crisis on Remittance Flows to India 
 
 
The impact of the financial crisis that originated in the US has been visible across 
countries, both directly and indirectly. While the advanced countries including the US 
are already into recession due to the credit crunch, developing countries, including 
India, have been impacted through both trade and capital flows. There are also 
apprehensions about workers’ remittances and NRI flows to India slowing down as a 
consequence of global financial crisis and the recession in major advanced economies. 
There is a perception that the recession induced rising job losses in the US and Europe 
could fall more on migrants workers. Even if there is no lay-off, workers would often 
have to accept lower wages as employers worldwide are seeking to cut costs in an 
attempt to cope better with the financial crisis. Fears have also been expressed in 
several quarters about the reverse migration of Indian laborers working in the Gulf 
countries, which could result in a decline in remittances and NRI deposits in India. 
The construction industry in the Gulf region, especially in the UAE, is facing a tough 
time due to the global meltdown and has left millions of construction workers with an 
uncertain future. Furthermore, declining oil prices, by reducing incomes of workers in 
the Gulf countries, could also lead to reduced remittances flows to India. A study was 
conducted by the Reserve Bank of India with the help of its Regional Offices to 
analyze whether there has been any reverse migration and consequent slowdown in 
remittances. 
 
 Although there is no official data/information available on the job losses 
suffered by migrants residing in the Gulf countries, the findings of the study revealed 
that there are no indications about workers from the Gulf region returning to India. 
Further, informal discussions with some of the bankers in different states/region 
indicate that the Banks do not have any authentic information on the issue and have 
not noted any trend in reverse migration. However, based on informal discussions 
with select Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), it was gathered that a lot of Indians as well 
as people from other nations are losing jobs in UAE, mainly in the construction 
industry, where companies are attempting to reduce their expenses. It was understood 
that companies are re-tendering for many projects as the rate of all construction 
materials has come down. As the construction sector has also been affected, workers, 
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sub-contractors, manufacturers of all related goods have been affected. However, 
most of the lay-offs have affected people who were working at the entry level or 
lower level executives. 
 Based on the information collected from regional offices of the Reserve Bank, it 
was observed that so far there was no slowdown in the inward remittances. This could 
be attributed to a number of factors as noted below. 
 
   1. As inward remittances depend upon the interest differential and the exchange rate 
movement, due to the rupee depreciation in the recent period, there has been a 
significant rise in inflows, particularly through the rupee denominated NRI accounts 
such as NRO and NR(E)RA schemes. 
 
   2. Furthermore, the hikes in the interest rate ceilings on NRI deposits since 
September 2008 to LIBOR/ Swap rate plus 100 basis points in case of FCNR(B) and 
LIBOR/Swap rate plus 175 basis points in case of NRE deposits have increased the 
interest differential in favor of India. This along with the weakness of the rupee vis-à-
vis the US dollar, some of the remittances might have been attracted towards India 
which probably might have masked the adverse impact on inward remittances to 
India. 
 
   3. The variation in the NRI deposits from the Gulf is generally in response to the 
cyclical movement in international oil-prices. 
 
 However, while advanced countries are officially into recession due to the 
ongoing global financial crisis, increasing fears are being raised about its impact on 
the growth prospects of Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). Against this backdrop, 
a quick recovery is not in sight. In fact, the latest IMF forecast in January 2009 
suggests global growth to reach 0.5 per cent in 2009, its lowest rate since World War 
II (it was 3.4 per cent in 2008). Simultaneously, the main stimulus to global growth is 
excepted to come from India and China, which are expected to grow by 5.1 per cent 
and 6.7 per cent, respectively in 2009 (7.3 per cent and 9.0 per cent, respectively in 
2008).  
  
 With North America accounting for nearly 44 per cent of the total remittances to 
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India, followed by the Middle East (24 per cent) and Europe (13 per cent), some 
slowdown in remittances due to the global financial crisis and the associated 
contraction in economic activity cannot be ruled out. According to the World Bank 
estimates (November 2008), remittances from the Gulf region, the livelihood for 
millions in South Asia and the developing world, could decline by 9 per cent in 
nominal dollar terms during 2009 as compared to a rise of 38 per cent witnessed in 
2008, while global remittances to developing countries is estimated to fall by 0.9 per 
cent (against an increase of 6.7 percent to US $ 283 billion in 2008). 
 




Innovative Approaches to Link Remittances, Diaspora, and Development 
 
Going beyond simply cash-to-cash funds transfers, “productizing of remittances” is an 
approach that looks at the value chain of money flows to identify situations, where the 
desired final output is not cash but the acquisition of tangible products or services. It 
is a product development and delivery process in which remittances are directly 
turned into the value for which the money is intended.  
 The benefit of this approach is its greater economic impact compared with 
traditional cash remittances. The cost of the money-transfer element of the transaction  
to the sender is virtually eliminated, thus increasing the buying power of the 
remittance. Furthermore, the sender maintains more control over the use of the 
remittance, thus lowering waste and misuse of the money. 
 The productized remittance approach can also give senders more options for 
managing their money, including financial services such as bank-based savings 
accounts, loan-based purchases, and access to capital.  
 There are many examples of how intermediary businesses have productized 
remittances in various parts of the world, particularly in Asia and Latin America. 
Thamel.com, a part of Thamel International, caters to more than 2 million Nepalese 
diaspora around the world. Through its platform, members the Nepali diaspora can 
purchase products and services in Nepal for themselves or for their friends and 
families, and also be eligible for loans - financed by Kumari Bank Ltd in Nepal—for 
housing, small businesses, education, or investments. For example, a Nepalese 
migrant working in Qatar can qualify for a loan to purchase a vehicle for a spouse 
residing in Nepal. 
 By making the payment for the vehicle through Thamel.com, the spouse can 
afterward drive and operate the vehicle as a taxi in the streets of Katmandu. In 
addition, there is no money transfer fee associated with loan payments.  
 Aryty (www.aryty.com), a telecommunication company based in the United 
States, serves the Filipino diaspora. Through its website, the diaspora can remit pre-
paid airtime to friends and relatives back in the Philippines. Aryty users are not 
sending money; they are simply sending pre-paid airtime to the recipient’s phone.  
 Similarly, multinational cement giant CEMEX enables Mexican immigrant 
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workers to send building materials instead of cash to their families back home. 
Another company serving the Mexican diaspora is Infinity Systems International 
(ISI), which provides Mexican immigrants with an alternative means of transferring 
hard-earned funds to family members in Mexico for basic needs such as food, 
clothing, household items, medical care, pharmaceuticals, infant care items, and 
housing. ISI’s Tarjeta Más™ Program allows immigrants to send money in the form 
of a stored-value gift card to family members or friends, thus cutting out the 
remittance middleman and directing the funds to specific areas of need.  
 Productizing remittances provides a real development opportunity by moving 
beyond the transaction itself to addressing how these transfers are managed. 
Therefore, intermediary businesses operating the remittance-based platform, such as 
those discussed above, are motivated to find new ways to add value and offer new 
products and services to the remittance sender. Understanding remittance senders’ 
needs and developing the relationship between remittances and potential local 
business development are critical if remittances are to provide optimal economic 
results for the remittance sender and receiver, their community, and their country.  
 



























This thesis has centered around three distinct yet related essays on the international 
migration phenomenon. The Introductory Chapter provided the context, and a brief 
overview of intellectual debates on international migration. This was followed by the 
three essays. The advantage of essay-style thesis is that it has allowed identifying and 
addressing various contemporary aspects of international migration, involving the 
multi-disciplinary lens of public policy. 
The first essay analyzed the complex interrelationships between globalization, 
demographic trends, and international migration; and the potential impact that the 
forces of globalization and demography might have on the current migration policy 
paradigm in the developed world. The essay used available aggregate data from 
multilateral sources, and undertook an analytical descriptive macroeconomic 
approach to outline the policy implications that arise from the complex interplay of 
globalization, demography, and migration policy and management in the 
contemporary world. 
 The analysis concluded that from a public policy perspective, there is no 
single solution to the complex issue of population ageing and immigration. Measures 
to respond need to be comprehensive, and could include raising the age of retirement, 
reassessment of pension and health-care benefits, encouragement of labor force 
participation of women, facilitation of technological innovation among others.  
 The analysis also contended that while migration will not solve all of the 
challenges created by current and projected demographic trends, and that policy 
makers need to consider migration as one part of a policy response package, a more 
pragmatic view of the immigrants’ contributions to the economy and society is 
warranted.  
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 The public policy implications of the interlinkages between globalization 
phenomenon, demographic trends, and international migration in Essay 1 represents a 
new contribution to the public policy literature.  
The second essay focused on relatively neglected area of return migration. A 
detailed empirical evidence-based analysis of return migration in the Indian state of 
Kerala was undertaken to better understand its dynamics and impacts.  
The essay examined the dynamics of return migration in Kerala from two 
specific aspects. First, it utilized the two state-wide surveys to map the detailed profile 
of the return migrants, including their employment and occupational patterns. It also 
examined whether there has been occupational mobility (sectoral and sub-sectoral) 
among the return migrants, before emigration, and after return. This is important 
because such mobility is one of the avenues through which migration could bring 
about a structural transformation of the economy. The study found strong evidence of 
occupational mobility among return migrants, establishing that the act of emigration 
has been instrumental in bringing about industrial redistribution of workers in the 
State. 
Second, the essay analyzed various policy initiatives, which the Central and 
State governments need to pursue to enhance the contribution of return migrants to 
Kerala’s overall economic and social development.   
While not examined in detail in the essay due to the limited scope of the 
surveys, the analysis appeared to suggest that if the “Kerala model” is to be sustained, 
the state will need to implement innovative and business friendly policies which 
permit return migrants (as well as current migrants) to utilize their savings and their 
entrepreneurial and professional abilities for developing the state, as well as India. 
Social entrepreneurship, i.e. meeting social needs through capitalist means, could be 
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particularly relevant in this regard. This could be an important area for future 
research.  
Also, the two surveys around which the essay is centered do not sufficiently 
capture the extent to which the state of Kerala has been able to retain the talents and 
savings of the returned migrants. A hypothesis, which deserves to be investigated, is 
that in the absence of a conducive environment, Kerala may lose return migrants to 
other states in the country (such as Gujarat), which provide greater economic 
opportunities and amenities. Globalization has underscored the fact that no country or 
region can wholly depend on its own talent and capital. Therefore, the policies to 
retain and enhance the existing talent, and attract new talent are essential, even for the 
most developed and high-income countries.  
 The case study of return migration phenomenon in Kerala, based on primary 
survey data, represents an important contribution to the migration literature, 
particularly concerning India. The public policy implications of return migration have 
become even more important as the current global economic crisis is expected to lead 
to increasing return migration.  
The third essay examined public policy imperatives of remittances and their 
impact on economic development, with particular reference to India, which has been 
among the largest recipient of remittances over a considerable period. The essay 
surveyed the broad channels through which remittance flows can impact on 
intermediate goals of economic development such as macro-economic stability, 
efficiency, savings and investment intermediation, and household capital formation. 
 A noteworthy finding is that until recently remittances in India exceeded direct, 
portfolio investments, and foreign aid combined. Remittances have also helped 
finance India’s persistently large trade deficits, thus assisting in macroeconomic 
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stability. It underscored the need to find practical and feasible ways to use the 
remittance flows for meeting urgent infrastructure and social sector needs; and the 
need for public policies to design innovative means to increase the developmental 
impact of both migratory movements, as well as the remittances they generate.  
  Essay 3 applies global experiences and theoretical insights concerning the role 
of remittances in economic growth and macroeconomic management for the Indian 
case. To my knowledge, such comprehensive and integrated analysis has not been 
undertaken previously. 
 The current global economic crisis, arguably the severest in more than seven 
decades has increased the urgency of addressing various issues arising from 
international migration. The crisis is too recent, and its future contour is still 
uncertain. Therefore, only anecdotal evidence is currently available. The uncertainty 
about the macro-economic cycle, and whether the global economic recovery will be 
“V”, “W”, “L” or some other shaped does not however alter the broad demographic 
trends, and fundamental technological and other factors shaping the current phase of 
globalization.  
As the essays in the thesis suggest, these factors are interrelated, and they 
impact international migration as well as are impacted by it. The issues surrounding 
international migration will therefore require continuing attention of the 
policymakers, researchers, and other stakeholders. Regional and global cooperation, 
and bilateral and multilateral understanding and agreements (such as totalization 
agreements covering social security taxes of cross-border workers, and agreements 
pertaining to working and living conditions of low- and semi- skilled foreign workers) 
will also assume added importance. These however need to be structured 
appropriately, for which rigorous policy-oriented research, and sustained official 
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interest will be essential. Remittances also need to be linked with micro-finance and 
social entrepreneurship. These represent areas for further research, which is context 
specific and is based on sound empirical data and ground realities. 
Countries involved in international migration, both as suppliers and as 
recipients, particularly the developing countries, need to consider giving greater 
priority to developing indigenous policy-relevant research capabilities, and supporting 
databases.  
Finally, the analysis in this thesis strongly underscores the need for more 
robust and timely databases. This is the task of both the national and the state 
governments, as well as international organizations. While the United Nations, the 
World Bank, the OECD, and other organizations have been devoting increasing 
efforts to regularly harmonizing, documenting, and disseminating data at an 
aggregative level for large number of countries, there is however considerable scope 
for improving the robustness and disaggregation of the data to make them more 
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